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This dissertation examines the interaction between American social movements as
they pursue their constitutional rights.  The public law literature is dominated by a top-
down approach to the study of constitutional politics, frequently focusing on the impact
of Supreme Court decision-making.  Instead, I explore constitutional politics from the
bottom-up, analyzing constraints on social movement organizations as they formulate
their constitutional strategies.  Social movements must always be keenly aware of the
actions of their peers who also seek to exploit the Constitution for their own benefit.  My
findings indicated that social movements recognize this competitive relationship with
other social movements and treat their fellow constitutional claimants accordingly, acting
to contest claims unfavorable to their cause, co-opt claims of other groups that have
shown promise, and even form coalitions with their peers where an adjustment of their
own claims to accommodate their coalition partners will likely net a greater return than
going it alone.  These negotiated constitutional claims have resulted in significant,
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Chapter One:  Introduction
In March 2004 a group of black pastors from the Atlanta area condemned
comparisons being made by advocates of the gay rights movement between the gay rights
movement and the civil rights movement, particularly on the issue of same-sex marriage.
In a letter to the Georgia General Assembly, the pastors argued that “[t]o equate a
lifestyle choice to racism demeans the work of the entire Civil Rights Movement.”1  They
have not been alone in rejecting the analogy between the evils of discrimination based on
race and discrimination based on sexual orientation. In an editorial in the Daily Standard
in 2006, a black pastor from Massachusetts accused the gay rights movement of hijacking
the civil rights legacy, with a “brilliant playing of the race card,” in order “to exploit the
rhetoric of civil rights to advance the goals of generally privileged groups, however much
they wish to depict themselves as victims.”2
This type of cooption of past constitutional success, and its attendant backlash, is
commonplace among social movements in America today. Success breeds imitation,
whether the imitated find it flattering or not.  The civil rights movement is not alone in
serving as a template for success. Mark Henkel, the founder of an evangelical polygamy
organization, pointed out to a Newsweek reporter in 2006 that, “if Heather can have two
                                                 
1 Michael Foust, Atlanta: Black Pastors Rally to Oppose Same-Sex 'Marriage' (Baptist Press, Jan. 28
2004); available from http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=17941.
2 Eugene F. Rivers and Kenneth D. Johnson, Same-Sex Marriage: Hijacking the Civil Rights Legacy
(NewsCorp, Jun. 1 2006); available from
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/285fhdqe.asp. Of course this view is
not universally held within the modern civil rights movement.  Coretta Scott King spoke often in favor of
gay rights and of the linkage to the civil rights movement and her husband’s legacy.  “Homophobia is like
racism and anti-Semitism and other forms of bigotry in that it seeks to dehumanize a large group of people,
to deny their humanity, their dignity and personhood," King told a Chicago audience in 1998.  "Coretta
Scott King Speaks at the Palmer Hilton," Chicago Defender, Apr. 1 1998.
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mommies, she should also be able to have two mommies and a daddy.”3   Although the
gay rights movement has not yet won a decisive victory on marriage, polygamy
advocates have pushed the envelope of the social and constitutional successes the
movement has won thus far.  Lawyers in Utah plan to use the precedent set in the 2003
sodomy case, Lawrence v. Texas,4 which established that individuals have the right to
engage in private, sexual conduct without undue government intervention to advance
legal protection for polygamous relations.5   Not surprisingly, gay rights activists are less
than thrilled at such analogies, although opponents of gay civil rights happily make the
connection for the public.6  According to the public affairs director for Gay and Lesbian
Advocates and Defenders, Carisa Cunningham, she “frankly would not love to see an
article [about polygamy advocacy] in Newsweek because this is the connection that our
opponents make and we feel it’s a specious one.”7
The tensions over the familiar incidents of strategic cooption illustrated above
highlight the inherently competitive relationships that exist between American social
movements.  We are accustomed to recognizing the tensions between direct social
movement competitors, movement versus countermovement, abortion rights movement
versus pro-life movement etc., but it is easy to overlook the competitive posture of
movements that do not promote mutually exclusive beliefs or policies, movements that
are simply peers rather than opponents.  Nonetheless, these peer movements will often
                                                 
3 The organization is TruthBearer.org. See Elise Soukup, "Polygamists, Unite!," Newsweek, Mar. 20 2006.
4 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5 The case was dismissed by Utah’s Federal District Court and is currently under appeal.  See Bronson v.
Swensen, 394 F.Supp 2d. 1329 (2005).
6 Former U.S. Senator Rick Santorum gained notoriety in 2003 for making just such connections for the
public between requiring protection of homosexual behavior leading to requiring protection of polygamy,
adultery, incest, or bestiality in an interview with the Associated Press. The Associated Press (AP),
"Excerpt from Santorum Interview," USA Today, April 23 2003.
7 Soukup, "Polygamists, Unite!."
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struggle with each other to amass and maintain the resources necessary to accomplish
their goals for social and constitutional change leading to conflict between them.
This conflict, however, should not be a surprise.  Winning constitutional rights
requires substantial resources, and social movements representing the interests of
marginalized groups or unpopular ideas are rarely resource rich.  The organizations and
individuals active in a social movement must be opportunistic in capturing and
conserving the resources needed to force constitutional change, and these resources,
which can include anything from money, to manpower and membership, to expertise, to
public legitimacy, to political clout, to institutional access, to exploitable public policy
(existing laws, regulatory enforcement, or interpretive precedents), are limited.
Resource competition between, or possibly within, social movements that are
peers rather than opponents does not always manifest as strategic cooption, or poaching,
of resources created and/or possessed by others.  Cooperative strategies to share
resources, such as coalition, are possible where actors share compatible beliefs or policy
goals. Where the beliefs or policy goals of social movements are incompatible, strategic
contestation by one movement to preempt resource capture by another movement may be
necessitated. This tactical choice for dealing with resource competition, be it coalition,
contestation, cooption or something else, will impact the narrative crafting of
constitutional claims by social movements and their selection of an appropriate forum for
those claims. 8
In this dissertation, I build off this insight about peer resource competition in
order to provide a fuller depiction of the politics that shape social movements’
constitutional demands, demands which in turn influence and inform American
                                                 
8 I will discuss resource competition and its implications for social movements’ constitutional strategies in
much greater depth in Chapter Two.
4
constitutional development.9 In particular, I focus on the constitutional politics of social
movement competition during the Progressive and Inter-War Eras, which served as the
seedbed for the significant transformation of the Constitution that would occur during the
New Deal Era.  I examine the constitutional demands, to determine the effects if any of
peer resource competition on those demands, of five social movement organizations
across three major American social movements active during this period in their fight to
secure the economic advancement of workers within their ranks.  These movements are
the women’s movement, the civil rights movement and the labor movement.  From the
women’s movement, I examine the impact of resource competition on the strategies of
the Women’s Trade Union League (WTUL) and the National Consumers’ League (NCL).
From the civil rights movement, I examine the impact of resource competition on the
strategies of the National Urban League (NUL) and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).  From the labor movement, I examine the
impact of resource competition on the strategies of the American Federation of Labor
(AFL).  By studying the politics that shaped the constitutional insurgency10 of women,
African-Americans, and labor during this period, I offer previously overlooked insights
into constitutional development, as well as fresh perspectives on many of the closely held
disciplinary narratives of constitutional scholars regarding the reconstruction of the
Constitution during the New Deal, particularly the academic preoccupation with Lochner
v. New York.11
                                                 
9 I use the term politics here in the general sense of indicating the activities and/or interactions of groups or
individuals who seek some form of power within a system.
10 I am indebted to James Gray Pope for the characterization of social movements as constitutional
insurgents.  See James Gray Pope, "Labor's Constitution of Freedom," Yale Law Journal 106 (1997).
11 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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CONTRIBUTING TO POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
Social movements are worthy objects of constitutional inquiry.  They impact
constitutional development in several ways and at several junctures.  Their members file
lawsuits that bring cases before the courts, enabling ongoing judicial interpretation of the
Constitution.12 For example, the twentieth century litigation campaigns of the NAACP
were instrumental in prompting the Supreme Court to alter their reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment to mandate school desegregation13 and prohibit racially restrictive covenants
in housing.14  Social movements not only bring calls for constitutional change before the
courts through litigation, but also recommend the shape of that change through legal
filings and oral arguments, including the extensive use of amicus briefs that allow
movements to have a say in a broad array of constitutional cases.15
Social movements also attempt to affect the political and ideological make-up of
the federal judiciary, thereby influencing constitutional decision-making. Their members
lobby the president and the Senate in order to ensure the appointment of federal judges
friendly to their cause or defeat candidates who may prove unfriendly to their interests.
For example, liberal interest groups, including elements of the women’s movement,
fought successfully against the confirmation of conservative jurist Robert Bork to the
Supreme Court in the 1980’s.
                                                 
12 Federal courts do not issue advisory opinions.  An injured party must bring a claim to their attention.
The case or controversy requirement is one of the first things taught in any class on judicial politics or
constitutional law.
13 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
15 For a discussion of the use and importance of amicus briefs before the Supreme Court, see Gregory A.
Caldeira and John R. Wright, "Amici Curiae before the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How
Much?," Journal of Politics 52 (1990), James F. II Spriggs and Paul J. Wahlbeck, "Amicus Curiae and the
Role of Information at the Supreme Court," Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 2 (1997).
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The courts do not have sole control over the direction of constitutional
development, thus social movements also look beyond the courts to trigger constitutional
change.  In addition to participating in electoral politics, social movement organizations
also lobby Congress and the executive branch, and politically mobilize their members,
political parties and the wider public, in order to force constitutional change through
legislation, bureaucratic enforcement, or occasionally the passage of constitutional
amendments.  Movements have frequently succeeded in these political attempts to force
constitutional change.  For example, the civil rights movement did not rely simply on the
litigation campaigns of the NAACP.  Civil rights groups also worked diligently to ensure
passage of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, which proved to be a significant
vehicle for federal protection of civil rights as Congress pressed the limits of both its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power and its broad regulatory power under the
Commerce Clause.  In another example of politically based constitutional success,
elements of the women’s movement worked tirelessly to compel the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to fully enforce sex equality in the wake of its creation in the
1960’s.  Finally, groups within the temperance movement managed to use political means
to constitutionalize prohibition with the passage and ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment.
Social movements also engage in protest and social activism that targets both
public opinion and elite opinion in order to change perceptions about constitutional
meaning and constitutional possibility.  Movement activists have demonstrated great
constitutional creativity in the past, willing if the resources are there to forward new and
often controversial interpretations of the Constitution despite adverse authority.  In this
7
way social movements are constitutional Protestants.16  Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel
suggest that social movements can spur the kind of political contestation necessary to
cause constitutional principles to become “unstuck.”17  Social movements push the
constitutional envelope, advocating fresh interpretations of the Constitution, that often in
concert with major socioeconomic or technological changes in society, point to a
widening gap between constitutional principles and practice that may spur constitutional
elite to action.18  In essence, social movements, through persistence, can alter our
constitutional culture, which in turn may set the stage for constitutional change.  Reva
Siegel points to the effect of such persistent activism on constitutional culture and elite
constitutional interpretation with the effects of the women’s movement’s ERA struggle
on the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in the 1970’s.19
Despite this vital connection between social movement activism and
constitutional development, the great bulk of constitutional scholarship, both by political
scientists and legal scholars, has focused on what Robert Post and Reva Siegel call the
“juricentric Constitution,” where constitutional interpretation is treated as the proper
province of the judicial branch and where judges are viewed as the principle architects of
constitutional change and development.20  Scholarly reflection on constitutional
                                                 
16 Sandy Levinson distinguishes between constitutional Catholics, who accept authoritative constitutional
interpretations, and constitutional Protestants, who embrace the possibility of multiple constitutional
interpreters and interpretations.  See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1988), Sanford Levinson, "Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two
Questions for Michael Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics," Georgetown Law Journal 83 (1994).
Hendrik Hartog points to the ability and the history of social movements to imagine and pursue
constitutional visions that are in conflict with governing precedent.  See Hendrik Hartog, "The Constitution
of Aspiration and the Rights That Belong to Us All," Journal of American History 74, no. 3 (1987).
17 Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, "Principles, Practices, Social Movements," University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 154 (2006): 928.
18 Ibid.: 928-30.
19 Reva B. Siegel, "Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case
of the De Facto Era," California Law Review 94 (2006).
20 Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, "Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions
on Section Five Power," Indiana Law Journal 78 (2003).
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interpretation and constitutional politics tends to be court-centered, either in challenging
the underlying bases of judicial decision-making, or in examining the effects and the
legitimacy of acts of judicial review in a democratic polity.21  Scholars are not alone in
confounding constitutional law with constitutional development.  The Rehnquist Court
was a particularly strong proponent of the juricentric Constitution, frequently asserting
judicial supremacy and reserving for itself the role of telling the rest of the government
and the people what the Constitution means.22
Perhaps because of this coinciding right turn in constitutional interpretation and
increase in institutional fervor by the Supreme Court, the role of non-judicial actors in
constitutional politics and their contribution to constitutional development has received
increased scholarly attention in recent years.23  “Popular constitutionalism” has been
coined as the name to represent this growing body of constitutional scholarship that
                                                 
21 Judicial behavior, the legitimacy of judicial review, and the impact and enforcement of judicial decisions
have all been important areas of study for constitutional scholars in both the legal and the political science
academies.  Political scientists interested in judicial behavior have challenged long-held assumptions in the
legal academy about the apolitical and legally expert bases of judicial decisions.  The legitimacy and
specialized contributions of judicial review, by unelected officials in a democracy, fervently argued for by
constitutional theorists, are challenged if judicial decision-making is personalized or politicized.  For a
leading exemplar of this type of scholarship, see Jeffrey Allan Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme
Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press,
2002). Political scientists have also concentrated on the legitimacy of judicial review in a democracy, the
so-called countermajoritarian difficulty, by probing the incidents of judicial independence of the reigning
coalition.  Most scholarship suggests that such judicial independence is rare and short-lived.  For two early
classics in this line of scholarship, see Robert A. Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker," Jourrnal of Public Law 6 (1957), Robert G. McCloskey, The American
Supreme Court, The Chicago History of American Civilization. ([Chicago]: University of Chicago Press,
1960). Judicial impact has been another significant source of scholarship.  See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The
Hollow Hope : Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991).
22 Larry Kramer accuses the Rehnquist Court of pursuing an exaggerated form of judicial supremacy that
he dubs “judicial sovereignty.”  See Larry D. Kramer, "The Supreme Court, 2000 - Term Foreword: We the
Court," Harvard Law Review 115 (2001): 127. Post and Siegel point to the recent dilution of congressional
authority over the Fourteenth Amendment by the Court.  See Post and Siegel, "Protecting the Constitution
from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power." While Rachel Barkow considers the
Court’s emasculation of the political question doctrine, particularly in the wake of the 2000 presidential
election.  See Rachel E. Barkow, "More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy," Columbia Law Review 102 (2002).
23 Dale Carpenter, "Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents," Constitutional Commentary 20 (2003).
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centers on the People, in their many forms, and their elected representatives.  Popular
constitutionalism seeks to recognize the role of the People and of politicians in the
constitutional process, and for those scholars normatively inclined, to restore the People’s
contribution to constitutional interpretation, development and enforcement.24 Some
studies have focused on the contribution of the political branches to what Keith
Whittington calls “constitutional construction.”25  Other scholars, like Bruce Ackerman
and Sandy Levinson and Jack Balkin, have focused on the popular legitimation of
significant constitutional change authored by the courts through either “constitutional
moments” or “partisan entrenchment.”26
Constitutional scholars have also become increasingly interested in social
movements, and their influence on constitutional development.  William Forbath and
James Gray Pope both examine the constitutional strategies and rhetoric of the labor
movement.27  Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel together point out that social movements,
                                                 
24 For a thorough canvassing and explanation of the popular constitutionalism literature, see Doni
Gewirtzman, "Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia and the True Nature of Constitutional
Culture," Georgetown Law Journal 93 (2005). For two leading contributions to this literature, see Larry D.
Kramer, The People Themselves : Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004), Mark V. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1999). For the philosopher’s perspective, see Jeremy Waldron, Law and
Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
25 Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction : Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).  For attention to constitutional interpretation by
Congress, see Louis Fisher, "Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress," North Carolina Law
Review 63 (1985), Bruce G. Peabody, "Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A
Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes," Law and Social Inquiry 29 (2004). For attention to
constitutional interpretation by the executive branch, see Risa L. Goluboff, "The Thirteenth Amendment
and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights," Duke Law Journal 50, no. 6 (2001), Keith E. Whittington,
"Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy and the Politics of Constitutional Meaning," Polity 33
(2001). For a general survey of American constitutional development beyond the courts, see Neal Devins
and Louis Fisher, The Democratic Constitution (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
26 Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1991), Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, "Understanding the
Constitutional Revolution," Virginia Law Review 87 (2001).
27 William E. Forbath, "Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship," Michigan Law Review 98, no. 1 (1999),
William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1991), William E. Forbath, "The Ambiguities of Free Labor - Labor and the Law in the
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through creative and sustained constitutional contestation, alter the meaning of
constitutional principles and push constitutional elites to change constitutional
practices.28  Balkin and Siegel, in their independent work, each outline the impact of the
women’s movement at different junctures on constitutional development.29  William
Eskridge argues that law and legal actors are critical to understanding the dynamics and
the goals of identity politics by social movements.30  Michael Klarman’s recent book
provocatively challenges accepted understandings about the legal strategies of the civil
rights movement and both the power and the limit of the law as an engine of social
change.31
I contribute to this growing popular constitutionalism research agenda in two
ways.  First, by focusing on the activities of social movement organizations, I explore
constitutional development through the lens of popular forces demanding change, rather
than through the more commonly employed elite lens that privileges the actions and
beliefs of lawyers, judges and other constitutional elite in explaining constitutional
development. Second, by rooting my study of constitutional development in the actions
                                                                                                                                                  
Gilded Age," Wisconsin Law Review, no. 4 (1985), Pope, "Labor's Constitution of Freedom.", James Gray
Pope, "The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American
Constitutional Law, 1921-1957," Columbia Law Review 102 (2002).
28 Balkin and Siegel, "Principles, Practices, Social Movements."
29 Jack M. Balkin, "How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the
New Departure," Suffolk University Law Review 39 (2005), Siegel, "Constitutional Culture, Social
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto Era.", Reva B. Siegel, "She the
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family," Harvard Law Review 115,
no. 4 (2002), Reva B. Siegel, "Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement
Perspective," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150, no. 1 (2001).
30 William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law," University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 150, no. 1 (2001), William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Some Effects of Identity-Based
Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century," Michigan Law Review 100, no. 8
(2002).  This positive view of law’s centrality to social movement activity is challenged by Tomiko Brown-
Nagin, who argues that social movements are more likely to achieve their goals outside the constraints of
law and lawyers.  See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, "Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of
Affirmative Action," Columbia Law Review 105 (2005).
31 Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial
Equality (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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and the agendas of social movement actors themselves, I do not limit myself to the study
of constitutional development that occurs through courts.  Social movements rarely limit
their calls for constitutional change to a courtroom.  Scholars may be enamored with the
juricentric Constitution, but activists cannot afford to be so limited in selecting forums for
their constitutional demands.  Thus I provide a wider-ranging analysis of constitutional
development than typically offered, by exploring constitutional politics and change from
the bottom up.  I trace the competitive mediation of demands of constitutional advocates
that might be levied anywhere and before any constitutional arbiter.  By starting with the
construction of a constitutional claim, rather than the authoritative evaluation of a
constitutional claim after its submission, I can provide a fresh perspective on
constitutional development, one that embraces broader constitutional politics.
Even where past constitutional scholarship has embraced the activities of social
movements and their relationship to constitutional change and development, these studies
have tended to lack serious attention to social movement theory.32  I correct for this
inattention by explicitly grounding my research in that theory.  I also provide a level of
analytical precision in evaluating social movements that is typically absent in such work
                                                 
32 Michael W. McCann, "Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives," Annual Review of Law
and Social Science 2 (2006): 17-8.  But see Edward L. Rubin, "Passing through the Door: Social Movement
Literature and Legal Scholarship," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150 (2001).  This is not to say
that there has not previously been theoretically grounded work on law and social movements.  The legal
mobilization approach to law and social movements began to blossom in the 1990’s.  I do not draw
significantly from this literature because it has not been previously oriented towards explaining
constitutional development.  Michael McCann provides an excellent review of the legal mobilization
literature.  See McCann, "Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives.", Michael W. McCann,
"Mobilization of Law," in Social Movements and American Political Institutions, ed. Anne N. Costain and
Andrew S. McFarland (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).  A few quick points about the legal
mobilization research agenda.  Legal mobilization scholars embrace a more capacious  understanding of
law than traditionally studied.  They are interested in law not only as institutions and personnel, courts and
lawyers, but also as ideology, as norms transmitted to and mediated by the community. Marc Galanter,
"The Radiating Effects of Courts," in Empirical Theories About Courts, ed. Keith O. Boyum and Lynn M.
Mather (New York: Longman, 1983), 127, E. P. Thompson and Great Britain., Whigs and Hunters : The
Origin of the Black Act (London: Allen Lane, 1975) 258-69. Law therefore can be mobilized by popular
forces both formally and informally.  Frances K. Zemans, "Legal Mobilization - the Neglected Role of the
Law in the Political-System," American Political Science Review 77, no. 3 (1983): 700.
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on constitutional development.  I will discuss the application of social movement theory
to this project in much greater depth in Chapter Two.
STUDYING THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, AND THE
LABOR MOVEMENT DURING THE PROGRESSIVE AND INTER-WAR ERAS
Peer resource competition between social movements is always occurring so long
as multiple social movements are active in the political system, therefore, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to fully explore the impact of this competition on
constitutional development within the confines of a dissertation.  Far too many
movements have been active over far too long a period of time to undertake a
comprehensive review.  Therefore I will limit my study to the constitutional activities and
interaction of the women’s movement, the civil rights movement, and the labor
movement during the Progressive and Inter-War Eras, which stretched roughly from the
1890’s through the 1930’s and the constitutional reconstruction of the New Deal.33
I have selected these social movements for examination because they represent
three of the longest-standing and most active social movements in American politics.
They are touchstone social movements.  Each has been active in at least some
rudimentary form since the early days of the American Republic.  Ideologically-based
movements have come and gone, and new populations have arrived on American shores
over the years demanding integration into the political system, but these three populations
                                                 
33 Assigning years to mark the beginning and end of the Progressive Era is a difficult proposition.  There is
no universal consensus by scholars on when this period began and ended.  Many mark the start of the era
with the beginning of Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency in 1901, while other scholars mark the opening of
the period with the economic turbulence of the 1890’s.  Similarly, the end of the era is also subject to
dispute.  Some scholars mark the end of the period with the advent of World War I in 1914, while other
scholars extend the era into the 1920’s.  I am taking the widest possible view of this period by studying the
years from 1890 through to the late 1930’s.
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have, either in their own name or through their champions, presented social and political
challenges to the American system since its formation and remain active today.  The
women’s movement began to take significant form when women began to cut their
activist teeth on participation in the abolition movement, but the desire for improvement
of the social and political lot of women had been manifest since the birth of the nation,
famously illustrated by Abigail Adams’ plea to her husband to “remember the ladies” in
the founding of the new government.34   The civil rights movement began as
abolitionism, which was already in its infancy during the Revolutionary period, but
would eventually transition after the Civil War and Reconstruction from a predominantly
white antislavery movement to a predominantly African-American black rights
movement.  The labor movement has also been a permanent fixture in American politics.
Workers played an important role in the Revolution, and the earliest forms of organized
labor, guilds and trade societies, had already begun to proliferate at this time.
Since these movements have all been active, and have frequently interacted,
across the full sweep of American history, I have limited the scope of my study to only
one historical period where women, African-Americans, and organized labor found
themselves competing for constitutional change – the Progressive and Inter-War Eras.35  I
have selected this historical period as the focus for my social movement study for a
variety of reasons.  First, the Progressive and Inter-War Eras were marked by an
                                                 
34 Writing to her husband, John, while he was away serving in the Continental Congress, Adams requested
the following:  “By the way, in the new code of laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make,
I desire you would remember the ladies and be more gracious and favorable to them than your ancestors.”
John Adams, Abigail Adams, and Charles Francis Adams, Familiar Letters of John Adams and His Wife,
Abigail Adams, During the Revolution (New York,
Cambridge,: Hurd & Houghton;
The Riverside Press,, 1876), xxxii, 424 p.
35 These three movements have constitutionally intersected at several points, including abolition, the
attempted exploitation of the Fourteenth Amendment in its early years, the battle for civic inclusion and
economic survival in the Progressive Era, the period of integration into the welfare state following the New
Deal, and the capitalization on new equality commitments won in the 1950’s onward.
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acceleration and maturation of social movement activity.  It was, after all, a great period
of reform.  As Charles Epp explains, the Progressive Era saw the establishment of the
support structure necessary for large-scale legal mobilization.36  This support structure
developed from the modernization of law schools and the social sciences, and an
increasingly politically active middle class, that began to engage more fully with
movement causes through professions such as social work.  Numerous organizations,
including the organizations I study in this dissertation, were established during these
years to pursue social movement interests, bringing a new structure and level of
organized commitment to social activism that provided the roots for modern social
movement activity.37  This proliferation of highly organized social movement actors
provides a rich source of cases for studying peer social movement resource competition.
Second, the Progressive and Inter-War Eras witnessed tremendous social
upheaval, which was the product of a number of historical factors including rapid
industrialization and the reconstruction of capitalism, scientific advancement, the
destabilization of world politics and the threat of socialism and communism, and large-
scale urban migration and immigration.  Robert Wiebe refers to the America of the late
nineteenth century as a “society without a core.”38  This social dislocation pushed calls
for reform, and social movements stepped up their activities to deal with the pressures of
this turbulent period.  Social movements, including my case movements, would demand
significant social and political change on multiple fronts, including civic inclusion,
economic security, civil liberties, and the battle against corruption and other social ills
                                                 
36 Charles R. Epp, "External Pressure and the Supreme Court's Agenda," in Supreme Court Decision-
Making: New Institutionalist Approaches, ed. Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 277.
37 The NCL and the WTUL were established in 1899 and 1903 respectively.  The NAACP and the NUL
were established in 1909 and 1910 respectively.  The AFL was established in 1886.
38 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920, [1st ed. (New York,: Hill and Wang, 1967) 12.
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such as alcoholism.  This variety in movement causes only enhances the possibility of
significant interaction and competition between movement organizations, making this a
fruitful period for study of resource competition.
Third, due to the pressures of social, demographic and economic change, the
government, particularly the courts, had difficulty adjusting to meet the new social and
political realities of a modernizing America.  The resulting public frustration, with the
courts and even the Constitution itself, was manifest among both mass and elite.39 George
W. Alger wrote dramatically in the Atlantic Monthly in 1913 that, in years past, the
“courts were the ‘Palladium of our liberties,’ the ‘Guardians of the Ark of the Covenant.’
To-day the public attitude has largely changed.  These phrases are no longer current.  The
people are dissatisfied with the guardians, and in some quarters there is dissatisfaction
with the ark itself.”40  With the courts weakened as an institution, this created an
opportunity for movements to push for significant constitutional change both before the
courts and, more importantly, in front of emboldened legislators.
Finally, beyond this acceleration in both social movement activity and in the
public urgency for social change, the Progressive and Inter-War Eras represented a period
in constitutional history where no social movement had yet won a significant
constitutional victory.  There was no enticing previous model for constitutional success to
co-opt, thus competitive relationships between movement organizations would be marked
by a great deal of creativity and variety, in contrast to what we are accustomed to seeing
today with large-scale cooption of the civil rights equality narrative, making this a
particularly interesting period for the study of movement competition.
                                                 
39 Formalism came under fire during this period with the rise of legal realism.  See Morton Gabriel White,
Social Thought in America; the Revolt against Formalism (Boston,: Beacon Press, 1957).
40 George W. Alger, "The Courts and Legislative Freedom," Atlantic Monthly, March 1913, 345.
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Given the tremendous structural change and turbulence of the period and the
escalation in both the need and the demand for major constitutional change to
accommodate a radically changed America, it is not surprising that the early years of the
twentieth century proved to be the seedbed of a new constitutional order that was put into
place with the New Deal.  This reconstruction of the constitutional order makes the years
leading to this change inherently interesting to constitutional scholars, and the most
interesting constitutional feature of this period to constitutional commentators has long
been the ascendance and subsequent repudiation of the jurisprudence of what has become
known as the Lochner era.  Julie Novkov refers to Lochner v. New York as the case that
launched a thousand law review articles.41  This is hardly an exaggeration.  For
constitutional scholars, Lochner has long been the archetypical case illustrating a
dangerously activist judiciary.  An out-of-control court that, so goes the disciplinary
narrative, was eventually broken by political pressure with the famed “switch in time that
saved nine” that came in 1937 with the ruling in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish that
repudiated Lochner and marked the end of judicial obstruction of the new constitutional
order that was developing around the New Deal.42
In Lochner, the Supreme Court struck down a New York law that limited to sixty
the number of hours bakers could work per week.  The law was intended to protect the
health and safety of bakers, but the Supreme Court ruled that the law improperly
                                                 
41 Julie Novkov, Constituting Workers, Protecting Women: Gender, Law, and Labor in the Progressive
Era and New Deal Years (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001) 3.
42 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Frustrated by the Supreme Court’s persistent obstruction of the New Deal, Franklin
D. Roosevelt proposed the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1937, which would permit the president to
make a supplemental appointment to the Supreme Court for each justice over 70.5 years of age with at least
ten years of experience. This bill was a thinly veiled assault on the power of the elderly, conservatives on
the Supreme Court. Although the bill never passed, Roosevelt got his way. Justice Owen Roberts switched
away from his previously obstructionist position by voting in favor of New Deal measures beginning in
West Coast Hotel. This “switch in time that saved nine” by Justice Roberts has been famously attributed to
the institutional and political pressure of Roosevelt’s court-packing plan. For a colorful investigation of the
court-packing plan and its influence on judicial history, see Michael Ariens, "A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix
the Cat," Harvard Law Review 107 (1994).
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interfered with the right of individuals to freely make employment contracts.  No such
right to what would become known as liberty of contract is clearly stated in the text of the
Constitution, however the Supreme Court reasoned that the liberty guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause included protection of a right to negotiate
contracts for labor unmolested by the state.43  This ruling stopped progressive efforts to
win passage of protective labor legislation in state legislatures around the country in its
tracks.
Outrage was immediate, and not only from reformers but also from constitutional
commentators.  The Lochner majority was pilloried, even from within the decision itself.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his famous dissent, accused his brethren of unprincipled
behavior in service of laissez-faire economics by deciding the case, “upon an economic
theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. … The 14th Amendment does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”44  Subsequent scholars would echo
Holmes’ frustration and would paint the Court as an intruder into the legislative sphere,
manufacturing rights that reflected their own upper class bias and their political
affiliations.45  According to William M. Wiecek, Lochner became the “negative
touchstone” of modern scholarship for discussing malfunctioning courts that substitute
their own preferences for those of a legislature, violating the sanctity of the separation of
                                                 
43 The Due Process Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows: … nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law …
44 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
45 For an extensive review of this neo-Holmesian assessment in constitutional scholarship, see Howard
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged : The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1993) 3-4. Some early examples of this literature include Alfred Hinsey
Kelly and Winfred Audif Harbison, The American Constitution, Its Origins and Development (New York,:
W. W. Norton, 1948), Carl Brent Swisher and Edward McChesney Sait, American Constitutional
Development (Boston, New York [etc.]: Houghton Mifflin company, 1943).  A more recent illustration of
this characterization of the Lochner Court can be found in Paul Kens, Judicial Power and Reform Politics:
The Anatomy of Lochner V. New York (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1990).
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powers, or put another way, Lochner is the emblem for courts that make law rather than
interpret it.46
Many scholars have pushed back against this negative depiction of the Lochner
Court.  Revisionist accounts of Lochner have been popular and have focused primarily on
two issues.  First, some scholars, right in the wake of the outcry against the Court, zeroed
in on the level of Supreme Court commitment to liberty of contract jurisprudence during
this period, suggesting that Lochner was something of an outlier for the Court and that
angst over judicial activism during this period is overblown.47  Second, other scholars in
more recent years focused on the degree to which liberty of contract jurisprudence was
drawn from legitimate and significant legal traditions, suggesting that the majority did
not craft liberty of contract from whole cloth.48
                                                 
46 William M. Wiecek, Liberty under Law: The Supreme Court in American Life, The American Moment
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988) 123-5. Such blatantly political decision-making on the
part of appointed, life-tenured justices with the power of judicial review draws such attention, because it
constitutes a threat to the propriety of empowered courts in a democratic system of government. Thus
Lochner has served as a major blemish on the veneer of the judicial legitimacy that justifies the practice of
judicial review ever since. Furthermore, the negative connotation of Lochner as an example of illegitimate
judicial activism has complicated the subsequent development of substantive due process jurisprudence, as
the Supreme Court has faced an ongoing struggle to establish the proper ambit of constitutionally protected
liberty. In the modern revival of substantive due process, Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas strongly
distances himself from the ghosts of Lochner. He writes, “we are met with a wide range of questions that
implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some arguments suggest that
Lochner v. New York should be our guide. But we decline that invitation …. We do not sit as a super-
legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business
affairs, or social conditions.” 381 U.S. 479, 481-2 (1965).
47 Charles Warren argued that the Lochner Court had struck down only two other state regulations, belying
any characterization of the justices as reactionary. See Charles Warren, "A Bulwark to the State Police
Power - the United States Supreme Court," Columbia Law Review 13 (1913), Charles Warren, "The
Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court," Columbia Law Review 13 (1913).  See also Robert E.
Cushman, "Social and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment," Michigan Law Review 20,
no. 7 (1922), Louis M. Greeley, "The Changing Attitude of the Courts toward Social Legislation," Illinois
Law Review 5 (1910), Charles M. Hough, "Due Process of Law Today," Harvard Law Review 32 (1919).
48 Eric Foner contends that “freedom of contract” ideals developed out of the anti-slavery tradition and had
infused labor rhetoric with a commitment to “self ownership” from that point on. See also Eric Foner, Free
Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (New York,:
Oxford University Press, 1970), Eric Foner, Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1980).  See also Forbath, "The Ambiguities of Free Labor - Labor and the Law in
the Gilded Age.", David M. Gold, "Redfield, Railroads and the Roots of 'Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism',"
American Journal of Legal History 27 (1983), Charles W. McCurdy, "The Roots of Liberty of Contract
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Given this intense and long-standing scholarly interest, the Lochner narrative
makes an excellent disciplinary trope to explore from a fresh vantage point, starting from
the perspective of those social movements that confronted the reality of an economic
system governed by liberty of contract jurisprudence, and who competed with their peers
to craft a response to these difficult constitutional conditions.  To do so, I will focus on
the efforts of organizations within the women’s movement, the labor movement, and the
civil rights movement that fought to win rights for and improve the conditions of workers
within the ranks of their movements.  Work is an important topic for constitutional study,
not only for its relationship to economic survival but also for its relationship to civic
status.49  Lochner was a blow then to the citizenship of workers as well as their
stomachs.50  These three movements, through the organizations I highlight, developed
three different responses to Lochnerian jurisprudence, and each of these responses would
be significantly shaped by peer resource competition with other movement actors.
OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION
                                                                                                                                                  
Reconsidered: Major Premises in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937," Supreme Court Historical Society
1984 (1984), William E. Nelson, "The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth-Century America," Harvard Law Review 87 (1974).  Howard Gillman studies in-
depth the long-standing constitutional commitment to principles of equality and resistance to class or
partial legislation that he argues influenced the Lochner Court.  See Gillman, The Constitution Besieged :
The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence.  See also Michael Les Benedict,
"Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meanings and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism," Law and History Review 3 (1985), David M. Gold, The Shaping of Nineteenth-Century
Law: John Appleton and Responsible Individualism, Contributions in Legal Studies, No. 57 (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1990), William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to
Judicial Doctrine (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), Cass R. Sunstein, "Lochner's
Legacy," Columbia Law Review 87 (1987).
49 See Gretchen Ritter, The Constitution as Social Design : Gender and Civic Membership in the American
Constitutional Order (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006).
50 With white working class men, African-Americans and women each confronting a slightly different
challenge from their labor difficulties to their civic inclusion.  See ibid.
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In Chapter Two, I offer a fuller discussion and application of social movement
theory to this project.  I expand on the peer resource competition insight and demonstrate
its significance to constitutional inquiry.
In Chapter Three, I explore the response of the labor movement to Lochnerian
jurisprudence.  The leading labor organization, the AFL, would rebuff efforts by other
movements, including the women’s movement and the civil rights movement, to pool
resources.  The AFL would instead develop its own sophisticated constitutional narrative
built on the Thirteenth Amendment to contend with the conservative courts of the day, a
narrative not open to women or African-Americans due to the closed nature of unions,
which has been largely lost to constitutional history.  I contend that this constitutional
response has been lost to modern scholarship, because it was abandoned by the AFL, out
of necessity, in order to sustain a coalition with more politically influential progressives,
an elite social movement of the day.  The progressives won out in the competition for
resources, and their constitutional vision was accepted with judicial sanction of the
Wagner Act in NLRB v. Jones& Laughlin Steel Company, which paved the way for the
New Deal reconstruction of the state.51  In recovering the constitutional vision of the
AFL, I argue that the disciplinary obsession with the excoriation and subsequent modest
rehabilitation of the Lochner Court, misses the arguably more significant doctrinal path
of that era for our constitutional development that ran from the landmark case of Loewe v.
Lawlor,52 through Duplex Printing Company v. Deering,53 to Jones & Laughlin.  Starting
constitutional inquiry into this period with the efforts of those clamoring for change,
workers themselves, can uncover the significance of what has been previously obscured
to constitutional scholars.
                                                 
51 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
52 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
53 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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In Chapter Four, I examine the response of members of the civil rights movement
to Lochnerian jurisprudence.  African-Americans found themselves in the unusual
position of actually benefiting as workers, on balance, from unpopular Lochnerian
jurisprudence during the Progressive and Inter-War Eras.  This is an insight that has been
developed by some recent Lochner revisionists, such as David Bernstein and Paul
Moreno, who suggest that free contract constitutionalism was not a universal evil for
marginalized American populations.54  This unique position among workers was not lost
on African-American activists, and they would at times rally to the defense of the courts
and of laissez-faire constitutionalism during this period.  However, in studying the failed
efforts of the NAACP and the NUL, which formed their own internal movement
coalition, to enhance their constitutional resources through the formation of a coalition
with the AFL and adoption of labor’s constitutional narrative, it becomes clear that this
strategic defense of the courts and their jurisprudence during this era by black activists in
the NAACP and the NUL represented an expedient rather than a genuine commitment to
laissez-faire constitutionalism.  Incidental to these failed attempts is the revelation of a
deep constitutional irony, as African-Americans found themselves in the odd position of
challenging efforts by the AFL to expand the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.
In Chapter Five, I study the development and legacy of the gendered exception to
Lochnerian jurisprudence, created in Muller v. Oregon, which would culminate in the
rejection of Lochner in West Coast Hotel.55  The exception, which permitted state
regulation of women workers under the police power, was built on a maternalist rationale
and was the product of the constitutional activism of the women’s movement itself, led
                                                 
54 David E. Bernstein, Only One Place of Redress: African Americans, Labor Regulations, and the Courts
from Reconstruction to the New Deal, Constitutional Conflicts (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press,
2001), Paul D. Moreno, Black Americans and Organized Labor : A New History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 2006).
55 208 U.S. 416 (1908).
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by the advocacy of the NCL.  The NCL was not alone, however, in the extensive
legislative campaigns for sex-specific regulations undertaken to exploit the gendered
Constitution created in Muller.  One of its leading partners was the WTUL, which was a
SMO with roots in both the labor movement and the women’s movement.  The WTUL
faced a choice after the decision in Muller between allocating its resources to the
integration of women workers, whose interests the organization represented, into the
labor movement, or allocating its resources to the exploitation of the gendered
Constitution, which would channel women into a constitutional place apart from the labor
Constitution being developed by the AFL. By studying the unsuccessful resource
competition between the WTUL and the AFL, as the AFL rebuffed efforts by the WTUL
to form a coalition and welcome women workers into unions, we can better understand
the strategic tensions and constitutional tradeoffs inherent in embracing the gendered
Constitution, which the WTUL subsequently did.  These same tensions and tradeoffs
created a rift in the women’s movement and a heated resource competition between the
NCL, WTUL and others with the National Women’s Party (NWP) over the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA).  This battle would be mirrored by a similar rift between a faction of
women workers opposed to the gendered Constitution and the WTUL itself.  I study this
resource competition between the WTUL and these women workers to further explore the
tradeoffs inherent in the gendered Constitution that would have a legacy that reached far
beyond the repudiation of Lochnerian jurisprudence in 1937.
In Chapter Six, I will conclude the project by reflecting on how highlighting
resource competition between social movement organizations not only assists us in
reevaluating our commitment to the Lochner narrative as a means to understanding the
constitutional development of the critical pre-New Deal years, but also serves as a useful
tonic to a juricentric approach to studying constitutional development.
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Chapter Two:  Theoretical Framework
Studying social movements is complicated by the difficulty of identifying just
what a social movement is. There is no one uniform definition for a social movement, nor
is there universal agreement on how to measure the actions or political impact of a social
movement.  Do social movements exist only when mass political activity calling for some
form of social change is occurring, or do social movements persist so long as some
community that identifies with and promotes that social agenda continues?1  Similarly,
are social movements a set of preferences and demands for social change, a population
holding those preferences and making those demands for social change, or sequences of
contentious politics triggered by those preferences and demands for social change?2
Frequently constitutional scholars who incorporate social movements in their work do not
attend to these definitional issues, raising questions as to the precise nature of the
                                                 
1 Jo Freeman and Victoria L. Johnson, Waves of Protest : Social Movements since the Sixties, People,
Passions, and Power (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999) 3.  For instance, was the
women’s movement still technically a social movement between its first wave that witnessed mass activity
on behalf of suffrage and its second wave that witnessed mass activity on behalf of equality?
2 McCarthy and Zald contend that social movements represent preferences for social change, while Tilly
and Tarrow each pinpoint episodes of contentious politics as social movements.  According to McCarthy
and Zald, a social movement is “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for
changing some elements of the social structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society.” Mayer N. Zald
and John D. McCarthy, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," in Social
Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays, ed. Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy
(New Brunswick, U.S.A.: Transaction Books, 1987), 20.  But according to Charles Tilly, a social
movement is “a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the
jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population’s worthiness,
unity, numbers, and commitment.” Charles Tilly, "From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements,"
in How Social Movements Matter, ed. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (Minneapolis,
Minn: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 260.  Sidney Tarrow explains that social movements are
“sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective
action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful
opponents.” Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed.,
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998) 2.
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phenomena they are describing as social movements and the conclusions they draw about
them.
In this dissertation, I use the categories of social movement analysis set forth by
McCarthy and Zald, whose classic work on resource mobilization would form the
backbone of the resource mobilization approach (RM) to the study of social movements.
My project draws significantly from RM theory. They define three concepts that are
important to the theory and structure of my project: social movement (SM), social
movement organization (SMO), and social movement industry (SMI).
McCarthy and Zald define these terms as follows:
• Social Movement (SM):  A set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing
preferences for changing some elements of the social structure or reward
distribution, or both, of a society.3
• Social Movement Organization (SMO):  A complex or formal organization that
identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a
countermovement and attempts to implement those goals.4
• Social Movement Industry (SMI):  All social movement organizations that have as
their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement.5
Upon reviewing these definitions, it appears that McCarthy and Zald could be
simply describing issue cleavages and basic interest aggregation by interest groups or
political parties.  They admit as much, but emphasize that when dealing with social
movements one is dealing with ideas and organizations that operate at the margins of the
                                                 




political system.6  Social or political marginality appears to be the key distinction for
many scholars between social movements and interest groups or other ordinary political
actors and activity.7  Paul Burstein expresses great frustration, however, at this
indeterminacy.  He suggests that attempting to assess where contentious collective action
occurs on a continuum of institutionality or conventionality to determine whether a social
movement, rather than an interest group or even a political party, is involved is a fruitless
enterprise. No meaningful line can be drawn.  Instead, he recommends that social
movements and their component organizations be treated as interest groups for purposes
of study.8  For the most part, many scholars working in this area have abandoned, out of
frustration, the concept of a social movement altogether in favor of the more inclusive
and more readily understandable and analyzable concept of contentious politics.9
I do not go so far in this dissertation.  I do not deny the fluidity and overlap
between social movement politics and ordinary interest group politics, but social
movement terminology is so well entrenched in our common political understanding that
it is useful to continue to employ it in this dissertation.  Furthermore, during my period of
study of the early twentieth century, it is relatively uncontroversial to describe industrial
workers, women, and African-Americans as sufficiently marginalized, both as political
                                                 
6 Ibid., 20.
7 Paul Burstein, "Social Movements and Public Policy," in How Social Movements Matter, ed. Marco
Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 7.
Gamson highlights a lack of previous mobilization for the represented population.  William A. Gamson,
The Strategy of Social Protest, 2nd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub., 1990) 16.  Tilly isolates the lack
of formal representation for the represented population.  Charles Tilly, "Social Movements and National
Politics," in Statemaking and Social Movements : Essays in History and Theory, ed. Charles Bright and
Susan Friend Harding (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 306.  McAdam focuses on the
employment of unconventional and disruptive politics by a population.  Doug McAdam, Political Process
and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) 25.
8 Burstein, "Social Movements and Public Policy," 8-9.
9 Doug McAdam, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge Studies in
Contentious Politics (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).   See also McCann,
"Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives," 23.
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activists and in the preferences in society for their social and civic empowerment, that it
is fair to apply social movement terminology to their activity, regardless of whether some
of the SMOs I study are more institutionalized or conventional in their political approach
than others.
Returning to McCarthy and Zald’s social movement concepts, this categorization
is helpful because it provides theoretical guidance for precise analysis of social
movement activity.  These categories account for both the ideational and organizational
aspects of social movements, and they allow for the possibility of studying social
movements along multiple dimensions.  While a social movement is a set of opinions or
beliefs in a population aimed at creating significant social change, SMOs are the
“carriers” of a social movement.  They are embedded in a social movement and
institutionalize its goals and conceive and carry out the tactics necessary to achieve those
goals.10  For instance, the NAACP is a SMO that works to achieve the goals of the civil
rights movement.11  In order to gain leverage on the question of the impact of social
movements on constitutional development, SMOs will serve as my units of analysis
because SMOs make the constitutional demands that will be accepted or denied by
constitutional arbiters such as the courts or Congress.12
 McCarthy and Zald’s categorization is also helpful because it acknowledges that
social movements are characterized by multiple voices and beliefs. Social movements are
                                                 
10 William A. Gamson, "Introduction," in Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected
Essays, ed. Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (New Brunswick, U.S.A.: Transaction Books, 1987), 1.
11 Using McCarthy and Zald’s conceptual framework, the civil rights movement is a set of opinions and
beliefs in society representing preferences for justice, broadly conceived, for African-Americans.  These
preferences can be realized through the actions of SMOs.
12 As discussed in the last chapter, my case SMOs are, from the women’s movement, the Women’s Trade
Union League (WTUL) and the National Consumers’ League (NCL), from the civil rights movement, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League
(NUL), and from the labor movement, the American Federation of Labor (AFL).
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rarely subject to hierarchical control.13  There can exist a spectrum of organizations or
localized clusters of individuals, with varying degrees of institutional sophistication, that
share the general (though not necessarily identical) beliefs of a social movement and who
act independently in furtherance of those beliefs. McCarthy and Zald acknowledge this
diversity in representation of a social movement’s preferences.14  As defined above, a
SMI is their “organizational analogue” of a social movement.15  For example, the
NAACP is hardly the only organization active in the civil rights movement.  The NAACP
is one member of a SMI that includes, or has included, other SMOs such as the NUL, the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE), and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).
Given this diversity in representation, a social movement will be characterized by
multiple (and not always perfectly coherent) beliefs and policy preferences, and likewise
a typical SMI will be comprised of multiple SMOs with varied beliefs and varied policy
preferences in service of those beliefs that will, once again, not always be coherent or
complementary.   For example, as will be discussed in some detail later in this
dissertation, the women’s movement was famously split following the winning of
suffrage by a significant policy disagreement between those SMOs that favored support
for protective labor legislation for women, such as the NCL and the WTUL, and those
                                                 
13 Jo Freeman, "A Model for Analyzing the Strategic Options of Social Movement Organizations," in
Waves of Protest : Social Movements since the Sixties, ed. Jo Freeman and Victoria L. Johnson (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 221.  See also Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy,
"Social Movement Industries: Competition and Conflict among Smos," in Social Movements in an
Organizational Society: Collected Essays, ed. Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (New Brunswick,
U.S.A.: Transaction Books, 1987), 161.
14 Many resource mobilization scholars are interested in how this diversity of representation affects the life
cycle and efficacy of different social movements.  For instance, are social movements that are characterized
by greater institutionalization in their SMOs or hierarchical control by their SMOs ultimately more
successful or more fully mobilized?  See generally Freeman, "A Model for Analyzing the Strategic Options
of Social Movement Organizations."
15 Zald and McCarthy, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," 21.
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SMOs, such as the National Woman’s Party (NWP), that favored formal equality for
women as a policy goal.  These two approaches to achieving justice for women were
incompatible at the time, and the women’s movement SMI split, as these SMOs were
unable to negotiate a policy compromise.  The implication of such diversity, illustrated
above, is that resource competition will take place between SMOs within a SMI, as well
as between SMOs in peer SMIs.  Thus the constitutional demands made by a SMO will
be channeled by competition with both internal and external peers.
One final observation is pertinent.  Many SMOs represent beliefs and pursue
policy goals that are consistent with the umbrella beliefs of multiple social movements,
and social movements themselves can frequently share overlapping beliefs and policy
goals.  For instance, it is often difficult to draw meaningful lines between organizations
working in the environmental movement, the animal rights movement, and even many
peace movements, much less draw lines between the movements themselves.  SMIs,
therefore, are both highly permeable and subject to overlap, therefore strict assignment of
SMOs to one SMI or another may not be possible.  For instance, the National
Organization for Women (NOW), given its policy commitments, could be classified as a
SMO operating in both the women’s movement SMI and the abortion rights movement
SMI.  In fact, it might be possible to characterize the abortion rights movement itself as a
sub-movement of the women’s movement if one considers the broadest possible
preferences of each movement.  In my own case studies, this complication is particularly
relevant to determining whether a group, such as the NCL, which was dominated by
women and pursued protective labor legislation for women but had an overall mission of
improving the workplace, properly belongs in the women’s movement SMI, the labor
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movement SMI, or both.16  Given such blurring of the lines between many social
movements and their SMIs, my study of peer resource competition between SMOs will
treat all SMOs as peers who compete, whether that competition is internal or external to
their particular SMI.
The resource mobilization approach and the political process approach to the
study of social movements are the two primary theoretical influences on this project.
These two schools of social movement theory developed in response to the classical
model of social movements that emerged in American social science in the years
preceding the mass protests of the Civil Rights Era.  The classical model emphasizes the
psychological state of individuals that take part in social movements.  According to this
model, some strain in society creates psychological disruption in individuals who turn to
some form of extreme collective action to relieve that psychological disruption.17
Scholars, in the wake of the movement activity of the 1960’s, were dissatisfied with this
psychological explanation for social movement participation.
Out of this academic dissatisfaction developed the resource mobilization approach
(RM) to social movements, from which I borrow social movement terminology.  RM
theory emphasizes the rationality of individuals involved in social movements.18  RM
theorists do not view social movement actors as discontented individuals working out
                                                 
16 The NCL was made up of many women that considered themselves social progressives.  Thus the NCL
may also be categorized as part of the progressive movement’s SMI.  Assuming of course that the
progressive movement can properly be categorized as a social movement, despite common reference to
progressives as a movement from this period of history.  It was a white, middle class movement, thus it is
difficult to consider the progressives sufficiently marginalized to constitute a typical social movement
under the McCarthy and Zald categorization.  I will take this issue up in greater detail in Chapter Five when
I study resource competition between the labor movement and progressive elite.
17 See generally William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill.,: Free Press, 1959), Neil J.
Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York,: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), Ralph H. Turner and
Lewis M. Killian, Collective Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall, 1957).
18 See generally Jo Freeman, The Politics of Women's Liberation: A Case Study of an Emerging Social
Movement and Its Relation to the Policy Process (1973), microform :, J. Craig Jenkins, The Politics of
Insurgency : The Farm Worker Movement in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985),
Zald and McCarthy, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory."
30
their psychological confusion or dissatisfaction. RM theory, therefore, assumes that
movement activity is purposeful and governed by strategic considerations.  Purposive,
rational behavior on the part of social movement actors is a central assumption of my
own theory of resource competition between peer SMOs.  As discussed in the last
chapter, RM theory also provides a helpful distinction between social movements and
their constituent organizations (SMOs), providing greater theoretical leverage on social
movement activity and how it might vary and sustain itself.
The political process approach to the study of social movements developed out of
RM theory as some scholars became dissatisfied with the organizational focus of RM
theory.  Political process scholars place more emphasis on the political environment and
its effect on social movements.  Movements succeed or fail based on the opportunities
available to them in the political system, such as elite alliances, institutional or electoral
instability, or societal and institutional tolerance of protest.19  Inherent in my theory of
resource competition is an acknowledgment of the wider political environment as a locus
for resources that can be exploited.  My theory of peer resource competition assumes not
only that SMOs behave rationally, but also that environment matters.  Regardless of their
own entrepreneurial or strategic prowess, SMOs may find themselves unable to amass the
resources necessary to be successful.  Certainly the organizations I study in this
dissertation had difficulty realizing their goals.  Nevertheless SMOs will attempt to
strategically account for environmental conditions in the formation of their constitutional
claims and their interactions with peers.
                                                 
19 See generally Anne N. Costain, Inviting Women's Rebellion: A Political Process Interpretation of the
Women's Movement (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), William A. Gamson, The Strategy
of Social Protest (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1975), McAdam, Political Process and the Development
of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's Movements :
Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage books, 1979), Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social
Movements and Contentious Politics, Tilly, "Social Movements and National Politics."
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RESOURCE COMPETITION AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY
Winning constitutional rights requires substantial resources.  SMOs cannot expect
to have their demands for constitutional change met without a fight, for which they must
be suitably armed.  Such needed resources can come in many forms, and can include
everything from material assets such as money and manpower, to intangible assets such
as political connections and public support or receptivity to the message or members of a
movement, to targets of opportunity such as favorable existing constitutional precedents
that can be exploited.  SMOs, since they typically represent the interests of marginalized
groups or unpopular beliefs, must be opportunistic in amassing these resources and
putting them to use if they hope to force the kind of social and political change necessary
to secure a constitutional victory.
As in any environment, resources are limited, and scarcity leads to competition.20
Like any other organizations in a shared environment, SMOs compete with each other
and they must be ready to adapt to that competition if they are to survive and succeed.21
Therefore, SMOs can be expected to consider, in conjunction with their own ideological
beliefs and policy goals, a wide variety of resources available to them in crafting their
social, political, and constitutional claims and tactics.22  These resources can be found
within the organization itself, in the wider sociopolitical environment, and in the
government.
                                                 
20 I borrow this insight from the field of ecology.
21 Charlotta Stern, "The Evolution of Social-Movement Organizations:  Niche Competition in Social
Space," European Sociological Review 15, no. 1 (1999): 91.
22 Just as a SMO may have resources available to it, such as monetary donations, volunteer manpower or
well-placed political contacts, it will also be confronted with constraints, such as hard costs like legal fees
or office expenses, negative public opinion, or adverse laws already on the books.  I will treat constraints
(negative resources) as inherent in the concept of resources.
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Figure 1 below illustrates this framework for a SMO’s strategy formation as it
assesses its organizational resources, the resources present in the wider sociopolitical











Figure 1:  Formation of SMO Strategy23
                                                 
23 I am indebted to Jeffrey Berry for some of the above terminology.  See Jeffrey M. Berry, Lobbying for
the People : The Political Behavior of Public Interest Groups (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1977) 263.  I do not mean to suggest in this figure that SMOs follow a strict progression of resource
evaluation, from organizational resources first, to environmental resources second, to governmental







































Organizational resources are those assets that can be immediately tapped by a
SMO.  SMOs will pursue strategies that reflect both what, and who, they know, and what
they can afford.  The size of a group’s membership (or wider ideological adherents that
can be mobilized) will affect its ability to engage in mass protest as a tactic, or to engage
in other types of mass campaigns like petitions or congressional outreach. Likewise, the
wealthier a SMO, or the greater its institutional resources such as office space,
professional staffing, or in the modern context computer expertise, the better positioned it
will be to support extensive public relations campaigns and other cost-intensive projects.
SMOs will also be constrained by the interests and expertise of its leadership and staff.
For instance, if a SMO is staffed by a high concentration of lawyers it may be more likely
to pursue legal and constitutional strategies than a SMO staffed by a high concentration
of social workers, which might focus more on social or economic outreach on behalf of
its movement cause.  As will be discussed later in this dissertation, just such a division in
tactical approach existed between the legally oriented NAACP and the service oriented
NUL.  Similarly, a SMO led by older or more socially and economically established
individuals might tend to more conservative or elite-oriented tactics than SMOs
dominated by younger or more socially alienated leadership.  Such a contrast in
approaches occurred in the women’s movement with the tactical divide between the older
and more established National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), led by
the likes of Carrie Chapman Catt, which preferred backroom elite persuasion in the fight
for suffrage, and the young radicals of the NWP, such as Alice Paul and Lucy Burns, who
engaged in aggressive public protest.
                                                                                                                                                  
where SMOs will be simultaneously assessing and husbanding the various available resources in their
environment.
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Before discussing environmental resources, which include peer SMO activities, I
will briefly review the types of governmental resources that may impact SMO strategy
formation.  Just as mass public opinion can serve as a resource, or constraint, on the
tactical and the narrative options of a SMO, so can the opinion of members of
government, in any branch or at any level, and their receptivity to a movement’s message
or population. Sometimes government elite may be a willing audience for movement
demands.24  They may even become movement allies, serving as an active partner in
creating constitutional change that favors a particular group. Such an alliance may reflect
shared values and beliefs, or it may reflect a shared policy preference.  For instance,
foreign policy concerns during the Cold War pushed government elite, particularly within
the executive, to favor the extension of greater civil rights to African-Americans to blunt
communist critique of the lack of equality in the American system.25  Alliances between
government elite and SMOs are not always built on shared beliefs or policy preferences.
They may also be based on personal or party or other political connections.  Any
connection between organization and elite, whether it is ideological or expedient in
nature, can provide a SMO with valuable access to the policymaking process.  SMOs will
typically craft their constitutional strategy to exploit that access.  Of course, this access is
not always judicial, thus a SMO will not always craft a constitutional strategy that relies
on litigation.  They will prioritize the branch or level of government where they have the
most receptive audience.  For instance, as will be discussed later in this dissertation, the
AFL had a hostile audience in the courts, thus they crafted their constitutional claims to
appeal to congressional power to control the courts under the Constitution.
                                                 
24 This receptivity to a SMO’s claims may not be identical to mass receptivity.  SMOs will be sensitive to
when they may have an elite inroad.
25 See Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights : Race and the Image of American Democracy, Politics
and Society in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
36
Access to the policymaking process is an important resource for SMOs, and it
may come through political connections or allies as discussed above, or it may come via
institutional machinery that provides groups with a forum for reaching members of
government with their message.  Such institutional machinery might include
congressional hearings or bureaucratic agencies.  For instance, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the President’s Commission on the Status of
Women (PCSW) were two important access points for movement actors within the
women’s movement to inform and lobby public officials to their cause during the 1960’s
and 1970’s.  Another popular access point for SMOs is the amicus brief, which provides
movements with a low-cost opportunity to influence judicial policymaking.  The NCL
was a pioneer in this area with the creation of the Brandeis Brief.
Laws, regulations, and judicial precedents are also important resources for SMOs
seeking constitutional change.  Even if an existing law, regulation or precedent does not
directly serve a policy preference held by a SMO, it may be exploited by the SMO in an
effort to expand its reach to serve the interests of the movement.  Typically it is more cost
effective to leverage an existing resource than to attempt to create an entirely new
resource.  This is why cooption is such an appealing tactic for SMOs, particularly where
resource creation is especially costly.  Laws, regulations and judicial precedents do not
all cost the same to create or to leverage.  It may be easier to lobby an executive agency
to adjust regulatory enforcement than it is to move Congress to make a legislative
change.  It may be more costly yet to get a court to either create an entirely new
precedent or overturn an existing precedent in our incremental, common law system.
SMOs must take all these factors into consideration when choosing a forum for their
constitutional demands.  Women activists first tried (unsuccessfully) to exploit the
Fourteenth Amendment to win suffrage in the years following its ratification, before ever
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opting for a much more cost-intensive amendment strategy that required winning over
both 2/3 of Congress and 3/4 of state legislatures.
As I stated earlier, the flip side of a resource is a constraint, and existing laws,
regulations and precedents may sometimes be barriers to certain constitutional demands
favored by a SMO rather than possible avenues to realizing those demands.  SMOs may
determine that some existing laws or precedents are too costly to challenge, therefore
prompting strategies to work around these hostile government policies or abandon
altogether certain constitutional narratives.  Once again, as will be discussed later, the
labor movement would encounter just such constraining forces when dealing with the
courts during the Progressive Era, prompting the AFL to turn instead to legislative
strategies for constitutional change.
Environmental resources available to SMOs are quite varied.  Public opinion of a
social movement and public receptivity of either movement beliefs or a movement
population will govern strategy formation.  If a movement is unpopular then a SMO will
not be able to select a strategy that relies on high public support for success. Sometimes
mass and elite receptivity to a movement may be split.  SMOs must be sensitive then to
the audience they target when making their appeals.  The availability of media
opportunities or other advocacy platforms will also impact SMO strategy.  The
flourishing of the internet has offered a tremendous new and readily accessible media
platform to SMOs.  SMOs may also find resources, and of course constraints, in
American cultural values and beliefs, including constitutional values.  Louis Hartz
famously lamented that American liberal commitments prevented socialism or other
leftist movements from flourishing.26  Hendrik Hartog has observed the power of
                                                 
26 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America; an Interpretation of American Political Thought since
the Revolution, [1st ed. (New York,: Harcourt, 1955).
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constitutional values of liberty and equality to inspire otherwise marginalized groups to
success.27
In addition to these environmental conditions, competitors will also factor into
SMO strategy formation.  It is the competitive environment that is my focus in this
project.  At any moment, numerous actors will be actively pursuing social and political
influence and control over the direction of American public policy and the distribution of
social goods.  Thus, a SMO does not form its strategy (or for that matter its goals) in a
vacuum.  It must take other actors and their ideas into consideration, noting what
resources can be captured from competitors and what issues are currently being promoted
that may bear on their own interests.  Other actors can include corporations, parties,
interest groups, other SMOs, both those in the organization’s own SMI and those in the
SMIs of other movements, religious groups, charitable organizations, foundations,
professional associations etc.  If any of these actors share consistent or complementary
beliefs or goals with a SMO, they may be tapped as coalition partners and their resources
shared.  If a SMO is so lucky, they may find sponsors, such as foundations, among these
other actors, which are willing to donate resources.  Similarly, if other groups are
promoting ideas or policy proposals that are beneficial to a SMO, the SMO may consider
that issue adequately covered without having to expend their own resources for its
promotion.  The SMO may also be able to co-opt that issue and its success for its own
benefit.  Just as the flip side of a resource is a constraint, the flip side of cooperation is
competition.  Thus, where other actors are promoting inconsistent ideas or policies, a
SMO may adopt competitive, contesting tactics, such as protest and other forms of
negative publicity, pointed political lobbying, or challenging litigation, to blunt the
success of those efforts.
                                                 
27 Hartog, "The Constitution of Aspiration and the Rights That Belong to Us All."
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I am particularly interested in these cooperative/competitive relationships between
SMOs as these relationships relate to their constitutional claims and tactics.28  Not
surprisingly, organizations embedded in American social movements have a long history
of joining forces with each other, borrowing ideas and strategies from one another, and
jousting with each other to control the constitutional high ground.
This interaction between SMOs may take many forms depending on whether
these peer organizations hold compatible or incompatible goals and beliefs.  Figure 2 and
Figure 3 below sketch the possible tactical relationships that may develop between peer
SMOs given the compatibility of their respective ambitions.  Discussion of these figures
will follow.
                                                 
28 The decision-making framework I have sketched above is not limited in applicability to SMOs, but I will
focus my discussion on the concerns relevant to SMOs in this dissertation.
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Figure 2:  Strategic Options Where Peer SMOs Hold Compatible Belief or Policy Goal
Figure 3:  Strategic Options Where Peer SMOs Hold Incompatible Belief or Policy Goal









Where SMOs share compatible beliefs or policy preferences, they can offer
important benefits to their activist neighbors.  If social movements share complementary
beliefs and goals, then the SMOs that represent those movements may be willing to pool
their resources and form a coalition.  The ability to share funds, offices, workers, expert
advisers, membership lists, political connections, public attention and the like can be
invaluable to advocacy groups.29 Of course, this pooling of resources will likely come at
the cost of some compromise on goals and tactics, since multiple preferences must be met
when a coalition is formed.  Although they had joined a coalitional group, the American
Equal Rights Association (AERA), formed to advance both the interests of women and of
African-Americans in the years following the Civil War, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and
Susan B. Anthony would quickly break off to form their own SMO to serve women’s
interests exclusively, the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), because they
could not accept the ideological and tactical compromises necessitated by the AERA
coalition.30  Because tactical and narrative negotiation is an inherent part of coalition, a
coalition strategy can be useful for groups that have minor ideological or policy
differences that they may be able to comprise on in order to gain the benefits of pooling
resources.
                                                 
29 Jeffrey M. Berry’s study of public interest groups identifies coalitions as one of the most popular
strategic options for these groups. Berry, Lobbying for the People : The Political Behavior of Public
Interest Groups  254-61.  Coalition is also a likely tactic among SMOs both within a particular SMI and
between peer SMIs because they are frequently populated by either an interconnected or similarly trained
elite.  Karen O'Connor, Women's Organizations' Use of the Courts (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books,
1980).  Often activists are also involved with multiple SMOs also leading to a natural preference for
coalitional tactics.  This was particularly the case during the Progressive Era.  Naomi Rosenthal et al.,
"Social Movements and Network Analysis: A Case Study of Nineteenth-Century Women's Reform in New
York State," The American Journal of Sociology 90, no. 5 (1985).
30 Stanton and Anthony were unmoved by the suggestion that women should give up the fight to have the
Fourteenth Amendment drafted to explicitly protect sex because it was the “Negro’s Hour,” and winning
protections against racial discrimination took priority at that time.  See Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al.,
History of Woman Suffrage (Rochester, N.Y.: C. Mann, 1887) v.2.
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Other SMOs can also serve as useful models for success.  If a litigation strategy or
legislative campaign has succeeded for a peer SMO, then other SMOs can follow in their
footsteps without having to expend the resources necessary to develop an original
strategy for constitutional change.  Perhaps more important than the cost effectiveness of
the adaptation necessary for cooption is the tremendous benefit that flows from the use of
analogies to make that adaptation of a winning constitutional strategy work.
Constitutional recognition of rights by the government’s judicial and/or political elite
grants a powerful moral legitimacy to a movement’s cause that can motivate broad public
support for change in favor of other movements that can convince the public, and
members of the government, that they are similarly situated.  Analogies are particularly
useful when the mobilization of law will be through litigation, as there may be inviting
legal precedents available for exploitation.  Analogies are also a major tool of legal
reasoning, making them even more attractive when mobilizing law.31  The landmark
constitutional victories of the civil rights movement in the mid-twentieth century have
created a cottage industry in “like race” analogies for modern SMOs across many social
movements.32  Once again, there has been some dissatisfaction expressed among activists
and commentators who chafe at the ideological compromises inherent in such tactics
requiring adaptation.33  Nevertheless, cooption remains an enticing tactic because it is
                                                 
31 Cass R. Sunstein, "On Analogical Reasoning," Harvard Law Review 106, no. 3 (1993).
32 Janet E. Halley, "Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Representation," in The
Politics of Law : A Progressive Critique, ed. David Kairys (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998).  See also
Serena Mayeri, ""A Common Fate of Discrimination": Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical
Perspective," Yale Law Journal 110, no. 6 (2001).
33 Catherine A. MacKinnon, "Reflections on Sex Equality under Law," Yale Law Journal 100 (1991).  For
a different view on the proper interpretation and deployment of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Robin
West, Progressive Constitutionalism : Reconstructing the Fourteenth Amendment, Constitutional Conflicts
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), Robin West, Re-Imagining Justice : Progressive Interpretations of
Formal Equality, Rights, and the Rule of Law, Applied Legal Philosophy (Aldershot, Hants, England ;
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003).
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difficult for a SMO to independently amass the resources necessary to trigger
constitutional change.
Related to the cooption strategy is the choice to assume adequate coverage of
issues by other groups.  An issue coverage strategy differs from cooption, because when a
SMO co-opts an issue, policy or belief that has been promoted by another group, it
actively claims that issue, policy or belief for its own use, expending resources in order to
capture greater resources.  When assuming issue coverage, a SMO will not expend any
resources and will not make an explicit claim involving that issue, policy or belief.
Inaction becomes its tactic.  For example, a SMO dedicated to advancing the interests of
unwed mothers may rely in part on the benefits to unwed mothers that flow from the
efforts of SMOs or public interest groups dedicated to advancing the interests of children,
while choosing to concentrate their own resources on other issues or tactics.  However,
the greater the salience of an issue, policy or belief to the goals and values of a SMO, the
less likely they are to settle for the passive tactic of inaction as against pursuing active
strategies such as coalition, cooption, or if the issue or policy being promoted by others
cuts against their interests, contestation.  In some cases, inaction may be the tactical
posture between peer groups either because a SMO is indifferent to the actions of the
other or possibly unaware of other groups’ preferences or actions.  Indifference or
ignorance of competitors is more likely where issue salience for a SMO is low or the
consequences of inaction are low.
Sometimes peer SMOs do not share compatible beliefs or policy preferences.
While SMOs might monitor the activities of other SMOs in order to identify potential
coalition partners or targets for resource-saving cooption or issue coverage, they may also
monitor the constitutional claims of other groups in order to preserve their own assets and
options.  The Constitution is not a boundless resource.  It is a discrete text, with
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demanding limits on attempts at both textual and interpretive expansions of that text.34
Once legal precedents are set or legislation passed in response to the claims of one
movement, this may foreclose the options of other movements.  Not only may it be
harder to overcome a constitutional precedent in the courtroom, or repeal or replace an
existing law, but also SMOs may face the constraints of adverse public opinion and
constitutional norms that have been subsequently influenced by the institutionalization of
these precedents or laws.  While social movements, being the good constitutional
Protestants that they are, typically remain ideologically resilient in the face of hostile
precedent, it is nevertheless extremely costly, and perhaps untenable, to fight an uphill
constitutional battle, particularly if an SMO plans to fight through the courts where
precedent controls.  In these instances, SMOs may not be able to afford to allow some
issues to be covered or policies promoted that are inconsistent with their own interests.
Contestation of the ideas or policy proposals of other SMOs becomes necessary.35
This constitutional scarcity is illustrated in the fate of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36  In the years immediately following
the amendment’s ratification, a group of white butchers from Louisiana famously
attempted to test its scope in The Slaughterhouse Cases.37  The butchers argued that the
                                                 
34 Amending the Constitution is a difficult, and according to some commentators nearly impossible, task.
SMOs therefore need exceptional resources to win a constitutional amendment.  See Sanford Levinson,
Responding to Imperfection : The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1995). Similarly, given the common law system we operate under, with its
reliance on judicial precedent, convincing courts to go in a new or contradictory constitutional direction
will also require substantial resources.
35 This point is obvious in competition between movement and countermovement.  The point of SMO
efforts in oppositional movements is to foreclose the constitutional options of opponent groups.  My study
focuses, however, on SMOs that are not direct opponents.  But even among SMOs that do not share
mutually exclusive overall goals or beliefs, there may be times when they pursue particular policies that
reduce the resources of their peers, thereby necessitating competition and contestation.
36 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in part: … No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; ….
37 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
45
Privileges and Immunities Clause protected the right of a citizen to pursue his profession.
The Supreme Court reacted strongly to the attempt to apply the Fourteenth Amendment
to situations that did not involve racial discrimination, gutting the Privileges and
Immunities Clause in its decision and rendering it a dead letter ever since.  This had an
immediate effect on the related efforts of members of another social movement, as
women litigating for both the right to pursue a profession and the right to vote under the
guise of the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court were rebuffed.38  Since
then, this intriguing constitutional resource has been effectively off the table for all
subsequent SMOs that might consider its use.  Legal scholars like to point to just such
constitutional resources as great avenues for social progress, but the reality of precedent,
constitutional scarcity, and the scarcity of resources available to SMOs make such
adventuresome attempts by SMOs, who create the cases and controversies necessary to
involve constitutional decision-makers, to revive or revisit these constitutional provisions
unlikely.39
Should other SMOs seek to capitalize on analogies to a social movement’s
winning constitutional claim, this may limit the flexibility or scope of the rights or
remedies being coopted.  In this instance, SMOs may need to go on the defensive to
contest these attempts at cooption.  As discussed in the last chapter, many civil rights
activists, particularly among the black clergy, have jealously guarded the civil rights
legacy against cooption by gay activists.  Scholars have also noted that the flexibility and
                                                 
38 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).  Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
39 Richard Aynes recommends just such a revival of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to social
movements pursuing progressive social change.  See Richard L. Aynes, "Constricting the Law of Freedom:
Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Slaughter-House Cases," Chicago-Kent Law Review 70
(1994), Richard L. Aynes, "On Misreading Bingham,John and the 14th Amendment," Yale Law Journal
103, no. 1 (1993).
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fluidity of some constitutional protections won by a particular movement may be lost
when coopted by other groups.40
Coalition is also a potential tactical relationship between SMOs that hold
incompatible beliefs or preferences.  As stated above, negotiation is inherent in coalition,
therefore it may be possible for groups to compromise on their differences in order to
maintain a beneficial cooperative posture rather than a resource-draining competitive
posture.  However, as also discussed above, negotiating ideological or policy
disagreements becomes more difficult the more intense the ideological or policy
preferences, or the greater the gain that a group stands to realize by pursuing their
unmediated preferences.
Indifference or inaction is, of course, also possible between SMOs that hold
incompatible goals or beliefs, but the greater the salience of an issue or policy or belief to
the organizations involved, or the scarcer the resources involved (and the Constitution is
a particularly scarce resource as discussed above), the more likely there will be some
engagement between groups.  SMOs can rarely afford to be preempted from promising
constitutional narratives, or constrained by hostile constitutional precedents, by ignoring
the claims made by other actors in the competitive environment.
These various types of tactical relationships between SMOs are not all equally
likely at all times.  Cooption is particularly likely as a SMO strategy when powerful
constitutional precedents govern.  If constitutional decision-makers are strongly
committed to a particular constitutional narrative, and that narrative has become
embedded in the wider constitutional culture, then a constitutional strategy modeled on
that narrative has greater traction and becomes more likely to succeed, while the costs of
                                                 
40 See Trina Grillo and Stephanie M. Wildman, "Obscuring the Importance of Race:  The Implication of
Making Comparisons between Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms)," Duke Law Journal 1991, no. 2
(1991), Halley, "Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Representation."
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pursuing an inconsistent constitutional claim would rise.41  When there are not such
successful constitutional precedents to draw upon, SMOs will be less likely to rely on
cooption, and the competitive environment might witness more complex engagement
between SMOs as groups build coalitions and attempt to prevent other unfavorable
claims from gaining constitutional sanction.  This complexity of engagement may be
particularly likely at times when the constitutional order appears to have destabilized,
either due to the development of institutional weakness in a constitutional decision-
maker, or due to major technological or social upheaval that make prior constitutional
precedents unsatisfactory or unworkable in practice.42 When the constitutional order is
destabilized, the costs of forcing constitutional change may decrease, motivating SMOs
to pursue diverse constitutional strategies. As discussed earlier, such instability in the
constitutional climate of the Progressive and Inter-War Eras is what drew me to its study.
Similarly, where the Constitution has been freshly expanded through amendment, SMOs
may jockey for the opportunity to exploit that new constitutional space.  Such jockeying
between activist groups certainly took place in the wake of the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment.43
I should also note that the constitutional decision-making process of SMOs that I
depict in the above section is not static.  SMOs are operating in a dynamic environment.
Assessments of available resources, identification of potential partners or targets for
cooption, selection of appropriate advocacy forums, and other tactics will be
                                                 
41 Charles Hamilton refers to such a strongly established set of constitutional narratives and precedents as a
“master frame.”  Such a master frame has developed around the constitutional victories of the civil rights
movement and have in turn triggered widespread cooption by other groups.  Charles V. Hamilton, "Social-
Policy and the Welfare of Black-Americans - from Rights to Resources," Political Science Quarterly 101,
no. 2 (1986).
42 Balkin and Siegel, "Principles, Practices, Social Movements," 928-30.
43 And led to both the split in the suffrage movement and a longstanding bitterness and distrust between
members of the civil rights movement and the women’s movement when the AERA broke apart.
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continuously changing as SMOs are confronted with the effects of the actions of other
members of the sociopolitical system.44  I conceive of constitutional development as
occurring in a continuing feedback loop, therefore SMOs must remain nimble in their
response to constitutional change if they hope to succeed.
THE HORIZONTAL CHANNELING OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMANDS
This theoretical framework that I have sketched above suggests that it is likely
that SMOs will engage in some tactical relationship with peers in crafting their
constitutional messages and acting upon them.  However, academics have largely ignored
this competitive engagement when trying to better understand constitutional politics and
development.  Julie Novkov suggests that constitutional scholars have been preoccupied
with solely studying the actions of judges to understand constitutional change.  Thus they
will frequently miss the fuller political story of the demands made on constitutional
decision-makers such as judges.  Novkov explains that whether these scholars “have
attributed judges’ actions to simple preferences about policy, to adherence to competing
principles, to institutional pressures, or to some combination of these factors, judges and
their institutional context have largely been at the center of the analysis.”45  She
recommends taking a wider view to understand constitutional development in recognition
of the inherently conflicted nature of constitutional interpretation.
For Novkov, constitutional change is worked out in “nodes of conflict.”   Nodes
of conflict represent the contested narratives that occur when points of constitutional
                                                 
44 These members include constitutional arbiters themselves.  For instance, every time a court issues a new
constitutional opinion relevant to a SMO’s goals, that SMO must reassess their own resources and tactics.
45 Novkov, Constituting Workers, Protecting Women: Gender, Law, and Labor in the Progressive Era and
New Deal Years  15.
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ambiguity become the subject of communication between lawyers, courts and interest
groups (often SMOs).  Novkov points out that none of these parties are in complete
control of this discursive contestation, nor can any of these parties create a node of
conflict completely on their own.  Changing social conditions may particularly motivate
the identification of ambiguities and inconsistencies in existing doctrine, which will enter
the constitutional decision-making process through lawyers’ briefs.  The contested
constructions being produced via these interactive nodes of conflict then move
constitutional development, and will eventually settle the constitutional ambiguity and
close the node of conflict.46  Novkov’s theory highlights the contestation inherent in
judges’ constitutional decision-making.  I am also interested in the contestation inherent
in constitutional decision-making, but I widen the analytical node of conflict to include
the initial competition between political actors (often SMOs) that results in the
constitutional narratives, which will be subsequently presented to constitutional arbiters,
that will be subject to the further contestation Novkov depicts.  Incidentally, my approach
is not limited to the judicial context, like Novkov.  As a SMO assesses its resources and
undertakes the necessary adjustment of its claims, it may choose to put those claims
before another constitutional arbiter, such as Congress.
My approach also builds off the insights of Robert Cover. Cover explains that law
is a small part of the normative universe, or nomos, that communities live by.  He refers
to the urge of communities to generate legal narratives embedded within larger cultural
and historical narratives as jurisgenesis.  America is constituted by multiple communities,
which generate multiple legal narratives that will inevitably collide.  Thus it becomes the
purpose of the state, through the courts, to suppress these legal narratives and to choose
what narratives will constitute the law.  This choice among many independently
                                                 
46 Ibid.  15-22.
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generated legal narratives is what Cover refers to as the jurispathic office of the courts.47
This jurispathic function is vertical in nature, with development being imposed from
above.  Most constitutional scholars are preoccupied with this vertical channeling of
constitutional development, assuming that SMOs conform to the demands and
predispositions of constitutional decision-makers if they hope to succeed.  I will explore
whether there is also a horizontal analogue to the jurispathic function, meaning that
alternative constitutional narratives generated by social movements may be channeled or
constrained not just from above by strategic assessments of the courts, or other
constitutional arbiters, but also by the narratives of a SMO’s constitutional fellow
travelers.  Figure 4 below illustrates these two dimensions, horizontal and vertical, along
which a SMO’s constitutional claim can be mediated.  
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By exploring this horizontal mediation of the constitutional claims of peer SMOs,
I provide a fuller depiction of constitutional development.  Also, by tracing these
competitive relationships, I can begin to map the political genealogy of constitutional
development in America, rather than focus simply on the more commonly studied legal
genealogy, or even intellectual genealogy, of constitutional ideas and change.
Although I am exploring the claims made in the name of the Constitution, I do not
purport to explain why the Constitution has developed as it has.  While I would like to
believe that the popular constitutional expressions that I study in the following pages are
not all sound and fury signifying nothing, I do not seek to authoritatively demonstrate
that the particular mediated calls for constitutional change by the SMOs that I highlight
have directly reshaped constitutional development.  In many cases these SMOs will fail
to force the change they seek.  In any event, isolating the impact of social movement
actors on policy is a complicated and contested proposition.48  Instead, I seek to uncover
constitutional roads less traveled that may prove instructive for future constitutional
reflection, as well as to provide greater attention to the politics that molded our past
constitutional culture and informed (if not directly influenced) past constitutional change.
Such sensitivity to the constitutional politics of the past also provides us an opportunity to
reconsider many of the closely held narratives of modern constitutional scholars and
commentators, particularly in regards to their preoccupation with Lochnerian
                                                 
48 Marco Giugni, "How Social Movements Matter:Past Research, Present Problems, Future
Developments," in How Social Movements Matter, ed. Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly
(Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), Tilly, "From Interactions to Outcomes in Social
Movements." See also Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for
Racial Equality, Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope : Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
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jurisprudence, who have so often relied on a truncated, juricentric view of constitutional
development.
REVISITING THE OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION
The figures below illustrate the particular resource competition relationships that I
will explore in each of the following case study chapters.  The peer competition
illustrated will impact the shape and substance of the constitutional responses of each of
my case SMOs to Lochnerian jurisprudence during the Progressive and Inter-War Eras.
This peer resource competition is, of course, just one feature of the larger resource
considerations, such as elite receptivity, organizational wealth and mobilizable
membership, or governing constitutional precedents, which factored into the
constitutional strategy of each group for contending with laissez faire constitutionalism.
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Figure 5:  Peer Resource Competition Highlighted in Chapter Three
Figure 6:  Peer Resource Competition Highlighted in Chapter Four
























Chapter Three:  The Lost Proto-Corporatist Constitutionalism of the
AFL
Workers would face extremely difficult times during the Progressive and Inter-
War Eras.  The growing pains of industrialization along with rapid urbanization and mass
immigration would combine with judicial hostility to reform to create bleak conditions
for American labor.  Constitutional scholars have particularly focused on Lochner v. New
York,1 and its entrenchment of free contract jurisprudence, as the emblem of this judicial
hostility to the working class, identifying Lochnerian jurisprudence as the key roadblock
to the reform of the constitutional order necessary to cope with the reconstruction of
American capitalism.  According to this conventional constitutional wisdom, the story of
Lochner ends in the expedient shame of the “switch in time that saved nine” that occurred
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish2 in 1937, as the chastened Supreme Court bowed to
intense public and political pressure to remove the shackles of laissez-faire constitutional
principles on states that had prevented them from reforming the workplace and rescuing
workers from the excesses of industrial exploitation.
As discussed in Chapter One, many scholars in recent years have challenged this
accepted wisdom that the Lochner Court had acted on their own capitalistic preferences
to construct a theory of free contract liberty that was unsupported by prior constitutional
precedents and ideological commitments.  However, both the conventional wisdom and
these revisionist accounts, that have so greatly absorbed the attention of the academy,
overlook the actual constitutional experiences and the constitutional desires of those
individuals, workers, that scholars have cast as the Lochner Court’s victims.  The labor
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movement was most definitely the victim of a hostile Supreme Court during the
Progressive and Inter-War Eras, but Lochner (and liberty of contract jurisprudence) was
not the key exemplar of this hostility.
By charting the difficult constitutional course of the labor movement through this
period, from the point of view of and through the activities of its leading SMO, the AFL,
two themes emerge that contrast with conventional constitutional scholarship.  First, as
suggested above, the free contract jurisprudence that was crystallized in Lochner was not
the most serious judicial challenge to organized labor during this period.  That challenge
arose out of judicial sanction of labor injunctions and other impediments to collective
bargaining.  Second, by tracking the AFL’s strategic response to this judicial attack on
collective bargaining, a proto-corporatist constitutional vision that attempted to meld
individualism with group rights and straddle two constitutional eras is revealed.  This
unique AFL approach to group rights, which has been largely lost to modern
constitutional scholarship, fell victim to resource competition, as the AFL jettisoned this
narrative to maintain a coalition with powerful progressive elite who held a statist agenda
that was inconsistent with the proto-corporatism of the AFL with its collective freedom
of contract theory.
By the time Lochner was decided in 1905, the AFL had already changed course
away from state protection of labor in favor of privately negotiated collective bargaining.
Thus Lochner, itself, did not represent a catastrophic blow to the labor movement, nor did
its repudiation in West Coast Hotel represent the labor movement’s eagerly anticipated
salvation. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Loewe v. Lawlor3 and Duplex Printing Co.
v. Deering4 resonated much more deeply in the offices of the AFL and wrought far more
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damage to labor interests than Lochner.  Likewise, the labor movement would more
eagerly seek the promised relief in 1937 of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.5 than of
West Coast Hotel.  Although my study of the constitutional strategy of the AFL leads me
to focus on a different doctrinal path and a different tectonic shift in the constitutional
development of the New Deal, this does not mean that the revisionist project of
rehabilitating the Lochner Court becomes irrelevant to the experience of workers who
were ostensibly the victims of this activist bench.  These devastating decisions against
collective bargaining also highlight the tensions between state neutrality and hostility to
class legislation, which some revisionist scholars claim influenced the justices of this era,
and the raw personal and political preferences for laissez faire economic principles that
the conventional Lochner account ascribes to the majority justices.  To illustrate this
point, I will apply in this chapter the work of two such Lochner revisionists, Howard
Gillman and Cass Sunstein, to the Court’s assault on collective bargaining in Duplex and
its capitulation to state oversight of collective bargaining in Jones & Laughlin.6
The AFL devised a powerful and ingenious constitutional theory, built on the
collectivization of freedom of contract ideals, to support its rights to collective bargaining
that were challenged in Duplex, but because it was forced to abandon this narrative in
order to benefit from a critical coalition with progressives, this theory has been lost.  Lost
even to revisionist constitutional scholars, such as Ken Kersch, who have attempted to
recover the competitive complexity of the relationships between groups fighting to
survive laissez-faire constitutionalism in order to puncture the disciplinary commitment
to the inevitability of the progressive reconstruction of the Constitution and the
                                                 
5 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
6 See Gillman, The Constitution Besieged : The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers
Jurisprudence, Sunstein, "Lochner's Legacy."
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inevitability of the development of modern civil rights from that reconstruction.7  The
AFL’s deployment of its unique proto-corporatist constitutional vision, which rested in
large measure on the Thirteenth Amendment, and its subsequent abandonment of that
vision each occurred primarily in the halls of Congress.  It was before legislators, rather
than judges, that the AFL advanced its constitutional theory, and it was under pressure
from progressive legislators and their allies, not judges, that the AFL backed away from
its constitutional theory to embrace the progressive constitutional vision that would find
validation in Jones & Laughlin.  It’s hardly surprising that scholars wedded to a
juricentric examination of constitutional development would miss the AFL narrative and
the sophistication of the competitive relationship between the AFL and progressives.  It
never manifested itself before the courts.  To illustrate this point, I will highlight the
resource competition between the AFL and progressive elite that played out in Congress
beginning with submission of the Shipstead Bill by an AFL ally in 1927 and the later
passage of the Wagner Act, a progressive embrace of a state solution to the difficulties of
collective bargaining, in 1935.
THE VERTICAL CHANNELING OF AFL STRATEGY:  THE COURTS AND THE LABOR
MOVEMENT’S TURN TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
With the approach of the Progressive Era, the labor movement was undergoing
significant change with the ascension of the AFL as its leading organization.  Founded in
1886, the AFL quickly eclipsed the influence of the Knights of Labor (KOL), who had
                                                 
7 See Kenneth I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities in the Development of American
Constitutional Law (Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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dominated the labor movement during the Gilded Age.8  While the KOL had emphasized
a radical producers’ vision of the economy that emphasized decentralization and
republicanism, the AFL, under the leadership of Samuel Gompers, had accepted the
reality of a permanent wage-earning class in the modern economy and had resolved to
develop the economic power necessary to counterbalance big business.9
The courts would have a profound effect on the shaping of AFL strategy as their
rulings would push the AFL away from state-based labor reform and toward an economic
approach to advancing workers’ interests, which included tactics such as strikes and
boycotts meant to provide the leverage necessary to improve wages and working
conditions.10  This voluntarist approach did not envision a role for government in the
establishment and management of relations between capital and labor.  Instead,
employers and employees were to rely on the economic weapons naturally held at their
disposal to set the terms of the working relationship through collective bargaining.11
                                                 
8 The KOL foundered due to infighting and the lack of a coherent program, as it undertook a series of
confused and contradictory positions in response to the industrial revolution.  See Gerald N. Grob, Workers
and Utopia; a Study of Ideological Conflict in the American Labor Movement, 1865-1900 ([Evanston, Ill.]:
Northwestern University Press, 1961).
9 Victoria Charlotte Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the
United States, Princeton Studies in American Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
See also Forbath, "The Ambiguities of Free Labor - Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age."  For a fuller
discussion of the formation of the AFL and the ascendancy of Gompers’ vision of trade unionism, see Julie
Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The American Federation of Labor and Political Activism, 1881-1917
(Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
10 The classic view of the AFL is that it became strictly apolitical entering the twentieth century,
abandoning entirely political action and legislative reform.  Julie Greene has argued persuasively that this is
a gross overstatement of the AFL’s move away from politics.  The AFL did engage in party politics and
elections and also sponsored legislation regularly, particularly legislation aimed at curbing the judiciary, in
order to protect and promote collective bargaining practices.  See Greene, Pure and Simple Politics: The
American Federation of Labor and Political Activism, 1881-1917. See alsoWilliam G. Ross, A Muted
Fury: Populists, Progressives, and Labor Unions Confront the Courts, 1890-1937 (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1994).
11 The term “voluntarism” to describe Gompers’ conservative, trade unionist approach was coined by
Michael Rogin.  See Michael Rogin, "Voluntarism: The Political Function of an Antipolitical Doctrine,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 15, no. 4 (1962).
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While early labor history looked beyond the state to explain the AFL’s adoption
of voluntarism, more recent labor history has focused on the constitutive force of the state
in shaping AFL strategy.12  Victoria Hattam and William Forbath both point to the
actions of the courts as driving the eradication, or at least submersion, of radicalism in the
labor movement in favor of conservative and apolitical tactics. According to Hattam,
given the dispersal of power in the American system of government due to separation of
powers and federalism, the courts gained significant control over the regulation of
economic life in the Gilded Age.  Proving themselves unfriendly to workers, courts long
stifled the efforts of organized labor through the application of the common law doctrine
of conspiracy against workers, hoping to quell labor protest and with it any burgeoning of
class consciousness. Despite legislation passed at labor’s behest to control conspiracy
trials, courts continually interpreted these laws in such a way as to render them
                                                 
12 Traditionally labor historians had looked beyond the state for explanations of the change to an economic
approach by the American labor movement.   Early in the twentieth century, economist John R. Commons,
and later his student Selig Perlman, argued that given the lack of a wider class consciousness in the United
States, it was no surprise that labor activism did not coalesce around class as industrialization progressed.
See John Rogers Commons et al., History of Labour in the United States (New York,: The Macmillan
Company, 1918).  Perlman explained that, among other things, the absence of a feudal legacy in America
combined with a sense of boundless opportunity, relative class mobility, decent wages and working
conditions, and the inability of a third party to take root in the two-party system of the United States
contributed to the lack of class consciousness and the apolitical nature of the American labor movement
once it confronted job scarcity.  See Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (New York,: The
Macmillan Company, 1928) 154-75.  Consistent with this view was the assertion by Gerald Grob that trade
unions reflected the larger middle class outlook of the United States, and the Marxist-inspired claim by
Philip Foner that the movement away from reformist impulses was an inevitable stage of capitalism’s
development.  See Philip Sheldon Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, 2d ed. (New
York: International Publishers, 1975).  While later historians have subsequently argued that the American
working class did exhibit its own class-consciousness, most commentators have agreed that an assortment
of social and historical factors prevented the development of a comprehensive radical agenda for labor as it
progressed into the twentieth century. See David Brody, Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the
Twentieth Century Struggle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), David Montgomery, The Fall of
the House of Labor : The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City & the Rise of the
American Working Class, 1788-1850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).  Michael Rogin,
however, contends that the AFL’s voluntarism was actually driven by the labor elite’s desire to maintain
their control over the movement. See Rogin, "Voluntarism: The Political Function of an Antipolitical
Doctrine."
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meaningless, and conspiracy trials continued unabated in the decades following the Civil
War.  This failure by legislatures to curb the courts and their common law attack on
organized labor disillusioned Gompers and others and pushed them toward voluntarist
solutions to labor’s problems. 13
William Forbath points to a slightly later movement by the courts as spurring the
critical reinvention of the labor movement.14  He charts in detail the persistent failure of
protective labor legislation, such as wages and hours and working conditions laws, before
the bench, as courts consistently nullified labor’s reformist agenda of the late nineteenth
century as it emerged from state and federal legislatures in the years leading up to the
infamous Lochner decision.15 He points in particular to the 1885 nullification of a New
York law that prohibited the manufacture of cigars in tenements as a significant moment
in the evolution of Gompers’ political thought.  Gompers, himself a cigarmaker, had
personally lobbied for the passage of this legislation. However, citing individual rights in
controlling the terms of the disposition of one’s own labor as justification, the court in In
re Jacobs16 swiftly undid several painstaking years of effort by Gompers and others to
achieve reform.17
In Jacobs, New York’s high court was already expressing its familiarity with and
approval of freedom of contract jurisprudence two full decades before Lochner served as
                                                 
13 Victoria Hattam discusses the resurgence of conspiracy prosecutions lasting from 1865-1896.  See
Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States.
14 Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement.  See also Leon Fink, "Labor, Liberty
and the Law: Trade Unionism and the Problem of the American Constitutional Order," The Journal of
American History 74, no. 3 (1987).
15 See Appendix A.  Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement  177-92.  Better than
sixty such laws had been nullified prior to Lochner.
16 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
17 Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement  39-42.
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its capstone.  Justice Earl, echoing the views of Justice Field in his famous pro-laissez-
faire dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases,18 explained that:
Liberty, in its broad sense as understood in this country, means the right, not only
of freedom from actual servitude, imprisonment or restraint, but the right of one
to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live, and work, where he will, to earn his
livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation.  All
laws, therefore, which impair or trammel these rights, which limit one in his
choice of a trade or profession, or confine him to work or live in a specified
locality, or exclude him from his own house, or restrain his otherwise lawful
movements … are infringements upon his fundamental rights of liberty, which are
under constitutional protection.19
As Roscoe Pound pointed out in 1909, liberty of contract was a doctrine that could not be
dismissed as an aberrational construct of the Supreme Court to reflect its socioeconomic
preferences, as the doctrine had found favor in courts all over the country in the years
before and after Lochner.20
Reflecting on the tenement law and its nullification by the Jacobs decision in his
autobiography, Gompers observed that:
                                                 
18 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
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This equality of right, with exemption from all disparaging and partial enactments, in the lawful pursuits of
life, throughout the whole country, is the distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States. To them,
everywhere, all pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without other restrictions than such as are
imposed equally upon all others of the same age, sex, and condition. The State may prescribe such
regulations for every pursuit and calling of life as will promote the public health, secure the good order and
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This is the fundamental idea upon which our institutions rest, and, unless adhered to in the legislation of the
country, our government will be a republic only in name. The fourteenth amendment, in my judgment,
makes it essential to the validity of the legislation of every State that this equality of right should be
respected. How widely this equality has been departed from, how entirely rejected and trampled upon by
the act of Louisiana, I have already shown. And it is to me a matter of profound regret that its validity is
recognized by a majority of this court, for by it the right of free labor, one of the most sacred and
imprescriptible rights of man, is violated.  83 U.S. 36, 109-10.
20 Roscoe Pound, "Liberty of Contract," Yale Law Journal 18 (1909).  Besides Jacobs, other cases where
state courts struck down protective labor legislation prior to Lochner include Millet v. People, 177 Ill. 295
(1886), striking down an Illinois law that set the manner of payment in the mining industry; State v.
Goodwill, 33 W.Va. 179 (1889), striking down a West Virginia law that required payment of wages in
lawful money; and Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98 (1895), striking down an Illinois maximum hours law for
women.
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Securing the enactment of a law does not mean the solution of the problem as I
learned in my legislative experience.  The power of the courts to pass upon
constitutionality of law so complicates reform by legislation as to seriously
restrict the effectiveness of that method. … After the Appeal Court declared
against the principle of the law, we talked over the possibilities of further
legislative action and decided to concentrate on organization work.  Through our
trade unions we harassed the manufacturers by strikes and agitation until they
were convinced that we did not intend to stop until we had gained our point and
that it would be less costly for them to abandon the tenement manufacturing
system and carry on the industry in factories under decent conditions.  Thus we
accomplished through economic power what we had failed to achieve through
legislation.21
As Gompers gained control over the AFL and the AFL in turn gained control over the
labor movement, this strategic lesson, learned by Gompers the hard way in New York, to
avoid the possibility of judicial review of reform, instructed organized labor’s subsequent
tactics.  Labor opted to treat adverse precedent as an opportunity for a new direction
rather than as a continuing obstacle to action.  The AFL would now tolerate protective
labor legislation only on behalf of perceived weaker groups, such as women and children,
or men engaged in the most absolutely dangerous professions such as mining.22  For most
men they now believed that economic action was the best means to achieve real,
enforceable reform that would not be watered down by courts or subject to the whims of
political parties and the red tape of legislatures.23  Furthermore, reliance on economic
power rather than state power provided well-organized and powerful unions the option of
pushing their demands ever higher without being held back by artificial barriers such as a
minimum wage.  Of the usefulness of legislative reform, Gompers once rhetorically
asked:
                                                 
21 Samuel Gompers and Nick Salvatore, Seventy Years of Life and Labor: An Autobiography (Ithaca, NY:
ILR Press, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1984) 61-2.
22 Julie Novkov discusses the continued efforts during the Lochner era to except women and children from
the freedom of contract and uphold protective labor legislation on their behalf.  See Novkov, Constituting
Workers, Protecting Women: Gender, Law, and Labor in the Progressive Era and New Deal Years.
23 Mollie Ray Carroll, Labor and Politics (Boston and New York,: Houghton Mifflin company, 1923).
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Is there anywhere in the experience of our industry, in the experience of workmen
organized into trade unions, where they have ever secured anything determining
the terms of labor for themselves through legislative enactment that it did not
return as a boomerang, that it did not establish the machinery that gave the courts
an opportunity to render decisions that created an obstacle in the path of the
movement it required years to overcome?24
As for the consequences of winning success through the state, he looked abroad for
cautionary examples and continued:
Only eighteen years ago that wonderful system was adopted in Australia and New
Zealand.  The men there are about as well organized as in any of our countries.
Although they control the Parliament at the present time, they have been unable to
repeal any legislation they enacted and have since discovered only put brass bands
around their movement they could not burst, and have held them backward
instead of allowing them to go forward.25
Gompers and the AFL had learned the lesson of Jacobs and later Lochner well; pursuing
reform through the state after these earlier disappointments was now akin to accepting
gifts from Greeks.26
NECESSITY IS THE MOTHER OF INVENTION:  THE AFL DEVELOPS COLLECTIVE
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Gompers and others in the AFL had been leery of individual freedom and
atomistic conceptions of rights, believing that individual rights for workers in the context
of industrialized America were meaningless without collective power to shield them.27
Justice Holmes referenced this very difficulty in his dissent in Coppage v. Kansas, which
nullified a legislative solution to yellow dog contracts, pointing out that liberty of
                                                 
24 Quoted in Ibid.  65.
25 Ibid.
26 “I fear the Greeks even when they bear gifts,” commented Gompers in testimony before the Commission
on Industrial Relations in 1915 on government wage controls.  Quoted in Ibid.  57.
27 Ronald L. Filippelli, Labor in the USA : A History (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1984) 95.  See also Fink,
"Labor, Liberty and the Law: Trade Unionism and the Problem of the American Constitutional Order."
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contract could really only begin when there was an equality of position between the
contracting parties.28  But Holmes was in the minority on this Supreme Court, and its
persistent favoritism for atomistic rights such as the liberty of contract forced the AFL to
improvise.  The new mission was to collectivize freedom of contract to equalize
bargaining power and promote collective bargaining that would be carried on in the
private sphere.29 Organized labor now needed the courts to withdraw from policing the
economic sphere by accepting the liberty of individual workers to come together to strike
or to protest or to withhold patronage as a group in order to establish the terms of their
service.  This new logic of collective freedom of contract was eloquently explained in a
1917 AFL pamphlet:
The industrial situation in organization is such that the individual worker has lost
his identity.  Only through co-operative action is it possible for workers to have
individuality.  It is therefore necessary to establish for wage-earners the right of
voluntary co-operative action. ... We have found that individual rights and liberty
can be enjoyed only in associated relations.  It is the great purpose of the present
age to establish the right of individuals to voluntary collective action.30
The AFL embraced collective liberty of contract wholeheartedly in its rhetoric,
not only presenting private collective bargaining as a sensible strategy for worker
advancement that avoided the perils of court intervention, but also as a fulfillment of
constitutional ideals, readily co-opting the preferred judicial narrative that the freedom to
contract for one’s labor was an essential constitutional right, a critical quality of
manhood, and salutary for civic virtue.  Compare the suggestion of Justice Peckham in
                                                 
28 236 U.S. 1, 27 (1915).
29 Scholars studying British trade unionism of this era refer to this reinvention of freedom of contract as
“collective laissez-faire.” Ken Coates and Tony Topham, Trade Unions in Britain (Nottingham:
Spokesman, 1980) 265.  For further discussion of the AFL’s new twist on laissez-faire, see Fink, "Labor,
Liberty and the Law: Trade Unionism and the Problem of the American Constitutional Order.", Forbath,
Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement.
30 American Federation of Labor, "Involuntary Servitude in Colorado,"  (Washington, D.C.: American
Federation of Labor, 1917), 47.
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Lochner that the intelligence and judgment of bakers should be respected and that they
are “in no sense wards of the state,”31 with the suggestion by Gompers that social welfare
legislation does for workers what “they can and ought to do for themselves,” thereby
sapping their “initiative,” which is “the greatest crime that can be committed against the
toilers.”32  According to one AFL pamphlet, in exercising freedom of contract the worker
develops, “discrimination and strength of will.”33  Even before Lochner, the AFL, in its
declaration from the 1900 convention, spoke of the toilers having the “sufficient
intelligence and manhood to unite for their own and the common protection.”34  For
Gompers, trade unions benefited workers not only economically, but also made them
better citizens.  “The spiritual effect of industrial freedom,” he once wrote, “is of
incalculable potency in determining the moral fiber of the nation.”35
For a large swath of the working class, freedom of contract was now a rallying
cry.  At the time of the Lochner decision, the transformation of labor strategy and tactics
in response to economic due process was well underway.  With labor reform through
state legislatures no longer a priority for the AFL, continued judicial allegiance to notions
of substantive due process liberty would no longer be a major stumbling block for
organized labor.36 Thus, from the perspective of organized labor, the doctrinal evolution
                                                 
31 198 U.S. 45, 57.
32 From “The Workers and the Eight-Hour Work-Day.” Reprinted in Samuel Gompers and Hayes Robbins,
Labor and the Common Welfare, American Labor: From Conspiracy to Collective Bargaining (New York,:
Arno Press, 1969) 16.
33 Labor, "Involuntary Servitude in Colorado," 46.
34 Reprinted in John P. Frey, The Labor Injunction : An Exposition of Government by Judicial Conscience
and Its Menace (Thomson Gale, 1923 [cited 25 August 2006]); available from
http://galenet.galegroup.com.content.lib.utexas.edu:2048/servlet/MOML?af=RN&ae=F153308006&srchtp
=a&ste=14.
35 From the November 1916 American Federationist.   Reprinted in Gompers and Robbins, Labor and the
Common Welfare  22.
36 One aspect of economic due process jurisprudence that did remain strongly relevant to organized labor
was the inability of federal or state laws banning yellow dog contracts to survive judicial review.  Yellow
dog contracts were agreements signed by workers pledging that they would not join a union.  Federal
legislation that banned yellow dog contracts was struck down by the Supreme Court on Fifth Amendment
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from Lochner to West Coast Hotel that would work the undoing of freedom of contract
was now largely a sideshow of greater interest to progressives than to labor activists. 37
However, this capitulation to economic due process and redirection in strategy to
embrace laissez-faire economics and transform liberty of contract ideals did not spell the
end of judicial hostility toward the labor movement.  The courts responded cruelly to
labor’s attempts at collective bargaining.  The same interplay of favoritism for big
business and long-standing belief in state neutrality that pushed the courts to be skeptical
of labor reform through the state would also influence their approach to the enforcement
of antitrust laws against unions and the utilization of the equity power of injunction.  For
scores in the labor movement, the years running up to the 1937 decision in West Coast
Hotel would be remembered for the judicial assault on collective bargaining, not for the
judicial neutering of legislative labor reform that was to be undone in that case.
THE JUDICIAL ASSAULT ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
By the 1890’s courts had begun regularly using equity injunctions to control
organized labor. An 1895 editorial in the AFL’s journal, the American Federationist,
reported that “courts are to have something to do with solving the labor question, whether
                                                                                                                                                  
due process grounds in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), while state legislation was struck down
under authority of the Fourteenth Amendment in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).  This judicial
hostility to efforts to disrupt the use of yellow dog contracts would be particularly devastating to organized
labor when the Supreme Court permitted injunctive relief against unions attempting to persuade workers
who had signed yellow dog contracts to unionize in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229
(1917).
37 Particularly progressive women who had continued the fight for protective legislation on behalf of
women and children.  I will discuss this issue at greater length in Chapter Five.  See Novkov, Constituting
Workers, Protecting Women: Gender, Law, and Labor in the Progressive Era and New Deal Years, Joan G.
Zimmerman, "The Jurisprudence of Equality - the Womens Minimum-Wage, the 1st Equal-Rights-
Amendment, and Adkins V Childrens Hospital, 1905-1923," Journal of American History 78, no. 1 (1991).
I will take this issue up in greater detail in Chapter Five.
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the toilers like it or not.”38  Gompers’ gamble on voluntarism would not pay off so easily,
as the courts followed labor into the private sphere.  The labor injunction proved to be a
handy tool of control since an equity injunction, which is issued to prevent immediate,
irreparable injury to property until there can be a legal resolution of a dispute, could be
ordered without a trial, and without the attendant costs of time and sympathetic local
influence such as might be found on local juries. Courts during this period began to
consider intangible, pecuniary interests, such as a right to profits, protection of business
reputation and customer patronage, and maintenance of a labor force, as types of property
protected by the common law, effectively crippling collective bargaining tactics by
unions that would treat just these types of business interests as bargaining chips.
Use of injunctions against organized labor originated with railroad strikes in the
late 1870’s.  Unrest on the railroads, and with it injunctions of strikes and boycotts,
escalated and led to the showdown over the infamous Pullman Boycott of 1894, where
the Supreme Court would bless the use of equity injunctions against organized labor by
upholding the blanket injunctions and numerous contempt citations that had broken the
Pullman strikes.39 William Forbath conservatively estimates that some 4,330 labor
injunctions would eventually be issued by American courts between 1880 and 1930.40
Complementing the development of government by injunction and this new
understanding of property was judicial enforcement of antitrust legislation against
organized labor.  Common law conspiracy had been reborn, now codified as a legislative
imperative in the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act’s prohibition of combinations effected
for the purpose of restraining trade. The courts, not surprisingly, were quicker and more
                                                 
38 James F. Duncan, "To Purify Our Courts," American Federationist, March 1895.
39 See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).  For a fuller history of the Pullman Boycott and the related railroad
injunctions see Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement  66-79, Felix Frankfurter
and Nathan Greene, The Labor Injunction (New York: Macmillan, 1930) 17-24.
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eager to cite unions for illegal restraint of trade than the enormous trusts that had
originally inspired the legislation.41  Daniel Davenport, of the pro-business American
Anti-Boycott Association (AABA), would refer to unions as a “labor trust” in a 1904
debate with Gompers, feeding public distaste for the robber barons, and the AABA would
play a significant role in ensuring that unions came under the jurisdiction of the Sherman
Act by frequently sponsoring litigation against organized labor.42 Antitrust legislation
permitted even wider use of injunctions as businesses flocked to the courts to stay strikes
and boycotts until a trial could be had on the merits of whether organized labor had
formed an illegal combination to restrain trade, by which time, of course, the strike or
boycott in question would have been broken due to large dockets and “the leisurely
atmosphere of many American courts.”43  Prosecution under the Sherman Act also
brought the sting of the possibility of treble damages for its violation, and unions were
hardly in the position in this era to absorb financial penalties of such a magnitude.
Organized labor soldiered on and attempted to flex the muscle of the working
class through secondary boycotts and publication of “unfair lists,” but in 1908 the
Supreme Court, in Loewe v. Lawler, a case sponsored by the AABA, struck down a
secondary boycott by hatters in Connecticut as violating the Sherman Act’s ban on illegal
                                                 
41 The Supreme Court as part of antitrust enforcement greatly limited an assortment of union practices to
force collective bargaining, including: boycotts (Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 [1908] and Gompers v.
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43 Frey, The Labor Injunction : An Exposition of Government by Judicial Conscience and Its Menace
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restraint of trade.44  The Court refused to exempt combinations of labor from antitrust
enforcement.  Whatever slim hope Gompers and others had held for the viability of
industry-wide collective bargaining as a means to advance the condition of workers was
now shattered.
Gompers himself was nearly jailed in 1908 for his efforts to publicize a boycott of
an “unfair” iron molder in the American Federationist despite an injunction against the
boycott.  The prosecution of Gompers was a national sensation, and although the
Supreme Court eventually overturned the contempt charges, it was clear that unions
would not be permitted to threaten customer patronage as a tool of collective
bargaining.45  While workers could peacefully strike their own employers, the courts
would deny them the aid of fellow workers in their wider industry or the withholding of
the purchasing power of sympathetic customers.  Organized labor became desperate.
Without the ability to effectively strike in sympathy or to urge boycotts of goods and
services produced by recalcitrant employers, collective contract liberty would fail and
freedom of contract between equal parties would yet prove itself to be the joke that was
so often told by the progressive critics of the Lochner Court.  Reacting to the Loewe
decision, Gompers told members of Congress in 1908 that the Supreme Court had done
far more than doom the secondary boycott, but had in fact put all organized labor in peril
                                                 
44 Famously known as the Danbury Hatters Case.  In 1902, a Danbury hat manufacturer refused to
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as illegal combinations in restraint of trade.  “It is indeed true that under the decision our
very organized existence is unlawful,” he claimed dramatically.46
MANUFACTURING GOLD BRICKS FILLED WITH DYNAMITE:  THE AFL TURNS TO
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
Through injunctions and antitrust enforcement, the courts had nearly destroyed
organized labor in the early years of the twentieth century. But just as Gompers and the
AFL had improvised in the face of economic due process jurisprudence by collectivizing
freedom of contract ideals and retreating into the private sphere, they would also respond
to hostile courts deploying the common law and federal legislation against them through
a series of legislative initiatives meant to curb court jurisdiction and a sophisticated
constitutional narrative centered on the Thirteenth Amendment.  While organized labor
was deeply cynical in their assessment of the motives of judges in their persecution of
unions, they nevertheless responded with principled constitutional arguments to rebut
judicial outlawry, and in these arguments anchored in the Thirteenth Amendment we find
a counterpoint to the very constitutional principles of state neutrality and equality that
revisionist scholars of Lochner have claimed legitimately constrained the courts of that
period in their review of labor issues.47  Economic due process was not the only
constitutional issue that brought the question of judicial motives during this era into
focus, and economic due process by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century
was no longer the primary object of labor’s counter-attack.
                                                 
46 Quoted in Ibid.  167.
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The Thirteenth Amendment served as the linchpin of organized labor’s arguments
against government by injunction and the aggressive enforcement of antitrust laws
against unions. 48  As a practical matter, the Thirteenth Amendment appealed to organized
labor because it makes no distinction between state, federal and private actors in its
application.  Involuntary servitude simply cannot exist in the United States, and
Congress, courtesy of Section 2, has been given the remedial authority necessary to
eliminate or prevent involuntary servitude wherever it exists or might develop.  This
authority, in theory, could underpin procedural reforms of courts’ equity powers and the
passage of pointed amendments to antitrust legislation exempting organized labor from
their force.
Gompers and his allies offered three powerful arguments rooted in the Thirteenth
Amendment against the use of equity injunctions to settle labor disputes and the
application of antitrust laws to labor unions employing collective bargaining tactics.49
First, organized labor argued that given the new economic realities of industrialization,
mass production and the consolidation of capital, individual workers could not bargain
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effectively with their employers and therefore must form associations with other workers
to do so.  To enjoin or to criminalize the bargaining tactics of such associations would
create conditions of involuntary servitude for workers, a condition now constitutionally
prohibited.  Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment provided the constitutional justification for
the move away from an individualistic interpretation of economic due process that would
complement labor’s socio-economic argument for collectivization of freedom of contract.
To be able to quit a job, boycott goods, or protest employment practices had no force
when done individually.  To prevent workers from associating to do these things, even if
they might do them individually, amounted to conditions of involuntary servitude.  It
denied them an “effectual voice,” and their now “collective or group rights and
liberties.”50
Second, the AFL argued that the Thirteenth Amendment revised Fifth
Amendment property guarantees.  The courts were unmoved by collective freedom of
contract and were regularly redeploying the common law against unions attempting to
bargain collectively, but the AFL responded with their own analysis of the proper
meaning of property under the common law.  The labor power of an individual, according
to the AFL, could no longer be considered property, and thus could not be subject to an
equity injunction and should not be subject to control by anti-conspiracy doctrines.
Judges’ efforts to read business interests into the definition of property were not only
illogical, but also now unconstitutional.  The Declaration of the 1922 AFL Convention
makes this argument plain:
     Practically all the decisions of our courts in industrial disputes arising out of
the issuance of injunctions are founded upon the legal point of view that the labor
power of a human being is property … This conception is … unwarranted in law.
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It is of modern origin in its application in industrial disputes, not having been
seriously contended for until the adoption of the thirteenth amendment …
     This legal conception of labor power, taken in connection with anti-
combination and anti-conspiracy doctrines, is the cornerstone upon which the
equity power of our courts is founded …
     Prior to the adoption of the thirteenth amendment, it was not necessary to
divide the labor power from a human being from the person in whom it was
inherent … The person was bought or raised as a slave, he was contracted for if
not a slave; in either case he was a labor power that was desired and obtained.
     After the adoption of the thirteenth amendment the employer found it desirable
to find some way of maintaining his grip on the labor power, and so through anti-
conspiracy laws, and anti-combination laws and the misuse of the equity power of
our courts, the employer did, through the advice of attorneys and prompted by the
speculative theory of pseudo-political economists, set about to treat labor power
as property, separate and distinct from the person, notwithstanding the fact that
the labor power of a human being is the most personal of all things, and so
absolutely inherent in the person that it grows with his growth, diminishes in
sickness and with age, and passes away at death.51
Third, labor activists argued that the Thirteenth Amendment conferred a special
distinction on labor, thus making a class-based exception to the conspiracy function of
antitrust legislation for labor groups acceptable despite equality guarantees in the
Fourteenth Amendment.  According to the AFL, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition
of class legislation had to be read in concert with the Thirteenth Amendment’s special
treatment of labor.  Labor was the better of capital and deserving of special treatment.
Gompers liked to cite Abraham Lincoln on this point.  “And as the immortal Lincoln
said,” he told one audience, “’Capital is the fruit of labor and could not exist if labor had
not first existed.  Labor, therefore, deserves much the higher consideration.’”52  The
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Thirteenth Amendment now commanded that higher consideration, with its special
recognition of labor and its imperative that involuntary servitude in any form be swept
way, even against the baseline equality principle of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These Thirteenth Amendment arguments struck right at the heart of the problem
courts were having entering the twentieth century, as they confronted the radical changes
in society that had complicated the application of the common law and had created such
widely divergent class distinctions as to pressure the traditional application of norms of
equality.  As Cass Sunstein explains in regards to Lochner, courts were accustomed to
imposing a constitutional requirement of neutrality that meant preserving society’s
existing distribution of wealth and entitlements as governed by the baseline of the
common law.  To approve state actions that would radically rework society would be an
illegitimate subsidy of one group or class of citizens at the expense of others.53  But
emancipation and the Thirteenth Amendment had seriously complicated the common law
and its governance of the relationships between master and servant.54  Courts no longer
had a comfortable merging of man and labor to govern workplace relations.  But as
William Forbath points out, in the context of threatening late nineteenth and early
twentieth century labor unrest, there were plenty of “familiar mental grooves” into which
new notions of common law property could fit, cobbled from traditional understandings
of master/servant law and common law conspiracy.55  Buttressing these familiar mental
grooves was the jurisprudence developing from Field’s Slaughter-House dissent that
treated both a man’s intangible right to labor and a man’s intangible right to his business
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or enterprise as species of property.56  Thus, the common law was being effectively
refeudalized by equity judges.  Courts could remain in familiar territory when applying
equity rules in such a way as to maintain underlying societal distributions of wealth and
entitlements.  These distributions would surely be upset by judicial embrace of collective
laissez-faire.  Courts would be loathe to grant what would appear to be a subsidy from
society to organized labor by accepting a thoroughgoing revision of the common law.57
Nevertheless the AFL pounded home the message that the Thirteenth Amendment
had revised Fifth Amendment property guarantees, continuously challenging courts to
abandon the common law governance of labor relations.  In 1906, Gompers published an
article in the American Federationist, “No Property Rights In Man: The Essential
Principal of Protest Against Injunctions in Labor Disputes,” that made this very point.
That article was only one of many publications by AFL leaders to emphasize the revision
of the common law and the illegitimacy of equity injunctions to protect business’
intangible property interests.  In 1923, John P. Frey, a labor activist and editor of the
International Iron Molder’s Journal, published a book on the injunction problem,
referring to labor injunctions as the “menace” unleashed by government by “judicial
conscience.”58 Frey provided an extensive discussion of the misapplication by equity
judges of the common law in labor disputes, reviewing at length the history of the
common law from the English chancery courts onward.  He also catalogued the AFL
strategy against government by injunction, which included a strong public relations
campaign to raise awareness of the illegitimacy of labor injunctions, a drive to impeach
judges who issued injunctions, and finally legislative initiatives aimed at excepting
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organized labor from the Sherman Act which was the authority for many of the
injunctions issued against unions.59  These efforts to curb the courts were not particularly
successful, and the Supreme Court continuously disappointed the AFL with its blessing
of equity injunctions against labor. It would be difficult to authoritatively establish
whether the Supreme Court’s motives for ignoring the AFL’s arguments rested on
conservative economic ideology and a pro-business bias, or on a statesman-like need to
adjust the familiar confines of the common law to quell unrest and blunt major societal
change, however evidence for both characterizations of the courts can be found in this
long battle over government by injunction.
The AFL, which had gotten a slight momentum boost for its Thirteenth
Amendment approach from the Supreme Court’s attack on debt peonage statutes in the
South did not just go after equity courts in their deployment of the Thirteenth
Amendment.60  They also pursued legislation that would exempt union activity from the
Sherman Act.  This effort would squarely implicate the well-developed American
tradition against class or partial legislation that Howard Gillman has argued influenced
the decision-making of the Lochner Court.  Reeling from the Loewe and Buck’s Stove
decisions, the AFL turned to Congress for relief.  Gompers was insistent that labor should
be exempted from antitrust legislation, but he ran into stiff opposition from pro-business
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forces.  Daniel Davenport of the AABA lobbied legislators with pointed references to
“the Jeffersonian maxim of equal rights for all and special privileges for none.”61  Earlier
decisions by the Supreme Court would seem to support Davenport’s position that special
groups could not be exempted from antitrust enforcement.  In 1902, in Connolly v. Union
Sewer Pipe Company, the Court struck down an Illinois antitrust statute that exempted
farmers from its reach.  According to Justice Harlan, the legislation did not treat similarly
situated groups “alike under like circumstances and considerations, both in the privileges
conferred, and in the limitations imposed.”62  It was not clear that courts would accept the
proposition that capital and labor could be distinguished, and that the differentiation
between the right to work and the right to manage would be enough to overcome the
Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of the Thirteenth Amendment.
In 1914, after hard lobbying, Congress passed the Clayton Act.  Gompers referred
to the law as “the Magna Carta upon which the working people will rear their structure of
industrial freedom.”63  Section 6 proclaimed that “the labor power of a human being is
not a commodity or article of commerce.”  Gompers and the AFL were thrilled, so
thrilled in fact that subsequent history encyclopedias of the AFL would be stamped with
this very pronouncement.  While the Clayton Act had not been grounded in the
Thirteenth Amendment, many in Congress had echoed the rhetoric of the AFL.
Representative Casey remarked that “labor power or patronage can not be property, but
aside from this we have the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution prohibiting slavery
and involuntary servitude.”64  Representative Wilson also spoke in the voice of organized
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labor, as he pointed out that the assumption that man was property was repugnant to “all
civilized communities and specifically forbidden by the thirteenth amendment.”65
However, as Daniel Ernst explains, the Clayton Act was far more ambiguous in
its function than the celebrations of the AFL might suggest.  It was not entirely clear that
the Clayton Act had really done anything at all for the benefit of organized labor.66
Although the law made it clear that unions themselves could not be construed as illegal
combinations or conspiracies within the meaning of the antitrust laws under Section 6,
the Clayton Act did not expressly forbid the application of antitrust laws to union
activities.  While union existence would be protected, the statute did not clearly indicate
any protection of some of the more radical tools of collective bargaining such as
secondary boycotts and attacks on closed shops, which had been previously viewed by
courts as illegal.
Courts had the option to interpret the language of the Clayton Act regarding
unions robustly to provide them special protection from the antitrust laws, but to do so
would require courts to confront the question of equality and whether the Clayton Act
was illegitimate class legislation.  Such a robust reading of the Clayton Act to exempt
labor from the Sherman Act never came.  Consequently the courts did not have to tackle
the question of favoritism by the state, at least not in the context of the Clayton Act, for
the act had been neutralized by the Supreme Court in 1921 by their decision in Duplex.
Duplex exploited the weakness of the Clayton Act’s ambiguous language, which still held
unions responsible for illegal activity surrounding employment relations. With Duplex,
the Supreme Court reviewed an equity injunction that had been issued to stop a national
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secondary boycott by the Machinists and reached the conclusion that the statute did not
change preexisting law and secondary boycotts would continue to be construed as an
illegal activity.  The common law would continue to be applied as before, for the Clayton
Act, in the words of Justice Pitney, “is but declaratory of the law as it stood before.”67
To make matters worse for organized labor, the Clayton Act contained a provision
to extend equity relief to private parties.  Ironically, and devastatingly, the Clayton Act
would now support a new flood of labor injunctions, and the AFL would find itself in
greater peril than ever before.68  One correspondent with Senator William Borah would
refer to the labor provisions of the Clayton Act, which the AFL had fought so hard for, as
not just being “gold bricks,” but in fact “gold bricks containing dynamite.”69
Although the Supreme Court had gutted the Clayton Act by claiming it merely
codified the common law, this did not mean that they did not pass on the question of
preferential treatment of labor.  Shortly after issuing their ruling in Duplex, the Supreme
Court would review Arizona’s state version of the Clayton Act in Truax v. Corrigan.70
The Arizona statute prohibited the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes unless to
prevent irreparable harm to property and offered protection of peaceful picketing and
persuasion.  The Supreme Court would strike this provision down as a violation of both
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and equal protection clause since it
specially immunized the activities of organized labor and denied businesses the right to
pursue equity relief against labor in some circumstances.
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Chief Justice Taft wrote the majority opinion in Truax and offered extensive
argument on the point of the illegitimacy of class legislation.  The Supreme Court had not
conveniently discovered this principle of equality, but could point to a strong
constitutional tradition.  Taft writes of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Our whole system of law is predicated on the general fundamental principle of
equality of application of the law. 'All men are equal before the law,' 'This is a
government of laws and not of men,' 'No man is above the law,' are all maxims
showing the spirit in which Legislatures, executives and courts are expected to
make, execute and apply laws. But the framers and adopters of this amendment
were not content to depend on a mere minimum secured by the due process
clause, or upon the spirit of equality which might not be insisted on by local
public opinion. They therefore embodied that spirit in a specific guaranty.  The
guaranty was aimed at undue favor and individual or class privilege, on the one
hand, and at hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality, on the other. It
sought an equality of treatment of all persons, even though all enjoyed the
protection of due process.71
Taft went on to cite several cases that had rested on equal protection grounds, including
Barbier v. Connolly, Hayes v. Missouri, and Yick Wo v. Hopkins.72
One tantalizing statement from the opinion is Taft’s acknowledgment that a
guaranty of equal protection does not constrain the federal government. “The due process
clause,” wrote Taft, “brought down from Magna Charta was found in the early state
constitutions and later in the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution … while the
equality clause does not appear in the Fifth Amendment and so does not apply to
congressional legislation.”73  Thus Arizona was bound to offer all of its citizens their day
in court without any exceptions based on class.  The federal government, however, might
possibly make class-based distinctions in offering injunctive relief to its citizens.
Whatever encouragement this may have given organized labor about the possibility of
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federal protection of unions had been cruelly mooted by the evisceration of the Clayton
Act earlier that year in Duplex with the Court’s refusal to rein in the common law to
reflect the force of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Oliver Wendell Holmes complained bitterly of Taft’s reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment, resurrecting the ghosts of Lochner and once again questioning the motives
and modus operandi of the conservatives on the Court.  Holmes wrote in his Truax
dissent:
Legislation may begin where an evil begins. If, as many intelligent people
believe, there is more danger that the injunction will be abused in labor cases than
elsewhere I can feel no doubt of the power of the Legislature to deny it in such
cases. … There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making
of social experiments that an important part of the community desires, in the
insulated chambers afforded by the several states, even though the experiments
may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose judgment I most
respect.74
Felix Frankfurter agreed with Holmes.  In an editorial in the New Republic,
Frankfurter wrote of Truax that it was “destined to become even more classic than the
Lochner case – a challenge is offered to all who find intolerable authoritarian rule by five
men in contested fields of social policy.”75  Was Truax an example of judicial preference
or constitutional principle?  Was the Supreme Court bowing to long established
principles of equality, or was the Supreme Court finding convenient cover in the
Fourteenth Amendment for its economic ideology in rebuffing labor reform in Arizona?
Certainly the long history of resistance to class legislation highlighted by Lochner
revisionist Howard Gillman was likely on the minds of the Court in 1921 just as much as
it had been in 1905, when the Court tapped the due process clause of the Fourteenth
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Amendment.  By the same token, conservatives on the bench, such as Chief Justice Taft,
had not hidden their personal distaste for organized labor.76
While organized labor had been otherwise occupied developing its voluntarist
strategy by the time the Supreme Court had perfected free contract jurisprudence in
Lochner, all eyes of organized labor were tightly focused on the Supreme Court as it
passed on the vitality of state protection of collective bargaining practices in Duplex and
Truax.  The AFL’s rendition of the history of a Supreme Court hostile to the working
man and progressive reform would likely sound quite similar, if not identical, to the
rendition of the Progressive Era Court told by constitutional scholars preoccupied with
Lochner, but these narratives would almost certainly hit upon completely different plot
points in telling the story.  This difference in emphasis may not much matter except that
the histories of this unpopular Supreme Court conclude in two different cases, West Coast
Hotel and Jones & Laughlin, each case sending scholars down very different paths of
inquiry that remain deeply relevant to constitutional politics today.
RESOURCE COMPETITION WITH PROGRESSIVES:  THE AFL ABANDONS
COLLECTIVE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
The AFL frequently partnered with members of the progressive movement from
the 1890’s onward in order to pursue labor movement interests, particularly in efforts to
curb the power of the courts, which had thwarted the interests of both progressives and
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organized labor.77  As will be discussed at greater length in Chapters Four and Five, the
women’s movement and the civil rights movement would both attempt to pool resources
with the AFL and negotiate a united response to the difficult workplace conditions of the
period, but the AFL did not recognize sufficient benefits of a coalition with these peers to
either admit them on equal terms, or at all, to unions or to change constitutional course to
accommodate their preferences.  That was not the case with progressives.  The
progressives proved to be peers that the AFL could not resist compromise with.  This is
not surprising.  Progressive elite possessed far greater resources that the AFL could
capture if they were willing to compromise their constitutional preferences in order to
maintain a coalition than the women’s movement or the civil rights movement could ever
hope to offer.
The progressive movement was well-resourced, because it was a middle class
phenomenon.  Members of the middle class, which had become increasingly
professionalized during this period with the development of the social sciences and the
blossoming of professions such as social work that stimulated activism, reacted to the
widespread social ills that stemmed from industrialization and urbanization with a
reformist agenda that included curbing corporate power, particularly monopolies, ending
political corruption and enhancing democracy, battling vice, and educating and protecting
the underclass.78  Progressivism was not a coherent, tightly bound social movement.79  It
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represented a more diffuse reformist impulse that permeated the middle class, oriented
around a belief in the ability, and even duty, to engineer positive social change, and for
progressives that meant a reliance on efficient government tools for engineering this
change.
According to Robert H. Wiebe, the heart of progressivism lay in the faith and
ambition of the middle class to fulfill its destiny through bureaucratic means.80  It was on
this point that progressives and the AFL under Gompers would diverge.  As discussed
above, the AFL had grown hostile to state solutions to labor problems, and what little
faith they might have held in the sensibility or propriety of bureaucratic engineering of
the workplace was easily overwhelmed by the certainty that the courts would intervene to
crush any state intervention.  The Thirteenth Amendment facilitated a blessedly private
solution to labor difficulties.  It ensured non-interference with collective bargaining,
because labor would be exempted from anti-trust limitations and immunized against
overly generous judicial interpretations of property in order to prevent involuntary
servitude.  But just as the state would be prevented from thwarting labor’s collective
bargaining tactics, it could not rush in to govern the parameters of any collectively
bargained solution to labor strife either.  Wages, hours and other working conditions
would be set privately between employer and employee (en masse), and in this way the
AFL vision remained consistent with an individualistic constitutional order that relied on
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rights rather than bureaucratic management of social relations, while it simultaneously
acknowledged the importance of integrating groups into the constitutional order given the
industrial transformation of society.
Progressives were also convinced of the importance of integrating groups into the
constitutional order and labor was the vehicle for this integration, but they did not believe
that the old constitutional order that held the state at a distance from individuals should or
could be in any way maintained.  Competition, be it social, industrial or otherwise was at
the core of society and it could not be managed through abstraction but through political
management.81 As Ken Kersch explains, this Social Darwinism of progressive thinkers
was not particularly attractive.  Industrial democracy, therefore, became a progressive
watchword. For progressives like John Dewey, Herbert Croly and Walter Lippman, it
was necessary to recast the private sphere of the workplace into a public sphere where
workers, through industrial relations, could realize their full ethic and civic potential.82  In
articulating the virtues of industrial democracy, Walter Lippman sounded a great deal
like AFL leaders who had spun Lochnerian rhetoric of manhood and the dignity of the
empowered individual into a collective form.  Lippman writes:
If labor is apathetic, hostile to efficiency, without much pride, it is because labor
is not part of industrial management.  People don’t take a sympathetic interest in
the affairs of the state until they are voting members of the state.  You can’t
expect civic virtue from a disenfranchised class, nor industrial virtues from the
industrially disenfranchised.83
Progressives generously appropriated the labor movement’s resource of social sympathy,
and perhaps even more so labor’s resource in the social fear generated by labor unrest, in
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order to promote a labor gateway to a corporatist state.  But the key difference between
the collectivism and the industrial republicanism of labor and of progressives would be
that the AFL continued to conceive of the workplace as a private sphere, governed only
by the protections of constitutional rights, and not a public sphere subject to the paternal
intervention of the state.
This tension in the loose ideological coalition between labor and progressives had
been palpable in earlier attempts at bureaucratic management of labor strife.  Government
bureaucrats had always been as much an enemy to the AFL as the courts themselves.
State intervention was inconsistent with voluntarist beliefs in the autonomy, dignity and
manhood of workers, who would become better citizens, according to the AFL, if left
alone to fight their own battles.  When Colorado and Kansas had each experimented with
state management of collective bargaining earlier in the century by setting up industrial
commissions, the AFL had responded fiercely.  Workers would not go back to being
“wards of the state.”84
This tension would come to the fore again in the late 1920’s, as the AFL
challenged Congress to rein in the courts and to do so under the authority of the
Thirteenth Amendment. The 1920’s had proven to be difficult times for organized labor,
which was now faced with the full force of judicial governance by injunction. Andrew
Furuseth, one-time head of the Seamen’s International Union, and perhaps the most
fervent believer in the AFL’s Thirteenth Amendment strategy, decided to dispatch with
any effort to overcome revised definitions of property at common law or any attempt to
justify class-based exceptions from antitrust laws for labor.  He was frustrated by the
failure of the Clayton Act to restrain hostile courts, as the Supreme Court struck its final
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blow to the law’s labor provisions in 1921 in Duplex and then added insult to injury in
Truax.  The AFL had scrambled for new proposals to limit the injunctive authority of the
courts throughout the 1920’s, but Furuseth, complained that these proposals, submitted
by various progressive lawyers, did not sufficiently defend the liberty principles
underlying labor’s pursuit of industrial freedom. Tentative hedges against the courts’
injunction powers would not do.  There could be “no half loaf on fundamental
principles,” as far as Furuseth was concerned.85  Besides, in his view, limits on the
jurisdiction of courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes would be subject to the same
accusations of class legislation that undid Arizona’s anti-trust reform in Truax.  The
courts had shown they would not be swayed on any manner of a labor exemption to anti-
trust principles.  Instead, Furuseth opted for an extremely simple solution, which would
not implicate class favoritism, using Congress’ Article III power to set the jurisdiction of
the federal courts.  Furuseth’s friend, Minnesota Senator Henrik Shipstead, introduced
Furuseth’s bill in December 1927 to the Senate Judiciary Committee.  The Shipstead Bill
(S. 1482) consisted of only one line:  “Equity courts shall have the jurisdiction to protect
property when there is no remedy at law; for the purpose of determining such
jurisdiction, nothing shall be held to be property unless it is tangible and transferable, and
all laws and parts of laws inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.”86
This simple, yet drastic, solution to the injunction problem went over like a lead
balloon in Congress.  Its incredible breadth and vagueness turned off a variety of parties
that appeared to testify on the bill at its subcommittee hearings.87 Felix Frankfurter, who
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was a committed progressive and a Brandeis acolyte, would condescendingly summarize
Furuseth’s efforts as follows:
With indomitable tenacity, Mr. Furuseth has persisted in his own conception of
legal history and in the espousal of a reform deemed by him the correct legal
tradition.  There is much that is gallant in the picture of this self-taught seaman
challenging with power and skill an entire learned profession.  For, almost
without exception, the informed opinion of lawyers, even those most sympathetic
with Mr. Furuseth’s aims, regards his proposal as an attempt to the throw out the
baby with bath.  The Shipstead bill condemns many well-settled and beneficent
exercises of equitable jurisdiction that do not touch even remotely the interests of
labor.88
At the conclusion of the hearings, Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, a progressive,
determined that the Shipstead Bill was unacceptable in the form Furuseth offered, so he
tapped a group of expert advisers to draft a substitute bill.  Frankfurter would campaign
to be one of these appointed advisers, bringing closer the confrontation between the
AFL’s brand of individualistic corporatism with the statist corporatism of progressives.89
The time was near for this labor-progressive coalition, if it was to remain a coalition that
could share resources, to settle on the exact constitutional tenor of corporatist policy.
The substitute bill abandoned efforts to kill the injunction outright by redefining
property.  Instead, it assembled a detailed set of limitations on court jurisdiction, which is
subject to legislative control, to issue injunctions in labor disputes.  The substitute bill
spoke in the language of the AFL’s collective freedom of contract ideals in establishing
the public policy of the United States, but it pointedly did not cite the Thirteenth
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Amendment as authority for this policy.  As an aid to interpretation, Section 2 of the
substitute bill read:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of
governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and
other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is
commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his
freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable conditions of employment,
wherefore it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing to negotiate
the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the
interference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted
activities for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection….90
Furuseth was unsatisfied with this “half loaf” approach to the problem of hostile courts.
The bill still permitted some equity jurisdiction by courts over labor matters and for him
that was an unacceptable breach of the long-husbanded Thirteenth Amendment narrative.
The substitute bill, in Furuseth’s view, would bring the AFL right back to where they had
been, with the courts screaming class legislation and striking down the law, and without
the strongest constitutional rebuttal to the class legislation accusation, the Thirteenth
Amendment, in play.91
Delegates to the 1928 AFL convention did not embrace the substitute bill, but
instead reaffirmed support for the original Shipstead Bill.  Furuseth’s position still held
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sway over AFL membership.  Victor Olander, the secretary-treasurer of the Illinois
Federation, explained that the AFL did “not doubt the friendliness of the sources from
which the substitute bill emanated, it is our opinion … the time is here when the
Congress of the United States can be prevailed upon to provide a really adequate remedy
for the injunction evil.”92  But this bravado did not last.  As time passed and the substitute
bill floundered, AFL officials began to worry over the wisdom of the AFL’s position to
reject the “half loaf” that had been offered by Norris and his progressive experts.
Matthew Woll, the vice-president of the AFL, wrote to Victor Olander in 1929,
questioning whether it was wise to squander the friendliness of the Norris subcommittee,
a group of politicians he termed “perhaps the friendliest we have ever had.”  He
continued “[I]s not the Sub-committee liable to feel that it has exhausted all its ability,
and will it not be likely to disavow our future plans act in a more or less passive
manner?”93  At the 1929 AFL Convention, Thomas Kennedy of the mine workers
worried that the AFL not once again show the lack of unity that had marked the original
Shipstead hearings that made the labor movement the “laughingstock of Washington.”94
This is the language of resource competition.  Members of the AFL recognized the
strategic value of the AFL’s reputation among the progressive political elite, and the
favorable access they had been granted by those elite to the policymaking process.  Those
were resources they could not afford to squander in order to stick to a specific
constitutional narrative.  Expedience won out over Furuseth’s, and the now-deceased
Gompers’, principle.  The AFL voted in 1929 to endorse the substitute bill and strengthen
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their relationship with Norris and other progressive elite such as Frankfurter that held
political influence.95
The AFL endorsement did not lead to quick passage of the substitute bill.  The bill
continued to falter.96  This delay provided Furuseth an opportunity to fight for a
legislative embrace of collective freedom of contract built on the constitutional
foundation of the Thirteenth Amendment.  He would push Winter S. Martin, an AFL
attorney who had steadfastly supported his Shipstead Bill, to draft a new bill that would
fully and unequivocally embrace the Thirteenth Amendment as the source of broad labor
rights in the Constitution.  This proposal would represent the most mature expression of
the AFL’s long-held strategy.  It was the full loaf.  However, it would also represent the
last effective gasp of this constitutional narrative.  Senator Shipstead submitted Martin’s
memorandum on Norris’ substitute bill (S.2497) complete with the proposed Thirteenth
Amendment bill as a Senate Document in 1931.97
Martin’s proposed bill rested its authority on Congress’ Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement power and declared that free labor was an inalienable right and that this right
extended to associations of individuals acting in concert to advance their interests.  The
bill then prohibited injunctions against labor on conspiracy grounds (Sec. 4), prohibited
yellow dog contracts (Sec. 5), ended injunctions issued to protect business patronage
(Sec. 7), and repealed any conflicting provisions of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act
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(Sec. 8).98  It was in its following discussion, however, that the proposed bill outlined in
sophisticated prose the product of decades of determined constitutional thinking on the
part of Gompers, Furuseth, and many others.  Martin presented a proposition of fact,
which recounts in detail the practical need for collectivization of freedom of contract:
We disregard the facts of life if we say that the workers in these highly
specialized industries, controlled by huge financial interests, have any genuine
freedom of expression or any real influence in fixing the terms of their
employment.  In this situation only united action … can give even a semblance of
equality … Under such conditions, it is clear that the worker is in a position of
absolute helplessness, completely at the mercy of the employer.99
This proposition of fact was followed by a proposition of law that the above conditions
constitute involuntary servitude and therefore must be remedied, and explicitly reference
the amendatory force of the Thirteenth Amendment on the Fifth Amendment to bolster
the point that man’s labor can no longer be property and to treat it as such is to create
involuntary servitude.100
Martin assured Congress that involuntary servitude is a category broader than
slavery or even debt peonage.  He proudly cited Bailey v. Alabama, an old favorite of the
AFL, for having “definitely exploded” the notion that involuntary servitude could be so
limited.101  The interrelationship of modern industry requires this reevaluation, he
claimed, offering a complex metaphor comparing modern industry to a stockade.
Modern industry is a huge stockade with all the features of servitude within it, the only
difference being that the door is left open.  However, outside the door economic
conditions are such that workers will starve unless they remain within the stockade.  And
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then even this “vestige of an alternative,” the stockade’s door open to impoverishment
and starvation, is slammed shut by the labor injunction.102
The Thirteenth Amendment was presented as the ideal harbor for the fleet of
rights and protections necessary to empower workers to take the “initiative” to fight for
their own destinies by coming together with their peers and solving their own problems
through collective bargaining unmolested by the state.  Unfortunately for Furuseth,
Martin’s proposed bill went absolutely nowhere.  The AFL, which had not been totally
pleased with Furuseth’s actions, was skittish about offending progressives like Norris, so
they suggested a grafting of the Thirteenth Amendment rationale of Martin’s bill to the
substitute bill.103
Progressives reacted negatively to these Thirteenth Amendment claims.
Frankfurter would argue in pointed response to Furuseth and Winter that, “[T]he talk
about the Thirteenth Amendment is too silly for any practical lawyer’s use and would
only nullify the aim that lay behind the formation of the ‘public policy’.”104  His fellow
progressive lawyer and expert drafter of the substitute bill, Francis Sayre, had already
observed in a Yale Law Review article in 1930 that the Shipstead Bill and its progeny had
been misguided and naïve in its attack on the injunction.  “Such a notion every lawyer at
once would disclaim; but few trade unionists are lawyers,” he quipped.105  Labor’s
problems required wide-ranging legislative solutions.  Edwin Witte, yet another of the
progressive experts that drafted the substitute bill, wrote in 1932 of the foolishness of
labor for adhering to abstract conceptions of rights.  Labor problems required social
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scientific solutions.  Witte suggested, in typical progressive fashion, that “what is needed
is an examination of the facts and a study of how the law is actually working out, rather
than a priori reasoning, nice deductions, and reversion to old doctrines and phrases.”106
The rejection by progressives, who held the ear of policymakers, of a corporatist
constitutional vision that kept a foot in traditional, rights-based constitutionalism was
clear.
What originated as the substitute to the Shipstead Bill finally made it through
Congress as the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932, incorporating a number of jurisdictional
hedges against equity courts, but no major assertion of the constitutional rights of labor
and no concessions to the AFL, who had surrendered their objections and their
recommended amendments to the substitute bill, in order to maintain a vital coalition
with progressive elite.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act opened the door to the state-mediated corporatist
constitutionalism that progressives desired.  Ruth O’Brien argues that the Act, using its
approach of procedural rather than substantive limitations on judicial equity power,
decoupled union activities from union identity, inexorably leading to the need for a
bureaucratic apparatus necessary to determine who were the responsible parties in labor-
management relations.  Organized labor had lost its autonomy by sacrificing its privacy
in favor of protection and the march toward the regulatory statism embodied in the power
and purview of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was underway.107
Ken Kersch reads the significance of the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s progressive
triumph somewhat differently.  He contends that the Act set constitutional development
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on the course toward corporatism, because it embraced a class-based conception of labor
disputes, such as had been articulated in Louis Brandeis’ dissent in Duplex.  The Act
defined a labor dispute to include any unions with an interest in a particular industry.
There need not be a proximate relationship between employer and employee in order to
create protections from injunction.  Class-based legislation on behalf of labor had been
embraced.108  Regardless of which reading of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, O’Brien’s
reading or Kersch’s reading, is accepted, it appears clear that this legislation marked both
the capitulation of the AFL to their progressive friends and the first major step toward the
constitutional reconstruction of the economic order that would be built on a group
sensibility.
With Gompers and Furuseth now part of the AFL’s past and the coalition with
progressives on the progressives’ terms solidified, AFL president William Green felt
comfortable acceding to Senator Robert Wagner’s effort to rescue the weakened National
Industrial Recovery Administration, and the struggling Norris-LaGuardia Act, from
oblivion with his Commerce Clause gambit that would entrench a statist version of
corporatism in the Constitution.109  Signing off on the Wagner Act meant no looking back
for the AFL to traditional rights-based claims to support labor interests.
The Wagner Act, which was also known as the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), would secure the rights of workers in private industry to unionize and to engage
in collective bargaining, including the right to use tactics such as strikes and pickets. The
Commerce Clause was implicated both by the disruption of strikes and the burden on the
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economy resulting from employers’ refusal to bargain collectively, and by the need to
raise wages and more evenly distribute purchasing power throughout the economy to
stabilize commerce, which would happen through collective bargaining.110  If the Wagner
Act could survive judicial review then the days of the labor injunction and government by
judicial conscience were about to be over.  The NLRB would be established as part of the
Wagner Act to oversee the newly state guaranteed rights of collective bargaining.
Progressives had gotten their bureaucrats.  Industrial rights would now flow from the
state rather than from natural rights.  No matter the disappointment to supporters of
collective laissez-faire, organized labor had made the strategic adjustment to both the dire
economic times and the preferences of their progressive allies, and headed in a new
direction that would bind workers and the realization of industrial freedom to the state.
Labor would prove proud defenders of state-sponsored collective bargaining rights in this
newest phase of the AFL’s ongoing battle with the courts.
The Wagner Act was signed into law on July 5, 1935, and was quickly challenged
by employers across the country.  The remnants of the Lochner Court were still in place
and still a thorn in the side of progressive legislation, much to the chagrin of Franklin D.
Roosevelt as he attempted to get the New Deal off the ground.  The constitutionality of
the Wagner Act would be challenged in Jones & Laughlin, and here the tale of an activist
Supreme Court as told by organized labor meets back up with the narrative of Lochner
scholars as this constitutional era reached its final days.
This extended dance, performed principally in the halls of Congress, between the
AFL and progressive elite gets little notice in constitutional scholarship.  Evidence of this
interplay cannot be found in judicial decisions, for the Thirteenth Amendment theory of
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collective freedom of contract never found full legislative success.  Even Ken Kersch,
who sets out to explode “Whiggish” disciplinary narratives, conflates the
constitutionalism of the AFL and the labor movement and the constitutionalism of
progressives in setting up a dichotomy between progressive constitutionalism and the
individualistic constitutionalism of the civil rights movement.111  In an effort to peel back
constitutional history to reveal the tensions between black activists and the
progressive/labor coalition, the reality of the resource competition between labor and
progressives and the powerful constitutional tensions between them is not fully
acknowledged. Kersch comes closer to acknowledging these competitive tensions
between labor and progressives in the constitutional construction of the welfare state than
most constitutional scholars, but much remains obscured by his attention to the court
cases challenging the NLRB apparatus as a means to explore competitive
constitutionalism between past constitutional insurgents.  I will explore Kersch’s
dichotomy between the civil rights movement and the labor movement in much greater
detail in Chapter Four.
WHICH SWITCH IN TIME?  THE END OF THE LOCHNER/DUPLEX ERA
In 1937, the Supreme Court finally gave its blessing to the New Deal.  The case
famously remembered for the Supreme Court’s switch away from strict scrutiny of state
and federal economic legislation is West Coast Hotel.  In West Coast Hotel the Supreme
Court announced support for a state minimum wage law that protected women,
overruling the earlier granting of liberty of contract to women in Adkins v. Childrens’
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Hospital.112  Substantive due process, which had its high moment in Lochner, was
finished.  The traditional explanation for this about-face in West Coast Hotel was that the
justices had made a prudential decision to protect the integrity of their institution in the
face of significant public approval of the New Deal and the threat by President Roosevelt
to pack the court with sympathetic justices introduced in January 1937.113
Cass Sunstein and Howard Gillman analyze the cause of this shift in
constitutional interpretation differently, moving away from unflattering political
explanations for the justices’ actions.  Sunstein points to the revision in the Court’s
understanding of what neutrality by the state entailed under modern economic conditions.
The Court was still concerned about granting a subsidy to one group over others, but now
their entire understanding of who was receiving the subsidy from the government had
changed.  Employers were now the beneficiaries of an unfair subsidy, as their abuses of
employees came at a significant cost to society.  The West Coast Hotel majority referred
to the need for minimum wage regulation due to the exploitation “of a class of workers at
wages so low as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living,” casting “a direct
burden for their support on the community.”114  The Court declared that a “community
may direct its law-making power to correct the abuse which springs from [employers’]
selfish disregard of the public interest.”115  The baseline of state neutrality was no longer
going to be the common law and the market mechanisms inherent in it, but instead would
                                                 
112 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
113 But see Ariens, "A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat.", Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), Richard
D. Friedman, "Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional
Transformation," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 142, no. 6 (1994).  Revisionists of the switch in
time suggest that the threat of court packing did not significantly influence Justice Roberts before West
Coast Hotel.  Barry Cushman also suggests that the “switch” of the Court in support of the New Deal had
happened much earlier in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
114 300 U.S. 379, 399.
115 300 U.S. 379, 399-400.
100
be an assumption about what was necessary for all workers to have a living wage.116
Sunstein’s explanation of the change inherent in West Coast Hotel asserts a principled
reason for the change in constitutional approach by the Court.
Howard Gillman also suggests that the Court had more than its own institutional
survival on its mind in West Coast Hotel.  After having for so long viewed class
legislation as an unfair grant of an advantage for one group over another, the Court had
found itself unable to respond to the harsh realities of capitalism and the modern
economy.  State neutrality had traditionally been viewed as the best servant of the public
purpose, but the Court could no longer rely on this conception of neutrality to serve the
public purpose with the costs of state neutrality to society so great with the tremendous
disparity between employer and worker.117  The Court was embracing a changed
perspective due to changed conditions, not attempting to simply protect itself from
institutional attack.
But was West Coast Hotel the most significant switch in time executed by this
Court?  Organized labor would likely answer no.  It may have come first by a few weeks,
but West Coast Hotel was only a warm-up in their eyes to the Court’s momentous
decision in Jones & Lauglin.  With the Jones & Laughlin decision, we can also bring our
tale of the Lochner Court to a close on a note of judicial principle rather than with reason
to pillory the Court for grounding new constitutional doctrine on political expediency.
Just as with West Coast Hotel and the court packing plan, there was a significant external
pressure on the Court to change its constitutional interpretation in Jones & Laughlin.
This pressure resulted from the widespread sit-down strikes of 1937.  Large employers
had been systematically resisting the Wagner Act since its passage in 1935, and so unions
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throughout the country began to strike to ensure their collective bargaining rights.
Because these were sit-down strikes, they took place within the factories and employers
could not bring in strikebreakers to keep their businesses going.  The sit-down strikes
were successful in winning concessions from large corporations such as General Motors.
The sit-down strikes were so widespread, more than 400 strikes involving more than
400,000 workers across the country,118 and so damaging to the economy that they merited
mention at oral argument of the NLRA cases before the Supreme Court.119 The federal
government wasted no opportunity to draw the Supreme Court’s attention to the
economic impact of labor unrest at every opportunity.  In the Jones & Laughlin brief, the
government suggested that, “relationship to interstate commerce of industrial strife may
be said to be a matter of common knowledge.”120
The Wagner Act had been passed on Commerce Clause authority despite the
damaging decision in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States in 1935 that had
invalidated the NIRA.121  The prospects for success would get no better, in fact they
would get worse, in 1936 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co..122  In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court continued with its traditionally limited
understanding of interstate commerce, ruling that commerce is distinct from production,
and matters such as wages and working hours are production and therefore unreachable
by federal regulation.  This decision would seem to spell certain doom for the Wagner
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Act, and the public’s attention, including the attention of those workers then sitting in
protest in their factories, was on the Supreme Court as they mulled the Jones & Laughlin
case.  “The people stand before the oracles still waiting for a decision on the Wagner Act
cases,” wrote The Nation.123  While Time noted that on the day that West Coast Hotel was
issued the courthouse was packed with many luminaries eagerly awaiting the Wagner Act
decisions.  The magazine pointed out that it was time well spent, despite the
disappointment, because they had witnessed a “red-letter decision day.”124  While West
Coast Hotel was a welcome decision, it had not been as eagerly anticipated by the public
or the government as the decision that followed two weeks later.
The Jones & Laughlin decision was handed down on April 12, 1937, and it was
filled with references to lived experience.  The sit-down strikers had made their point.
The Court wrote of the old standard for the commerce clause:
We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our industrial life and to deal
with the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum. … When
industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their relation to
interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be
maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into
which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce
from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war?  We have often said that
interstate commerce itself is not a practical conception.  It is equally true that
interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not
ignore actual experience.  … Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the
recognition of the right of employees to self-organization and to have
representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is
often an essential condition of industrial peace.  Refusal to confer and negotiate
has been one of the most prolific causes of strife.  This is such an outstanding fact
in the history of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and
requires no citation of instances.125
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The Court had embraced a new perspective that was consonant with changing
times.  The nature of society was now such that old baselines for state neutrality could no
longer hold, and neither could prior understandings of the proper locus of government
responsibility and public policy.  “Actual experience” must be acknowledged and
appreciated in constitutional interpretation.  The crass suggestion that the Court had
simply changed its view to quell public and presidential furor in the face of both the sit-
down strikes and the court packing plan has its appeal, but the Court was also revising the
proper parameters of their constitutional analysis in the face of new social and economic
realities that required a new baseline and a new openness to what evidence could be
noted in judicial decision-making.
CONCLUSION
After West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin, the courts would no longer be a
major obstruction to the New Deal and to the transformation of the American
constitutional order.  West Coast Hotel revitalized state police powers, and Jones &
Laughlin broadened the Commerce Clause to permit a far wider ambit of federal
economic regulation.  To cap the story of the victory over the obstructionist Supreme
Court of the Progressive Era with only West Coast Hotel would miss the transformative
effect of the new commerce clause jurisprudence that would ultimately permit the federal
government to assume its own de facto police power.126  It would also leave a false
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impression of history.  West Coast Hotel was important to reformers when it was issued,
but for ordinary Americans fighting for change at the time, Jones & Laughlin was much
more significant and much more eagerly anticipated.  Organized labor had far more to
lose had the court struck down the Wagner Act, and scuttled federal guarantees of
collective bargaining, than if the Court had continued to block police power regulations
on due process grounds, for organized labor had long ago abandoned the benefits of state-
mandated terms of employment.
Not much is lost by supplementing the story of the Lochner Court with the story
of the Duplex Court.  Certainly the same debate over the justices’ allegiance to
constitutional principles of equality and neutrality versus judicial preferences for laissez-
faire economics can be carried out looking to the line of cases that directly challenged
organized labor in the twentieth century.  It is still possible to rehabilitate to some degree
this Court, and the legal model of decision-making, from the cruelest accusations of
ideological opportunism and unprincipled behavior by following the misadventures of the
AFL in the first decades of the twentieth century.
What is gained by analyzing this history through the lens of organized labor is not
only closer scholarly attention to the revolutionary enhancement of federal power
grounded in the Commerce Clause, but also acknowledgment of a wider set of
constitutional claims and potential directions for constitutional development.  The AFL
led organized labor through a long and often devastating series of skirmishes with the
courts, constantly innovating with new strategies and new or rediscovered constitutional
narratives as they met each new judicial thrust and parry.  The Constitution was primed
for its New Deal transformation with each adaptation of organized labor to hostile
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precedent, which required both constitutional creativity on the part of the AFL and a
willingness to eventually make compromises with their progressive allies.
Had the AFL had sole control over their own destiny, the turn to collective
bargaining to replace the safety net of the police power lost to freedom of contract may
never have occurred, but once it did, the first choice of the AFL was not mediation by the
state of bargaining between employers and employees.  But the AFL was not alone in its
quest to capture the Constitution back from the Lochner/Duplex Court, and the AFL
eventually made the expedient decision to surrender its Thirteenth Amendment claim and
its collective freedom of contract narrative to progressive faith in bureaucracy.  As
discussed in Chapter Two, doctrine does not change without extended conflict and
negotiation between judges and those representing forces fighting for change.  But there
also exists a horizontal dimension to this negotiation and conflict, not always played out
in briefs, oral arguments, or judicial decisions.  Peer social movements will negotiate
their claims in an attempt to best husband their resources and realize their policy goals,
and this happened between labor and progressives.  The lesson of studying the AFL’s
long journey from Jacobs to Jones & Laughlin is that by examining that conflict from the
perspective of those claiming the Constitution as their own, a much wider field of conflict
and complex negotiation for constitutional change can be appreciated, and a fuller arsenal
of constitutional arguments and provisions can be recognized for their radical potential,
such as the Thirteenth Amendment, rather than dismissed as too silly or too dusty for
current use.
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Chapter Four:  The Black Worker as Individualist?  The Effects of
Resource Competition on the Strategies of the Civil Rights Movement
The Lochner Court has long been a favorite villain of constitutional scholars for
its stubborn activism and its unjustified grafting of laissez-faire economic principles onto
the Constitution that thwarted progressive economic regulation by the state.  Many
constitutional scholars do not stop there, however, in recounting the villainy of this
particular group of justices.  For some critics, the Lochner Court was also a menace to the
welfare of African-Americans, thanks to an implicit racism and hostility to civil rights
present in laissez-faire constitutionalism.  For these critics, that menace was most clearly
illustrated by Plessy v. Ferguson,1 which was decided by substantially the same Court
that would later decide Lochner, and was motivated, so they contend, by the same
intellectual commitment to laissez-faire principles on the part of these justices.2  Given
judicial commitment during this period to barring state intervention against “natural”
economic or social forces, segregated blacks were just as much the victims of Lochnerian
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jurisprudence as exploited white workers.  Laissez-faire constitutionalism not only served
as an illegitimate constitutional barrier to economic reform, but also served as a
convenient constitutional excuse for perpetuating racist public policies and for neutering
the force of the Reconstruction Amendments.
As discussed in earlier chapters, revisionist scholars have attempted to rehabilitate
the Lochner Court, not only by tackling accusations that the justices were unduly activist,
but also by demonstrating that liberty of contract beliefs were well-established at that
time, and that state neutrality had been a long-standing constitutional commitment
governing judicial decision-making.  Now some scholars are turning their attention to this
ancillary indictment of the Lochner justices, and their laissez-faire ideology, as opponents
of civil rights for African-Americans during this era.  The challenge to this indictment
has focused not only on the characterization of Plessy as a product of laissez-faire
constitutionalism and a forerunner of Lochnerian jurisprudence, but also on the attitudes
of African-Americans of the period towards both laissez-faire constitutionalism and the
courts themselves.3  According to these latest Lochner revisionists, African-Americans,
in contrast to progressives and the white working class, tended to support both laissez-
faire constitutionalism and judicial activism.  While much of the country during the
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Progressive and Inter-War Eras viewed the courts as an enemy of democracy and a
servant of the capitalist elite, African-Americans viewed them as modest allies.  Unless it
can be demonstrated that African-Americans had misjudged and miscalculated their own
political interests at the time, it is difficult to paint the Lochner Court as their enemy.
The reasons for African-American support for an individualistic, rights-based
constitutional order partnered with aggressive courts to enforce that constitutional order
are not surprising when considering the political context of the Progressive and Inter-War
Eras.  First, free labor ideology had been a critical aspect of the abolitionist fight for
emancipation, so it is unsurprising that African-Americans would adopt and hold tightly
to the ideology and rhetoric that had contextualized the fight for their freedom.4  As late
as 1930, African-Americans were still proving to be “the most individualistic of
workers.”5
Second, courts proved to be the least hostile institutions of government to the
interests of African-Americans during this period.  With the rise of Jim Crow and the
influence of Social Darwinism on American culture, African-Americans faced
deteriorating social and political conditions entering the twentieth century.6  This racist
hostility frequently translated into discriminatory public policy segregating African-
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Americans, curtailing their political rights, and limiting their economic mobility.7  At the
national level, Woodrow Wilson would match this legislative assault by being the first
executive to segregate the federal workforce since the Civil War.8  But the Supreme
Court would actually make a series of rulings favorable to civil rights, which limited
some legislative abuses of African-Americans during this period.  The Lochner Court
invalidated grandfather clauses under the Fifteenth Amendment,9 struck down peonage
laws under the Thirteenth Amendment,10 policed state adherence to equality in the
provision of separate railroad accommodations under the Fourteenth Amendment,11 and
invalidated residential segregation ordinances under the Fourteenth Amendment.12 The
Supreme Court was certainly not an unqualified ally during this era.  They did after all
decide Plessy.  And as Michael Klarman points out, these pro civil rights decisions were
neither motivated by any forward-thinking beliefs in racial equality by the justices, nor
did they have the bite necessary to make a tremendous difference in the daily lives of
African-Americans.13  Yet however modest and inconsistent their assistance, the Lochner
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for whites to circumvent.  As to judicial motivation, he suggests that these decisions were the product of a
minimalist commitment to constitutionalism, since these practices that the Court invalidated were so
plainly unconstitutional that the Court had no choice but to strike them down.  Klarman, "Race and the
Court in the Progressive Era," 886,96-7.  See also Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme
Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality.
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Court was nevertheless the only institution of government that offered blacks any
measure of political, social or economic protection during this period.
Third, demonstrating the old adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend,
African-Americans recognized that the courts kept one of the greatest threats to the
economic survival of African-Americans in check – white workers.  As historian Rayford
W. Logan points out, it was not publicly sponsored Jim Crow laws, largely judicially
upheld, that worked the first and greatest exclusion of blacks from private organizations
or establishments, rather the “first large-scale exclusions of Negroes by private
organizations in the post-bellum period was the handiwork of organized labor.”14  David
Bernstein highlights the Lochner Court’s application of its ideology to strike down a
number of facially neutral economic regulations during this period, which protected the
economic interests of African-Americans, as evidence that blacks were knowing
beneficiaries of Lochnerian judicial activism.15 Every judicial blow against the collective
bargaining strength of organized labor, which as will be discussed subsequently in this
chapter firmly closed its doors to black membership, provided a competitive advantage to
black workers who had to negotiate individually with their employers to set the terms of
their employment.
Constitutional scholars have largely resisted, however, viewing black and white
workers of this period as competitors with fundamentally conflicting constitutional
interests, and African-Americans as beneficiaries of Lochnerian activism.  David
                                                 
14 Logan, The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir, 1877-1901  142.
15 See Bernstein, Only One Place of Redress: African Americans, Labor Regulations, and the Courts from
Reconstruction to the New Deal.  Bernstein studies judicial curtailment of emigrant agent laws that
prevented the recruitment of black workers out of the South and into competition with Northern white
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Bernstein argues that this blind spot is the product of a scholarly preoccupation with
understanding this period of politics and history as a product of economic class conflict,
inspired by both the influence of Marxist interest group theory and the focus of
Progressives of this time on the myth of the “interests” versus the “people.”  Because the
Lochner Court stood in the way of economic reform and made constitutional decisions
that benefited capital, the Court is best understood as an enemy of all oppressed workers.
This perspective, however, according to Bernstein, overlooks the economic reality that
not all workers share the same interests or the same position in the economic order.16
Ken Kersch agrees, but points to a different intellectual phenomenon.  He
contends that this scholarly blind spot stems from a disciplinary commitment to the
Whiggish historiography of the progressive statebuilding project which paints a linear
development of group-based civil rights, with blacks following labor into the protected
bosom of the state on an orderly and inevitable trajectory.  Generations of confident
constitutional scholarship regarding the welcomed and necessary advent of the welfare
state have made it extremely difficult for scholars to see and to acknowledge the serious
conflicts between the interests of the “oppressed” and to see the role of the progressive
state, and not the laissez-faire traditionalists in the judiciary, as an oppressor rather than
as merely a tardy liberator of African-Americans.17  In an affirming review of Bernstein’s
work, Kersch writes:
In our grand narratives of constitutional development and the emergence of the
American welfare state, central casting has arrayed the oppressed (blacks and
labor) acting in solidarity against the (capitalist) oppressor.  American blacks’
resentment of the heroes of Steinbeck novels and Woody Guthrie songs and their
alliance with employers are acknowledged in footnotes and discussed only in
                                                 
16 Ibid.  4-5.  Paul Moreno echoes Bernstein’s analysis.  See Moreno, Black Americans and Organized
Labor : A New History  1-3.
17 Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities in the Development of American Constitutional
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specialized historical studies.  For as Plato declared in his Republic, it is one of
the chief tasks of the ruling Guardians to ‘take good care that battles between
gods and giants and all other various tales of gods and heroes coming to blows
with their relatives and friends don’t occur in the stories the people hear and the
pictures they see.’18
In this chapter, I examine the actions and constitutional claims of African-
Americans themselves to test this revisionist account of their affinity for laizzez-faire
constitutionalism and for the courts.  To do so, I track the activities of the leading SMOs
of the early civil rights movement, the NAACP and the NUL, which negotiated their own
internal movement coalition, on behalf of the black worker.  What I find generally
confirms the revisionist rehabilitation of the relationship between the Lochner Court and
African-Americans presented by Bernstein and Kersch.  Civil rights leadership in this
period was protective of the courts and of the laissez-faire constitutional order that
empowered capitalists at the expense of organized labor.  However I discover, by probing
the effects of resource competition on the strategies of these movement organizations,
that the continued commitment throughout this period of the civil rights movement to
laissez-faire constitutionalism, individual rights, and judicial activism was grounded in
expedient necessity rather than a sincere constitutional preference for the continued
success of free contract jurisprudence and the maintenance of an individualistic
constitutional order. Bernstein overlooks this nuance in his account of the divergent
constitutional commitments of African-Americans and organized labor, while Kersch
credits A. Philip Randolph with crafting a corporatist constitutional vision of civil rights
that would be compatible with the New Deal state, overlooking the earlier contributions
of the NUL and the NAACP.
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My charting of the decades long courtship of the AFL by the NAACP and the
NUL belies any claim that the leadership of the civil rights movement was adverse to
surrendering their laissez-faire, anti-union beliefs to second the constitutional vision of
the AFL.  This courtship would fail, however, and the NAACP and the NUL would take
practically motivated measures to contest the AFL’s constitutional vision and continue to
promote the institutional interests of courts, who had proven to be stalwart enemies of
organized labor.  Evidence of this negative resource competition between the civil rights
movement and the labor movement, and the expedient nature of the constitutional
arguments of the NAACP and the NUL, are found in the hearings on the Shipstead Bill,
which I highlighted in Chapter Three.  My return to the legislative misadventures of the
Shipstead Bill not only clarifies the constitutional motivations of the civil rights
movement, but also reveals the ironic position the movement finds itself in as the
NAACP goes to Congress to contest a legislative measure grounded in an expansionary
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
COPING WITH THE NADIR OF RACE RELATIONS:  NEGOTIATING THE VOICE OF THE
BLACK WORKER
The Progressive and Inter-War Eras represented a bleak period for African-
Americans, as the promising developments of Reconstruction were swiftly swept away
following the exit of the federal government from the South.  Rayford W. Logan
famously referred to this period straddling the birth of the twentieth century as the
“nadir” of American race relations.19  Out of this period would develop a new race
consciousness and organization of protest that would challenge the dominance of the
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conciliatory, self-help approach to racial advancement of Booker T. Washington and his
Tuskegee Movement.  As discussed earlier, social movements are not monolithic entities.
They typically consist of a diverse array of groups and individuals who frequently hold
widely divergent preferences for social and political change and often develop conflicting
strategies for realizing those preferences.  Within every SMI there will be competition
over resources, as groups maneuver themselves, and their preferred visions for social or
political change, for success.  The civil rights movement in its early years would be no
different.  The outcome of this internal peer resource competition would significantly
impact the direction and success of later efforts to promote the interests of the black
worker, including the strategic decision to pursue a coalition with the AFL, and the
execution of that strategy.
Booker T. Washington was the leading voice for black interests entering the
twentieth century.  At the core of his philosophy was a belief that blacks must achieve
economic success before they could hope to realize civil or political rights or equal
treatment under the law.  His self-help approach no doubt resonated with those African-
Americans disillusioned by their increasing exclusion from the political process.  In his
famous Atlanta Exposition Speech in 1895, Washington urged African-Americans to start
from the bottom up, to “cast your bucket down where you are,” promising that, “no race
that has anything to contribute to the markets of the world is long in any degree
ostracized. … It is important and right that all privileges of the law be ours, but it is
vastly more important that we be prepared for the exercise of these privileges.”20  His
philosophy conformed to the dominant doctrine of laissez-faire capitalism, and he
preached a doctrine of conciliation, individualism, paternalism, and anti-unionism that
                                                 
20 Booker T. Washington, Louis R. Harlan, and Raymond Smock, The Booker T. Washington Papers, 14 v.
vols., vol. 3 (Urbana,: University of Illinois Press, 1972) 583-7.
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won him tremendous support among elite whites, including capitalist philanthropists and
national politicians, like Andrew Carnegie and Theodore Roosevelt.21  In fact, it was the
white capitalist that Washington appealed to for assistance in improving the social
conditions of blacks.  In his Atlanta speech, he implored these elite to “cast down your
bucket among these people who have, without strikes and labor wars, tilled your fields,
cleared your forests, builded your railroads and cities, and brought forth treasures from
the bowels of the earth. … We shall stand by you with a devotion that no foreigner can
approach.”22  It would be difficult to find a cozier depiction of traditional free contract
beliefs than this paean to the paternalistic employer’s embrace of the loyal and productive
employee.
Washington’s conservative approach left many African-Americans dissatisfied.
His emphasis on predominantly rural black interests in the South ignored increasing black
migration to the North and the urban experience.  Likewise, his staunch support for
industrial education and humble social and intellectual ambitions did not appeal to many
educated blacks, nor did it allow for the future development of a black leadership class.23
More importantly, many African-Americans were unwilling to turn their back on
organized protest and to rely on white benefaction to achieve racial advancement.  T.
Thomas Fortune founded the Afro-American League (later the Afro-American Council)
in 1890 with a declaration that it was “time to face the enemy and fight inch by inch for
every right he denies us.”24
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W.E.B. Du Bois would also challenge Booker T. Washington and his approach to
racial advancement directly, making a name for himself in 1903 with the publication of
The Souls of Black Folk, where he challenged Washington’s hostility to higher education
for blacks, his abandonment of civil rights, and his surrender of political power and
protest as tools for forcing change.25  Capitalizing on his growing reputation, Du Bois
would call a meeting of well-known anti-Bookerite black leaders, such as John Hope and
William Monroe Trotter, in 1905.   This meeting would spawn the Niagara Movement,
named for the location of the meeting, Niagara Falls, which explicitly rejected the
accommodationist approach of Washington.  The group would aggressively call for
equality for African-Americans and the immediate enjoyment of the same civil rights as
all other Americans, particularly manhood suffrage and the protest rights to free speech,
association and press.26  James Weldon Johnson, who would later serve as general
secretary of the NAACP, recalled that the Niagara Movement would divide the race into
“two well-defined parties,” and sow a “bitterness” that would continue for years.27
Entering the twentieth century, white interest in racial advancement also
intensified as many progressives turned their attention to the plight of African-
Americans.  Given the widespread racism of the Progressive Era, which witnessed the
growing popularity of eugenics and Social Darwinism, such a claim may seem
paradoxical.  However, according to Nancy J. Weiss, there were several reasons for why
a significant portion of white progressives, particularly from the north, during this period
                                                 
25 See the chapter entitled “Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others.”  W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of
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reached out to assist African-Americans, including abolitionist family tradition,28
religious conviction,29 commitment to social justice and democracy,30 and the
development of the field of sociology and the proliferation of trained social workers who
confronted the increasing number of urban blacks in their daily work.31  Whether these
white progressives were genuinely committed to racial equality or simply devoted to the
eradication of poverty and committed to social uplift and democracy is unclear,
nevertheless a significant number of northern progressives, particularly concentrated in
New York, embraced the black cause and helped to bring focus to the early civil rights
movement.32
The biracial NAACP and the biracial NUL, which would both quickly become the
leading SMOs of the civil rights movement, developed from this unrest among black
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intellectuals and this growing progressive concern for African-Americans among the
white biological, intellectual and spiritual heirs of abolition.  The NAACP would fulfill
the radical promise of the Niagara Movement and would continue to challenge the
influence of Washington’s conservatism over the civil rights movement.  While the NUL,
more conservative like Washington in its temperament, would fight for the interests of
urban blacks, whose concerns had been previously marginalized by Washington’s tight
focus on southern blacks and the rural experience.
The NAACP began as a reaction to the race riots in Springfield, Illinois in August
of 1908.  This racial violence in the home of Lincoln had a profound effect on Oswald
Garrison Villard, grandson of William Lloyd Garrison, William English Walling, a
prominent socialist intellectual, and Mary White Ovington, a socialist and a social worker
that had spent some years living and working in a black tenement and who had recently
become, at Du Bois’ invitation, the first white member of the Niagara Movement.  The
three met to discuss the possibility of forming a biracial organization to address racial
injustice and this meeting led to a “Call” for a conference on the Negro problem.  The
1909 conference was well attended by blacks and whites alike, and the NAACP was
formed, though it did not immediately carry that name.33
Du Bois would be brought on board to edit the group’s journal, Crisis.  Du Bois’
Niagara Movement was faltering at this time due to poor organization, poor funding, and
challenges from Washington and his followers.34  The NAACP represented a new venue
for the underlying ideals of the Niagara Movement, and its early black membership was
dominated by “Du Bois Men,” who were anti-Washington in their approach to civil
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rights.35  The NAACP would adopt aggressive tactics and a thematic commitment to civil
rights, which echoed the Niagara Movement.  Villard pointed out in his autobiography
that from the beginning his conception of the organization was that it should be an
aggressive watchdog of Negro liberties and should allow no racial wrong to occur
without protest and the maximum pressure that the organization could bring to bear.36  As
for civil rights, disfranchisement was the theme selected by Villard for the original “Call”
to arms that led to the formation of the NAACP, and Du Bois similarly made
disfranchisement the theme of the second conference of the NAACP.37
At the same time that the NAACP was finding its footing, the NUL was
coalescing out of a variety of social betterment organizations that had been formed in
New York in the first years of the century to assist urban blacks.  The first of these
organizations was the National League for the Protection of Colored Women (NLPCW).
The NLPCW was founded by Frances Kellor in 1906.  Kellor received her training in
both law and social work and made the plight of immigrants and blacks her life’s work.
The first goal of the NLPCW, as stated in its constitution, was to “prevent friendless,
penniless, and inefficient Negro women from being sent north by irresponsible agencies
which often misrepresented to them conditions in the northern city.”38  This mission was
reminiscent of Washington’s belief that blacks should remain in the south and
concentrate on self-help and self-improvement.  The group’s second order of business
was likewise Washingtonian, as the NLPCW concerned itself with improving the
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traveling experiences and living conditions of those women that did come north, as well
as provide them with necessary industrial training.
1906 also witnessed the organization of the Committee for Improving the
Industrial Condition of Negroes in New York. (CIICNNY), which was a biracial
organization founded by William L. Bulkley, the first black principal in New York’s
school system, and interestingly counting part of the future core of the NAACP Du Bois,
Ovington and Villard, among its other founding members.  Industrial education and
economic opportunity were the goals of the CIICNNY, and in this way the group
prefigured the NUL both in its mission and its biracial makeup.  It also prefigured the
NUL in its close relationship to and support from white business leaders.39  Although
Washington was suspicious of the CIICNNY, given its connection to Du Bois, the
organization reflected the pragmatism of Washington’s approach with its strict emphasis
on industrial education.  Similarly, the group engaged in direct appeals to blacks in the
south encouraging them to remain there since they were not equipped for urban life and
scarcely available industrial work.40
In 1910, the Committee on Urban Conditions Among Negroes (CUCAN) was
formed with the express goals of studying the conditions and impact of black
urbanization and of training black social workers to deal with this growing population.41
George Haynes, like Du Bois a black sociologist, spearheaded this effort with the
assistance of Ruth Standish Baldwin, the widow of a railroad magnate and a great
admirer of Washington as well as a contributor to the efforts of the NLPCW.  The focus
of CUCAN reflected the distinctly progressive commitment to sociology and the
burgeoning social work profession.
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Consolidation of these three organizations quickly followed on the heels of the
formation of CUCAN, which had eyed consolidation and a national reach from its
inception.  The NUL was officially formed in October of 1911 as the National League on
Urban Conditions (NLUCAN).  The name would be subsequently shortened to the
National Urban League in 1917, but I will refer to the organization as the NUL from here
on out.  The NUL’s mission would reflect the goals of its original constituent
organizations, and would focus on industrial opportunity and the training of black social
workers and the administration of social services to urban blacks.  It would take a
pragmatic approach to racial advancement that was reminiscent of Washington’s self-
help philosophy.  Self-improvement and economic success and social stability were the
keys to winning and maintaining rights and liberties.  “The fundamental proposition,”
according to George Haynes, “was the issue of wages and working conditions.  You give
him [the Negro worker] wages and proper working conditions, and he is bound to come
up in all other things.”42  According to one NUL Bulletin, civil and political rights were
not useful if blacks lived in poverty and idleness.  Effort must be aimed at “the most
fundamental element of race status: economic standing, physical and mental well-being,”
in order to bring about “internal group improvement.”43
As the NAACP and the NUL began to take shape, the question of whether it was
wise to dilute precious resources by spreading them across two organizations with
overlapping personnel and missions arose.  But this developing peer competition within
the civil rights SMI was dealt with quickly and a coalition was formed to responsibly
allocate resources and to divide responsibilities for advocacy.  When George Haynes
formed the CUCAN in 1910 with an eye toward consolidating with the CIICNNY and the
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122
NLPCW to form a national organization committed to the fields of employment and
philanthropy, he contacted Du Bois to discuss his intentions and to avoid any overlapping
of responsibilities between the NAACP and the organization he envisioned.  Du Bois
wrote Haynes to tell him that he intended “to co-operate with and forward” the work of
the CUCAN and “to avoid all unnecessary duplication.”  Du Bois recognized that
although the economic and philanthropic matters that Haynes intended his fledgling
organization to handle “would have been a natural matter of study” for the NAACP, the
field had now been preempted and resources should not be wasted in duplicating
efforts.44
This understanding between Haynes and Du Bois regarding the divided
responsibilities of the NUL and the NAACP would be formalized in 1911 when
representatives of each organization met to hammer out a working relationship.
According to organizational minutes, it was established that the NAACP would “occupy
itself principally with the political, civil and social rights of the colored people,” while
the NUL would deal “primarily with questions of philanthropy and social economy.”
The organizations would “interchange monthly reports on their activities and plans,” in
order to ensure an efficient division of their resources and responsibilities.45
The NAACP had originally included industrial opportunity for African-
Americans as one of its programmatic goals, so stepping aside from such a large area of
concern could not have been taken lightly. “Some of us gasped at having so large a field
of ‘advancement’ taken out of our program,” NAACP founder Mary White Ovington
later recollected, “but nothing could have been more fortunate.”  The NAACP “could not
have raised money for ‘philanthropy’ as successfully as an organization with a less
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militant program.”  Ovington also recognized that securing employment for black
workers would be “a business in itself,” therefore dividing the field of racial advancement
made great sense.46  Ovington’s reflections highlight the practical considerations that any
SMO must confront when establishing and prioritizing its movement commitments, and
provide insight into the differing predisposition and tenor of each of the developing
organizations as they organized their coalition.
As for predisposition, the NAACP, though it was concerned with the plight of
black workers, had already placed a premium on the pursuit of civil rights, particularly
battling disfranchisement.  For Du Bois and others in the NAACP, particularly Walling
who had already had unsuccessful dealings with the AFL on behalf of black workers, the
ballot was key to redressing black marginalization in industry.  Black workers could not
effectively compete for jobs if employers recognized that white workers had political
control over the state and its taxing, regulating and law enforcement functions through
the ballot.47  Winning civil rights would lead to economic empowerment.  On the other
hand, the NUL had made the daily life issues of the social and economic survival of
urban blacks its primary mission from the start.  Given the tremendous commitment of
resources that would be required to fight for both civil rights and economic opportunity
such a division of the field made great sense, seeing as how each undertaking would
really be “a business in itself.”
But beyond predisposition, Ovington’s reflections touched on the differing tenor
or temperament of the NAACP and the NUL.  It would be difficult for a “militant”
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organization to open white pocketbooks to fund social work, or to convince conservative
businessmen to open white factory doors to African-Americans.  The NUL was a more
conservative organization, operating consistently with many of the pragmatic tenets of
Booker T. Washington’s approach that had proven popular with many of the patrician
whites of the north.  In fact, the NAACP was buffeted in its early years by challenges
from Washington, and faced hesitance from white donors who respected the Tuskeegan.48
Thus a coalition with the NUL, which Washington supported,49 and the division of
programmatic responsibility allowed the two SMOs to maximize available resources.
This difference in temperament between the two organizations was also the
product of the type of members that were drawn to each organization.  Nancy J. Weiss
reports that over half the members of the NUL were black educators and service workers,
and educators at this time tended to favor the accommodationist approach of Washington
as well, naturally, as his emphasis on vocational education.  Black educators also tended
to be more conservative at this time due to their reliance on white philanthropy.  The
NAACP, on the other hand, had a large membership of both black lawyers and northern
black ministers who were more radical in their outlook and prioritized civil rights over
economic improvement.  As for the elite white membership of the two groups, there was
considerable range in ideology on both boards, but the NAACP elite was filled with
many socialist sympathizers and other radicals, such as Du Bois, Ovington, Walling,
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Russell and Jane Addams, while the white NUL elite was dominated by successful
philanthropist businessmen and their wives.50
Despite marked differences in outlook and approach to racial advancement, the
coalition between the NAACP and the NUL would hold, as the reformers recognized the
usefulness of dividing movement responsibilities.  Joel Spingarn, chairman of the
NAACP, would write NUL chairman Hollingsworth Wood regarding a 1917 League
conference that “I am glad, very glad that you are doing just this sort of thing, in your
own way, and not in mine, for no one realizes more than I that there is a place for both
ways.”51  Similarly, NAACP secretary John R. Shillady would tell a NUL conference in
1918, that “you are dealing from one angle, and we are dealing from another … but we
are all on the same job.”52 Roger N. Baldwin, a member of the NUL who also founded
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), perhaps captured the practicality of the
ideological compromise of the NAACP and NUL best when he recalled that, “method
and timing divide all reformers, and however deplorable their quarrels seem, they sift out
the practical.  Or, from a detached view, one holds the goal line while the others carry the
ball.”  Accordingly, he explained that he had “long supported both the ‘radical’ NAACP
and the ‘conservative’ National Urban League, not always on friendly terms, but with
closer association with the Urban League in my more accustomed old role as a social
worker.”53
As Nancy J. Weiss reports, the NUL liked at this time to term itself the “State
Department” of the civil rights movement, while referring to the NAACP as the “War
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Department.”54  Such a metaphor aptly captures the differences in missions and methods
between the two organizations that have been discussed above.  Such a metaphor also
provides insight into the manner in which the pursuit of black economic rights would
occur.  The NAACP and the NUL had negotiated the voice of the black worker and
assigned it to the NUL, which would speak in the words and tones of statesmen and not
crusaders.55  The interests of the black worker were now the primary responsibility of an
organization that favored negotiation, persuasion and education over protest and
agitation, an organization that favored the pursuit of pragmatic social and economic gains
over the vindication of constitutional rights.56  As will be discussed below, this
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preference for pragmatic and instrumental tactics would be demonstrated again and again
in the measures taken by the civil rights movement, under the leadership of the NAACP
and the NUL, to find a place for the black worker in the constitutional order of the early
twentieth century.
TRUE-BLUE BELIEVERS IN LAISSEZ-FAIRE CONSTITUTIONALISM?  THE
FRUSTRATED COURTSHIP OF THE AFL BY THE NUL AND THE NAACP
The advent of the Progressive Era witnessed significant deterioration in the
economic conditions of African-Americans that matched the social and civil blows that
Jim Crow had delivered.  Black land ownership plummeted by one-third between 1910
and 1930, and income growth for blacks also took a significant hit after 1900.  Black
employment in skilled trades also fell off considerably after promising growth during the
Gilded Age.57  While the Knights of Labor had been relatively open to black membership
in unions, the AFL, which had supplanted the influence of the Knights in the 1890’s,
would effectively close union doors to African-Americans as racial attitudes hardened
and the AFL turned its attention to other problems facing the American labor
movement.58 While the AFL had no formal policy of racial exclusion, its leadership did
very little to force its affiliated unions to admit African-Americans.  In fact, the AFL’s
1897 convention passed a resolution condemning reports that Negro workers were being
prevented from joining AFL unions.  It reiterated its welcome to all workers, “without
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regard to creed, color, sex, race or nationality.”59  By 1900, however, Gompers, who
reflected the spirit of the times, suggested that separate unions for African-Americans
could be established, and in 1902 the AFL constitution was amended to charter these
separate unions, entrenching second-class status for those very few black workers that
managed to unionize.
Du Bois’ study of the Negro artisan in 1902 confirmed this unfortunate
deterioration in the union prospects of the black worker, reporting that there were at that
time forty-three national unions operating in the country without a single black member.
Twenty-seven other national unions had very few black members, and in many AFL
affiliated unions the number of African-American members had actually declined
between 1890 and 1900.60  Union exclusion hardened black attitudes toward organized
labor.  “This is the age of combination, both of capital and of labor, wrote the prominent
black sociologist Kelly Miller, who would later serve as a vice-chairman of the NUL, in
1903.  “What the trusts are to capital, trades unions are to labor … Combination among
whites always proves inimical to the interests of the Negro.”61  The Colored American
was much harsher in its language, denouncing “labor barons” as “autocratic and
overbearing … narrow, dictatorial and full of prejudice …. The trade and labor unions are
the greatest enemies of the Negro in America and are doing more to foster and encourage
race hatred and the caste spirit than any other agency we know of.”62
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But the white capitalist embrace of cheaper black labor that Booker T.
Washington and other anti-union conservatives in the civil rights movement had
envisioned was weak at best.63  The classical liberal perspective of Washington was
waning in its influence.64  By 1909, Du Bois and his Niagara Movement had taken to
handing out equal blame for the desperate straits of black workers to both white labor and
white businessmen.  According to the 1909 Niagara Movement Declaration of Principles:
We hold up for public execration the conduct of two opposite classes of men:
The practice among employers of importing ignorant Negro-American laborers in
emergencies and then affording them neither protection nor permanent
employment; and the practice of labor unions in proscribing and boycotting and
oppressing thousands of their fellow-toilers, simply because they are black.
These methods have accentuated and will accentuate the war of labor and capital,
and they are disgraceful to both sides.65
 While black workers could readily count on discrimination from organized labor,
they could not rely on consistent support from white capitalists.  This presented the
leaders of the civil rights movement with a tremendous dilemma. Laissez-faire
constitutionalism was hitting its apex with Lochner in 1905 and organized labor was and
would continue in deep crisis from judicial persecution, but white capitalists were
proving to be fair weather friends to the black worker, and there was increasing
skepticism that tying the long-term interests of black workers to the interests of their
employers was wise or desirable in any event.  Even if the white capitalist proved more
reliably willing to hire, and to retain, black workers (at a discount of course), should the
judicial tide turn in favor of collective bargaining then the black worker would find
himself both out of work and alienated from his own class interests having failed to
previously tear down the union color line.  As the NAACP and the NUL came into
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existence and assumed the mantle of racial leadership entering the second decade of the
century, they were confronted with this difficult choice of whose fortunes, whose
constitutional vision, to tie the fate of the black worker to.
The NAACP, which was populated by many with socialist leanings, was
predisposed to fight for entrance into organized labor freeing black workers to be
recognized as workers first and to make common cause with their class.66 Du Bois
reached out as early as 1902 to unions on behalf of black workers, suggesting that
solidarity within their class was to everyone’s benefit.  Blacks would make “as staunch
union men as any,” if educated on the importance of unions.67  “It is only a question of
time when white working men and black working men will see their common cause
against the aggressions of exploiting capitalists,” he wrote hopefully.68  While Du Bois’
optimism on black progress with unions would turn to bitterness in the following years
given the harshness of AFL exclusion, he did not waver from promoting the cause of
collective bargaining in the NAACP’s Crisis.69
But the NUL, as discussed above, took the lead in directing movement efforts on
behalf of industrial blacks.  The NUL had been influenced by Washington’s pragmatism,
friendliness toward white elites, and bread before ballots approach.  Did this mean that
the NUL shared Washington’s same liberal commitment to an individualistic
                                                 
66 Founding members Walling, Du Bois, Ovington and Russell all shared, to varying degrees, socialist
leanings.  See Kellogg, Naacp, a History of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People  9-19, Moreno, Black Americans and Organized Labor : A New History  90.
67 Du Bois, The Negro Artisan. Report of a Social Study Made under the Direction of Atlanta University;
Together with the Proceedings of the Seventh Conference for the Study of the Negro Problems, Held at
Atlanta University on May 27th, 1902  7-8.
68 Foner, Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619-1973  80-1.
69 In 1912, Du Bois would argue that the mission of organized labor was “divine,” but that so long as
organized labor fought for only a “clique” of Americans, “they deserve the starvation which they plan for
their darker and poorer fellows.”  In that same editorial he would also write wistfully of the proud display
of the union label on the Crisis, despite the knowledge of every black reader that no black hand had
participated in its printing due to the printers union’s exclusionary practices.  W. E. B. Du Bois, "Organized
Labor," Crisis, July 1912, 131.
131
constitutional order and anti-union posture?  It is undeniable that the NUL dedicated
itself to courting white employers, regardless of their union practices, as one of its chief
strategies for aiding the black worker.70 But in studying the engagement of the AFL by
the NUL, it becomes apparent that any constitutional commitment to individualism or
free contract liberty was instrumental in nature and not ideologically driven.  As
discussed earlier, the leaders of the NUL were not ideologues.  They were not the same
type of determined constitutional thinkers that populated the NAACP.  Their tactics
reflected their pragmatic outlook.  And just as pragmatism counseled outreach to white
capitalists as a civil rights strategy, pragmatism also counseled outreach to organized
labor.  The NUL, despite its conservatism, would in partnership with the NAACP embark
on a long courtship of the AFL in an attempt to form a coalition on behalf of all labor
regardless of race.  The long and tortured history of this courtship, this resource
competition between the labor movement and the civil rights movement, would illustrate
the constitutional opportunism of the black activists that populated the NUL and the
NAACP.
Kelly Miller aptly captured the nature of the dilemma discussed above faced by
the black worker, recognizing that logic aligned the black worker with the cause of
organized labor, but that good sense aligned him with capital given the racism (and fear
of competition) of white workers.  He wrote:
  At present the capitalist class possess the culture and conscience which hold
even the malignancy of race passion in restraint.  There is nothing in the white
working class to which the Negro can appeal.  They are the ones who lynch and
burn and torture him.  He must look to the upper element for law and order.
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  But the laborers outnumber the capitalists ten to one and under democracy they
must in the long run gain the essential aims for which they strive. … How will it
fare for the Negro in that day, if he now aligns himself with capital and refuses to
help win the common battle?
  Sufficient unto the day is the industrial wisdom thereof!  The Negro would
rather think of the ills he has than fly to those he knows not of.  He has a quick
instinct for expediency.  Now he must exercise the courage of decision.  Whatever
good or evil the future may hold in store for him, today’s wisdom heedless of
logical consistency demands that he stand shoulder to shoulder with the captains
of industry.71
Miller was among the most conservative black members of the NUL, and his
advice to black workers to side with white business rather than white labor reflects that,
but even his conservative advice to the black worker “to stand shoulder to shoulder with
the captains of industry” falls far short of any spirited or sincere endorsement of the
individualistic constitutional order that neutered collective bargaining and empowered
white capitalists (who Miller noted were not racial egalitarians but at least practiced their
racism with “restraint”) to hold white labor at bay and pass those jobs along to black
labor instead.  Miller admits that black workers naturally belong in the constitutional
camp of organized labor, that “logical consistency” counsels such a place, that by rights
they should join the “common battle,” if not because the collective bargaining that
empowers the working class is constitutionally right, but because it is democratically and
therefore constitutionally inevitable, as “the laborers outnumber the capitalists ten to
one.”  But Miller points out that black workers have “a quick instinct for expediency,”
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and “today’s wisdom,” the desperate needs of the here and now, should guide them
regardless of the ills the black worker “knows not of” now but will likely someday face
for aiding the capitalists in, at least for now, breaking the backs of organized labor.
This “quick instinct for expediency” applied as much to black activists as it did to
black workers, and the NUL would not focus on securing the short-term survival of black
workers to the exclusion of pursuing long-term benefits for them.  From its earliest days
the NUL would court organized labor and profess a commitment to collective bargaining.
Such support may not have been cast in constitutional terms or shouted from the rooftops
where every white capitalist with a job to fill could hear, but it was nonetheless clearly
offered.
In 1913, George Haynes, reacting to the escalating crisis of black strikebreaking
in New York, took the initiative and called the local office of the AFL to open a dialogue
between the AFL and the NUL.  Haynes was invited to appear at the summer meetings of
the AFL’s executive council.  He consulted with the NUL board and a request to the AFL
was drafted for delivery at the meetings.  The NUL requested AFL cooperation along
four avenues:
1.  To correct the impression wide-spread among Negroes that labor unions and
organized labor of white men in general are not friendly toward Negroes as
members on full terms of membership.
2.  To educate the Negro working men in correct ideas of the underlying
principles of organized labor, and to show them that the interests of Negro labor
are ultimately one with those of white labor.
3.  To change the indifferent or prejudiced attitude of white union working men in
their relation to Negro labor.
4.  To assist in organizing associations in unskilled and semi-skilled occupations,
bringing Negroes into local unions with whites where they can, but organizing
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them into separate locals where they must, with full privileges and rights of
representation in the central councils and in the National conventions.72
This appeal to the AFL marked a clear embrace by the NUL of collective bargaining as
an important tool of industrial advancement (no matter what the Supreme Court might
have to say about it), and served as a clear indication that the NUL saw the future of
black workers as best served by absorption into organized labor.
Samuel Gompers offered a mixed reaction to Haynes’ proposal that their
organizations become allies and that blacks be aggressively welcomed into the AFL.  He
was supportive of the spirit of the proposal, but resisted taking any concrete action.
Gompers, with shameless sincerity, claimed that the AFL had already attempted to
unionize African-Americans, like they had all classes of working men, but had met with
resistance by blacks themselves. He based this analysis on the poor returns from the work
of three black organizers that had worked for the AFL since 1910.73  Haynes considered
asking the AFL to make a public statement in the press of “their broad principle and
sympathy with the Negro,” but hesitated in doing so given the reticence of Gompers,
explaining to the NUL that “they seemed somewhat disinclined to take any definite
action on this our first appearance before them.  I, therefore, decided not to ask them to
do any definite thing, not even to make a public announcement.”74  The caution of a
statesman rather than an agitator had been demonstrated.  Much to Haynes’ delight,
however, the AFL did issue of its own accord a publicized resolution welcoming the
NUL’s overture and agreeing to cooperate in black organizing.  Unfortunately, little
would come of this initial dialogue, as the AFL created no machinery for actually
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organizing black workers.75  The NUL would continue to pursue a relationship with the
AFL, but it would be five years before they would become more aggressive in their
pursuit of a coalition.
RENEWED URGENCY FOR ALLIANCE WITH THE AFL – THE GREAT MIGRATION
AND BEYOND
The effects of World War I and the great migration of 1915 to 1918 would
intensify the courtship of the AFL by the NUL, and draw the NAACP in to deeper
involvement. The demands of the war in Europe stimulated an economic boom in the
United States, but the war also led to a steep decline in immigration to the United States.
Northern industries had lost much of their base workforce, and so African-Americans
streamed northward to claim jobs. Some 322,000 Southern blacks had moved North
between 1910 and 1920.76 By the end of World War I, there was at last a significant black
industrial class. With more blacks in industry due to these significant demographic shifts
and with the post-war economy cooling, civil rights activists could no longer afford to
wait for organized labor to lessen its hostility to black workers.
Also fueling the new urgency for a settlement with the AFL was the violence of
the devastating race riots touched off by the great migration.  Among the worse race riots
was the riot of July 2, 1917 in East St. Louis.  The local trade union issued an appeal for
action against the growing Negro “menace,” and rumors that blacks were being brought
in as strikebreakers swirled.  The tensions erupted into violence and thirty-nine African-
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Americans were killed as most local authorities turned a blind eye to the violence.77  Du
Bois, who was sent to the scene by the NAACP, believed Gompers and the trade unions
were behind the tragedy.  He became increasingly bitter at the prospect of justice for the
black worker being achieved through acceptance in unions.  Of the East St. Louis riot, Du
Bois remarked in the Crisis that it “brought the most unwilling of us to acknowledge that
in the present Union movement, as represented by the AFL, there is absolutely no hope of
justice for an American of Negro descent.”78
Despite this pessimism, African-American activists had no real option other than
attempted alliance with the AFL.  The AFL ruled organized labor.79  Thus the NUL and
the NAACP had little choice but to continue to pursue a coalition with them, to continue
to try and capture the resources of the labor movement’s fight to improve the social and
economic place of the worker in the constitutional order.  Neither SMO appeared content
at this point to rely entirely on the white capitalist, and his judicially enabled grip on the
workplace, as a long-term solution to black economic empowerment.
In January 1918, the NUL held a three day conference on “Negro Labor in
America.”  The keynote address aptly captured the pragmatic approach of the NUL to
appealing to both labor and employers on behalf of the black worker, of playing both
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ends against the middle whenever possible.  “If the labor unions,” explained Chicago
League member Horace J. Bridges, “refuse [entrance] to the colored laborer, then the
labor unions themselves are putting into the hands of the masters a weapon to use against
them.  Because the men must live.”80
The meeting attendees passed a resolution directed to the AFL asking for a
“square deal” for Negro workingmen and efforts that would include deeds by organized
labor and not just words.  In exchange for such deeds, the NUL resolved “to urge Negro
workingmen to seek advantages of sympathetic cooperation and understanding between
men who work.”  The resolution also reflected the social work orientation of the NUL
and the legacy of Washington’s self-help approach as the NUL reminded black workers
“to be persevering in their efforts to improve in regularity; punctuality and efficiency;
and to be quick to grasp all opportunities for training both themselves and their children.
Success lies in these directions.” The black press extensively publicized this overture to
the AFL.  The New York Age gave the conference and resolution a banner three-column
headline on its page one: “National Urban League Advises Negro Workmen to Affiliate
with the Federation of Labor.”81
A joint committee of NUL members, NAACP members, and representatives from
the philanthropic Phelps-Stokes Fund was formed at this conference and would travel to
Washington in February of 1918 to meet with the AFL to ask for a response to the NUL’s
resolution.  A meeting with Gompers and other AFL leadership took place in April.
Gompers announced that black workers were welcome in the AFL and always had been,
and although getting the cooperation of local unions could be “difficult,” and there had
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been “unpleasant incidents” in past efforts to admit blacks to trade unions, he was sure
that if greater efforts were undertaken in the black community to ease suspicions about
unions, progress could be made.82
The NUL followed up on this meeting in June with a letter to Gompers that
recommended an agenda for action on the understanding reached in April.  In the letter,
the NUL asked the AFL to release a statement trumpeting the “advantages of collective
bargaining” to black workers, and to outline to black workers the benefits of “affiliation
with the American Federation of Labor.”  The NUL further reminded the AFL that the
“interests of workingmen white and black are common.  Together we must fight unfair
wages, unfair hours, and bad conditions of labor.”83  The NUL, and its partners at the
NAACP, clearly were not zealots when it came to constitutional individualism.
 Gompers referred the letter to AFL leadership and a statement was released:
It is with pleasure we learn that leaders of the colored race realize the necessity of
organizing the workers of that race into unions affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor, and your committee recommends that the President of the
American Federation of Labor and its Executive Council give special attention to
organizing the colored wage workers in the future.  We wish it understood,
however, that in doing so no fault is or can be found with the work done in the
past, but we believe that with the cooperation of the leaders of that race much
better results can be accomplished.84
Nothing of consequence came of the NUL/NAACP meeting with Gompers, and the
above report of the AFL served in the words of two historians of the NUL to be a great
“benchmark from which to judge future hypocrisy.”85  The AFL was not interested in
coalition with the civil rights movement and resisted sharing its resources with black
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labor.  Whatever benefits the solidarity and loyalty of the black workforce could bring to
the cause of organized labor clearly did not impress the AFL sufficiently or outweigh the
disadvantages they saw at this time in bringing black workers fully into the labor
movement.
Frustration with the AFL in the NUL and the NAACP deepened.  But the NUL
would not give up on the virtues of collective bargaining and its benefits to black
workers.  In 1919, the NUL, at its annual conference, issued a resolution that
unmistakably embraced collective bargaining, but did so pragmatically rather than
dogmatically as strikebreaking was countenanced as a fair fallback strategy for the black
worker.  The League resolved:
We believe in the principal of collective bargaining and in the theory of
cooperation between capital and labor in the settlement of industrial disputes and
in the management of industry. … We advise [Negroes] to take jobs as strike
breakers, only where the union affected, has excluded colored men from
membership.  We believe they should keep out of jobs offered in a struggle to
deny labor a voice in the regulation of conditions under which it works.86
Hardly the language of staunch individualists wedded to the freedom of contract and the
outlawry of collective bargaining practices.
In that same year, Eugene Kinckle Jones, field secretary of the NUL, would echo
this commitment to collective bargaining as the future for black workers.  Blacks had
become too significant a portion of the labor force to be ignored.  He explained to an
audience at Howard University:
It is inevitable that an adjustment of some kind must be made.  Whether it will be
through the affiliation of Negroes directly with white labor organizations or
through the formation of Negro labor organizations that will eventually affiliate
with labor but in the meanwhile will bargain with labor and capital alike, is the
question which the local situation in any industry must determine.  The fact
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remains, that Negroes must organize in industry for self-protection and self-
preservation.87
In these remarks, Jones continues to promote an independent relationship for the black
worker with white capitalists, where necessary, but he points out that such an
independent relationship must be collective in nature rather than individual in nature.
Although Jones is not speaking in expressly constitutional terms, his urgent support for
collective bargaining fits far more comfortably within the constitutional vision of the
AFL, the collective freedom to contract discussed in the last chapter, than it does with the
judicially entrenched constitutional order illustrated by Lochner and the soon to be
decided Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering.88
The tone of the NAACP’s efforts to merge the interests of white and black labor
during this period was not surprisingly, given its more radical leanings, blunter, both as to
the propriety of collective bargaining as the future for the black worker and as to the
impropriety of strikebreaking and individual dealings with employers in the short term.
In 1924, the 15th Annual Conference of the NAACP addressed the AFL in a resolution:
  For many years the American Negro has been demanding admittance to the
ranks of union labor.
  For many years your organizations have made public profession of your interest
in Negro labor, of your desire to have it unionized, and your hatred of the black
‘scab.’
Notwithstanding this apparent surface agreement, Negro labor in the main is
outside the ranks of organized labor, and the reason is, first that white union labor
does not want black labor, and secondly, black labor has ceased to beg admission
to union ranks because of its increasing value and efficiency outside the unions.
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  We face a crisis in inter-racial labor conditions; the continued and determined
race prejudice of white labor, together with the limitation of immigration is giving
black labor tremendous advantage.  The Negro is entering the ranks of semiskilled
and skilled labor and he is entering mainly as a ‘scab.’  He broke the great steel
strike.  He will soon be in a position to break any strike when he can gain
economic advantage for himself.
  On the other hand, intelligent Negroes know full well that a blow at organized
labor is a blow at all labor; that black labor today profits by the blood and sweat
of labor leaders in the past who have fought oppression and monopoly by
organization.  If there is built up in America a great black bloc of non-union
laborers who have a right to hate unions, all laborers, black and white eventually
must suffer.
  Is it not time, then, that black and white labor get together?  Is it not time for
white unions to stop bluffing and for black laborers to stop cutting off their noses
to spite their faces?89
This overture to the AFL would be ignored as surely as all earlier overtures by the
NAACP and the NUL, causing Du Bois to lash out angrily in a Crisis editorial, pointing
out that besides “perfunctory acknowledgment of receipt, no action has ever been taken
on this resolution by the American Federation of Labor.”90
CREDITING THE PRAGMATISTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL CORPORATISTS
The 1920’s also witnessed the rise of the New Negro Movement led by A. Philip
Randolph.91  Randolph was a socialist and therefore a strong believer in trade unionism.
Randolph also believed that African-Americans could no longer accept second-class
status and must reach out and take equal rights for themselves.  The New Negro was
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aggressive and proud while the Old Negro relied on white patronage and benefaction in
order to achieve progress.92  Randolph would be recruited to become the president of the
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP), which formed in 1925 and would embark
on a decade-long struggle with the Pullman Company that would divide the black
community.  Randolph incorporated the sensibilities of the New Negro into the fight for
black labor rights by the BSCP.  For Randolph, it was imperative to break the
individualist orientation of black workers, and their Old Negro leaders, who relied on the
patronage and paternalism of wealthy whites to ensure social and economic survival.  A
black collectivist conscience was a must, according to Randolph, thus Uncle Tom was
rhetorically revived and portrayed as an individualist by the BSCP.93
Where the NUL and the NAACP assumed a pragmatic and statesmen-like posture
in negotiating the precarious position of the black worker in both the present and the
possible future constitutional order, Randolph engaged in an aggressively ideological
reconstruction of the constitutional vision of the black worker that was corporatist in
nature.  This corporatism was rhetorically illustrated by a dialogue between old sleeping
car porters and new sleeping car porters depicted in Randolph’s journal the Messenger.
According to the new porter:
White folks are no different from any other kinds of folks, pop.  It all depends on
how much power you got, and you can’t get power unless you are organized.
You know the old joke about the farmer not bothering one hornet because of fear
of the rest of the hornets standing behind him.  Well, that’s all we porters got to
do.  That’s all the Negro race has got to do – stick together; be all for each and
each for all.94
Ken Kersch highlights this aggressive reimagination of the constitutional place of
African-Americans by Randolph in the 1920’s as marking the turn away from traditional
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individualistic constitutionalism within the civil rights movement and toward
incorporation with the corporatist constitutionalism of progressive and labor state-
builders.95 But Kersch’s credit to Randolph, for having “assimilated labor movement
ideology into civil rights thinking,” overlooks the earlier instrumentalist embrace of
corporatism on behalf of the black worker by the NAACP and the NUL that I have
outlined.96  Furthermore, Randolph and the BSCP would receive assistance from the
NAACP and the NUL in undertaking their protest campaign. Despite expressing
frustration at times with both the NAACP and the NUL for being too moderate and too
accommodating of their white partners in the civil rights movement,97 Randolph would
also credit the NAACP and the NUL for having been virtually alone among those in the
civil rights establishment to seriously turn “to the question of improving the lot of Negro
workers.”98  In fact, the NUL, under the fairly aggressive pro-labor leadership of both
Kinckle Jones and its industrial secretary T. Arnold Hill, would not only controversially
endorse the cause of the BSCP but also provide the black union with office space during
the 1920’s.99
IF YOU CAN’T JOIN THEM, BEAT THEM – THE SHIPSTEAD BILL
While Randolph began injecting economic and constitutional radicalism into the
civil rights movement as well as radicalizing the movement’s protest practices, the
                                                 
95 Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties: Discontinuities in the Development of American Constitutional
Law  195-201.  In this discussion of Randolph’s constitutionalism, Kersch repeats his conflation of the
corporatism of progressives with the proto-corporatism of the AFL, which I critiqued in Chapter Three.
96 Ibid.  201.
97 Bates, Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics in Black America, 1925-1945  6-7.
98 A. Philip Randolph, "The Negro and Economic Radicalism," Opportunity, February 1926, 126.  See also
Parris and Brooks, Blacks in the City; a History of the National Urban League  184.
99 Parris and Brooks, Blacks in the City; a History of the National Urban League  183-6.
144
NAACP and the NUL continued to keep an opportunistic foot firmly planted in the
laissez-faire constitutional order that favored white capitalists and had been carefully
protected by the courts.  This instrumentalist strategy would be well demonstrated by the
NAACP’s response to the legislative misadventures of the Shipstead Bill discussed in
Chapter Three.
By the late 1920’s, the AFL had grown desperate over the effects of the judicial
assault on collective bargaining practices.  As discussed in Chapter Three, the courts had
thwarted organized labor at nearly every turn through the aggressive use of injunctions
and antitrust measures to break strikes and boycotts.  Where Congress or state legislatures
had provided relief to organized labor by exempting them from antitrust enforcement, the
Supreme Court responded by striking that relief down on grounds that class legislation
was prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.  The AFL responded in 1927 with the
submission of the Shipstead Bill to the Senate, which radically proposed to eliminate all
equity jurisdiction, i.e. injunctive power, from courts over intangible property.  If passed,
the Shipstead Bill could liberate organized labor from judicial outlawry, allowing them to
press their collective bargaining practices to the fullest to win concessions from
employers (concessions that would almost certainly include eliminating the competition
of all non-union labor).
The prospect of the passage of the Shipstead Bill brought the dilemma that faced
supporters of the black worker into stark relief.  Black workers were still not welcome
into the ranks of organized labor due to the intransigence of the AFL and therefore could
not risk their empowerment, but supporting the empowerment of employers instead to
dictate the terms of employment meant permanently embracing lesser standards for
working conditions and wages.  A bad job, however, was preferable to no job at all.  If
coalition with the AFL had failed as a means to amass practical, political and
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constitutional resources on behalf of the black worker, then contestation of any
strengthening of their position was the only sensible strategic choice.  Thus it was not
surprising that two members of the Cleveland branch of the NAACP arrived in
Washington to protest the Shipstead Bill during its hearings.  Their testimony plainly
illustrated the constitutional opportunism of the NAACP when it came to support of the
equity power of the courts and their continued control over the workplace.
Harry E. Davis and Charles W. Chestnutt, both Cleveland attorneys, believed that
the removal of court equity control over the actions of organized labor would be a
disaster for black workers.  “My sole interest in being here is to prevent what I believe is
a gross injustice to a submerged group of people, the colored people, 12,000,000 in
numbers, 95 percent of whom are of the working classes,” explained Davis.100  Davis
contended that for African-Americans, “their biggest asset is their right to a job … the
right to earn a living.”101 Such language was steeped in the free contract language of the
individualistic constitutional order.  And this right was being thwarted by organized labor
as it sought to drive the black worker out of the workplace. Both Davis and Chestnutt
pointed to the hostility of organized labor against black workers that had left African-
Americans little choice but to opportunistically rely on their individual freedom to
contract with employers when and where courts had restrained organized labor.  “I make
the charge baldly that the labor unions of the United States, broadly speaking, are
unfriendly to colored labor,” accused Chestnutt.102  Labor unions “will go to any extreme
to discourage colored workmen, and to monopolize the various trades for white
workmen,” he continued.103
                                                 





 If African-Americans were going to be denied admittance into the collective that
would exercise collective bargaining, they were going to stand and fight the
transformation of the freedom of contract ideal away from the individual and more
importantly out of the protected haven of the courts. The courts may not have been much
of a friend to African-Americans over the last several decades, but they had proved
themselves kinder than state and federal legislatures.  Chestnutt was acutely aware of this
fact.  He explained:
The colored people of the country have exercised and still exercise their
citizenship under very great handicaps.  Their rights ... have been infringed by
legislation and by the common consent of white people to such an extent as in
many respects to nullify them; to such an extent, indeed, that it is only to the
courts that they can look for relief. ... The Federal courts, in those parts of the
country where the rights of negroes are most limited, have been almost their only
bulwark against oppression ... and the power of injunction has been one of the
strongest weapons which those courts have employed.104
Davis agreed, as he pointed to the importance of the courts to protect against tyranny of
the majority, as courts had always been “primarily intended for the protection of
minorities.”105  At this time, for much of the country, courts were the enemy, but for
African-Americans they were their “one place of redress.”106
Davis and Chestnutt accurately represented the view of the NAACP’s national
leadership in their Capitol Hill testimony.  The Clevelanders were in active contact with
James Weldon Johnson, the organization’s national secretary, and other officials at the
national office about their efforts against the Shipstead Bill.  The national leadership
referred the bill to their attorneys for their advice, which came back resoundingly in favor
of protesting the Shipstead Bill just as Davis and Chestnutt had begun to do.  The
association’s legal advisors considered the effects on labor to potentially be “immense,”





and they pointed to the “serious wrongs” to black workers that might result from passage
of the bill.107  No official NAACP position was ever taken, however, as the bill went
through several drafts, and as was discussed in Chapter Three, was frequently stalled.
Davis and Chestnutt’s testimony would also accurately represent the
instrumentalism of the NAACP’s position.  Happy to invoke the language of Lochnerian
jurisprudence and to defend the honor and importance of courts and their activist ways
they were, but they made no secret of the fact that if union racism was not an issue they
would feel quite differently about the fate of the Shipstead Bill and the collective power
of workers. Davis unabashedly admitted that, “(i)f I were a craftsman or artisan, I would
join a union.”108  Joining a union made good economic sense.  “Colored workers want
just as good wages and just as good working conditions as anybody else,” explained
Davis.  “They are just as much interested in getting the best out of life as anybody else
and are striving toward that end daily and they want that right protected and they are
willing to join unions to secure that protection,” but the problem for Davis was that, in
most instances, this was not currently an option for members of his race.109  Chestnutt
was likewise candid in his testimony.  “It is quite possible,” he argued, “it would be only
human nature, if colored working men were granted, as union members, equal rights ...
and entitled to benefit equally by whatever union labor might achieve in the way of
power or influence or reward, that they might not oppose this bill.”110  After all, Chestnutt
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admitted, “labor owes a great deal to the unions.  Their efforts have done much to
promote the dignity of labor and to secure a living wage for working men.”111
To lend constitutional gravitas to their pragmatic opposition to the bill, Chestnutt
pointed to the Fourteenth Amendment and the requirement of equal protection.  “This bill
is class legislation pure and simple,” argued Chestnutt.112  On this point he favorably
quoted Chief Justice Taft’s well-known 1914 speech to the American Bar Association
that outlined the constitutional justification for undercutting any special protection of
unions or collective bargaining.  This logic had found its way into many of the decisions
of the Taft Court.  Chestnutt quoted Taft as follows:
The great political power that labor combinations are believed to exercise has
enabled them successfully to press upon legislature the idea that they are
politically a privileged class, that the interest of the community lies in making
them so, and that their cause is so important that the ordinary means of enforcing
the law against their violations of it should be weakened rather than
strengthened.113
Such elevated status for one class of people was in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Labor could not be permitted the status of a protected class, because such
protection would work against black workers who did not belong to that class (though
they wished most urgently to join and then partake in all the special protection the
legislatures might wish to provide).  With this turn to the Fourteenth Amendment and an
equal protection narrative to thwart the ambitions of the AFL, the NAACP found itself in
an ironic position.  As discussed in Chapter Three, the Shipstead Bill marked the climax
of the AFL’s Thirteenth Amendment narrative of labor rights.  According to the AFL, the
Thirteenth Amendment, among other things, provided an important exception to the





general prohibition against class legislation that had been memorialized in the Fourteenth
Amendment.  The Thirteenth Amendment guaranteed a special place for labor in the
constitutional order, therefore antitrust exemptions were constitutional despite the
Fourteenth Amendment. With the Shipstead Bill, a crossroads had been reached where
the constitutional narrative employed to promote racial equality and secure civil rights,
equal protection, was being deployed to protect black economic advancement, at the cost
of contravening the leading constitutional narrative of benefit to the class and
occupational identity of most African-Americans at that time.  The irony was made all
the richer given that perhaps the most-celebrated and significant constitutional provision
for blacks, the Thirteenth Amendment abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude, was
the provision these civil rights activists sought to trump with their Fourteenth
Amendment claims of equality.114  Because of the AFL’s continued exclusion of black
workers, the civil rights movement was not free to lend its voice, at least not in full
throat, to labor’s constitutional narrative that was attractively built on the legacy of the
permanent emancipation of the slaves.  Instead retreat to the racial narrative of equality
was necessitated when organized labor appeared at all close to achieving its liberation
from the courts, and the NAACP forwarded that Fourteenth Amendment narrative
necessarily at the expense of their class interests.
Fortunately for the black worker, the AFL did not prevail with the Shipstead Bill,
leaving more time for the civil rights movement to find a way to convince or cajole the
AFL into opening union doors to black workers.  But this time would run short with the
economic collapse of the Great Depression and the recovery measures put into place by
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the New Deal.  As discussed in Chapter Three, the AFL would align themselves with
progressive statebuilders interested in reconstructing the constitutional order to embrace
(white) collective bargaining.  Now more than ever, the NAACP and the NUL needed to
break the union color line.
CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMATION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
Entering the 1930’s, disgust with the AFL, and its calculated footdragging against
admission of black workers, among members of the civil rights movement was palpable.
T. Arnold Hill of the NUL complained that the AFL had never “campaigned among its
members for its idea of fair play reiterated in frequent resolutions.”115  As usual, Du Bois
was more colorful in his complaint.  “The A.F.L. has from the beginning of its
organization stood up and lied brazenly about its attitude toward Negro Labor,” he
charged.  “They have affirmed and still affirm that they wish to organize Negro labor
when this is a flat and proven falsehood.”116  But the federal government had begun to
sponsor collective bargaining and incorporate it into the constitutional order with passage
of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933.  Section 7(a) of the NIRA
provided:
1)  that employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the
interference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives …
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2)  that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a
condition of employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining,
organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing …117
The NAACP and the NUL now had little choice but to continue to pound on the doors of
the AFL for entrance into their unions.
For a time the civil rights movement took solace in the fact that the NIRA had
failed to adequately safeguard labor’s ability to organize and to collectively bargain given
the weak machinery of the NIRA to enforce its collective bargaining positions and the
hostility of the Supreme Court.118 A pragmatic approach to continue courting both the
AFL and white employers looking for cheaper labor remained viable as business worked
around the NIRA. James Weldon Johnson, one-time general secretary of the NAACP,
counseled just such an opportunistic position in his advice to African-Americans
published in 1934:
Organized labor holds the main gate of our industrial and economic corral; and on
the day that it throws open that gate in realization of the truth that the cause of the
white worker and the black worker are one, there will be a crack in the wall of
racial discrimination that will be heard round the world.  We have not yet found
an effective means of convincing organized labor that this is what we ought to do.
… The only pressure we control for backing them up is the more or less veiled
threat of “scabbing.”119
Such an ability to play both sides of the constitutional street, and to take such
solace over the ineffectiveness of the NIRA did not last with the proposal of the Wagner
Act and its intended fortification of the provisions of section 7(a) of the NIRA.  The bill
would not only give the NLRB tremendous enforcement power in order to police
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employers to allow collective bargaining effectively, but also made union membership
mandatory (with the union being chosen by the majority of employees).  Now there was
virtually no hope for black workers to form their own competing unions or to somehow
coexist in an industry with white unions.  As Roy Wilkins of the NAACP explained in an
organizational memorandum, the Wagner Bill “rigidly enforces and legalizes the closed
shop,” meaning “the act plainly empowers organized labor to exclude from employment
in any industry those who do not belong to a union.”  He thought it was “needless to
point out the fact that thousands of Negro workers are barred from membership in
American labor unions and, therefore, that if a closed shop is legalized by this act Negro
workers will be absolutely shut out of employment.”120  The Wagner Act would give
government sanction to discrimination against black workers, explained T. Arnold Hill,
by elevating “labor to the dominant position of an active, operating co-partner with the
employer and the public, each having equal rights and authority.”121
But now that collective bargaining was going to be sponsored by the state, the
state could have something to say about whom the AFL permitted to partake in that
bargaining.  This meant a shift in tactics was necessary, and the New Deal had a profound
affect on the work of the NUL in particular.  For the first time, the NUL would move
away from negotiation with private parties like business leaders and labor unions in order
to win racial advancement, and focus instead on protest, lobbying and the legislative
process by encouraging petitions, mass letter-writing campaigns, and meetings with
members of Congress.122  Hushed tones and pragmatic entreaties were no longer the order
of the day, as the NUL began to speak in a louder, more aggressive, more ideological,
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much more public voice.  And this voice did not rail against the coming of a new
constitutional order that recognized the group above the individual.  Instead this voice
spoke up for the right of blacks to be one of those groups that would be constitutionally
recognized by the state.
The NUL and the NAACP turned their attention to winning inclusion of an anti-
discrimination clause in the Wagner Act.  Both the NUL and the NAACP prepared
informational statements for the hearings on the Wagner Act, and an amendment to the
bill was proposed that would deny the benefits of the legislation to any union that
discriminated on the basis of race.  The amendment stated that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to bar from
membership any worker or group of workers for reason of race or creed either by
constitutional provision or by ritualistic practice.123
Walter White, who now headed the NAACP, kept in close touch with Senator Wagner,
and his aide Leon Keyserling, to monitor the prospects of the NAACP/NUL amendment.
From Keyserling, White learned that the AFL had already killed the equivalent of the
amendment in earlier drafts of the legislation.  Keyserling reassured White that Senator
Wagner was sympathetic to their position, and had originally drafted the legislation to
provide “that the closed shop be legal only when there were no restrictions upon
members in the labor union to which the majority of workers belonged.”  But according
to Keyserling, the AFL “fought bitterly to eliminate this clause and much against his will
Senator Wagner had to consent to the elimination in order to prevent scuttling of the
entire bill.”124  The AFL would be likewise victorious over inclusion of the NUL/NAACP
amendment, despite numerous entreaties by the NUL and the NAACP to Senator
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Wagner, President Roosevelt, and members of Roosevelt’s administration.125  This
victory served as the final crushing rebuff to the overtures for coalition that the civil
rights movement had been offering the AFL for years.
The NUL and the NAACP received sympathetic responses from the progressive
statebuilders they lobbied, but they were also candid with these civil rights leaders about
the relative power imbalance between the AFL and black workers, who were not
organized and therefore not able to force any special consideration.126  The Wagner Act
passed in 1935 without any protections for the black worker and it would only be a matter
of very short time before the Supreme Court would make its “switch in time” that would
reject Lochnerian jurisprudence, constitutionally entrench collective bargaining, and put
an end to the individualistic constitutional order.127  The Labor/Progressive coalition had
won and blacks had not been included.  Attempting to pragmatically straddle two
different constitutional visions, and appeal to the separate partisans, white labor and
capitalist whites, of those distinct visions, was no longer a viable movement strategy and
the NUL and the NAACP would embark on a long struggle to bring black workers as a
group into the new corporatist constitutional order with a new phase of social and
constitutional activism conditioned by this New Deal alteration of the constitutional
order.128
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CONCLUSION
Looking back on the constitutional commitments of the NUL and the NAACP in
the years between the rise of Jim Crow and the constitutional acceptance of the New
Deal, it becomes clear that these SMOs made opportunism rather than ideology their
guide in selecting their constitutional tactics and narratives.  There existed a wide gulf
between the constitutional interests and beliefs of white workers and black workers
during this period that complicates any constitutional history that would paint the
Lochner Court as an unrelenting victimizer of the common man.  The Lochner Court,
with its free contract views and its hostility toward collective bargaining, was the
handmaiden of the white capitalist, and it was the white capitalist who often stood
between the black worker and starvation during this period.  The NUL and the NAACP
recognized this reality and were protective of the courts and their embrace of laissez-faire
constitutionalism and courted the white capitalist as a result.
But they also attempted with equal, if not greater, vigor to close the gap between
the white worker and the black worker.  For the NAACP and the NUL the future of the
black worker belonged with the future of all workers, but a complete constitutional
commitment to the cause of organized labor was not possible until entrance into AFL
unions had been won.  This left the NAACP and the NUL with a tricky navigation
between coalition with white capitalists and coalition with white workers.  They could
not afford to reject the resources provided by employers and their preferred constitutional
order, until the resources of the labor movement were secured for the benefit of the black
worker.  Such a practical bind limited any full-throated endorsement of either the
constitutional individualism that advantaged industrialists or the proto-corporatist
constitutionalism that was envisioned by the leaders of the AFL.
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This pragmatic approach of the NAACP and the NUL to advancing the rights of
the black worker had its roots not only in the practical barrier of the union color line, but
also in the nature of the organizations themselves and the effect of the coalition they
formed on behalf of the black worker.  Assigning primary responsibility for the interests
of the black worker to the NUL in a bid to save the limited resources of the civil rights
movement meant that an aconstitutional approach to advancing black economic interests
was more likely given the occupational makeup and more conservative disposition of the
NUL.  We can only speculate as to the possibility of a more openly ideological, rights-
oriented alternative vision of the Constitution that might have been developed on behalf
of the black worker, in contrast to both the individualism of Lochnerian jurisprudence
and the collective free contract approach of the AFL, had the NAACP assumed control of
the fate of the black worker.  Nevertheless, it seems clear that the internal movement
coalition between the NAACP and the NUL impacted the tenor and tactics of black
economic activism during this period.
My study shows that practical and political reality partnered with organizational
predispositions played into the pragmatic and decidedly aconstitutional tactics of the civil
rights movement on behalf of the black worker during the Progressive and Inter-War
Eras, as they courted the partisans of two constitutional visions at once.  This long,
painstaking history of pragmatic negotiation and persuasion of private groups is easy to
overlook when looking back on the sweep of constitutional history with the typical tools
of the constitutional scholar to find competing narratives of the Constitution.  An accurate
accounting of the civil rights movement’s constitutional commitments on behalf of
workers during this time cannot be fully found in the court cases, or even in the
legislative histories, that normally preoccupy scholars.  Nor can it be perfectly deduced
from economic principles or a careful understanding of the complex politics of the
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working class of this period, as David Bernstein attempts to do.   It is necessary to start
with the actions of the organizations themselves in order to understand the nature of their
constitutional beliefs and how they would express them.  Such a study reveals a
movement whose constitutional commitments were in flux between individualism and
corporatism, but whose leanings toward corporatism could not yet be fully expressed due
to instrumental considerations.  First the resources of the labor movement had to be
captured.  Unfortunately for the civil rights movement this capture of resources would not
occur, leaving African-American workers painfully sidelined in the revised constitutional
order of the New Deal.
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Chapter Five:  Working Women or Women Workers?  The WTUL,
Organized Labor, and the Gendered Constitution
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish1 in 1937
repudiated Lochner v. New York2 and the judicial commitment to free contract liberty that
case memorialized, which had radically limited state regulations of working conditions
for decades.  West Coast Hotel is typically viewed, by constitutional scholars, as a
watershed case for American constitutional development marking a sharp break with
traditional constitutional jurisprudence and heralding a new constitutional regime that
embraced the contours and ambitions of the New Deal state.3  Rarely, as Julie Novkov
points out, do these reflections on West Coast Hotel acknowledge that the decision not
only represents a new direction in constitutional development with the repudiation of free
contract jurisprudence, but also reflects a culmination of an established doctrinal
framework for protective labor legislation built on gender classifications.  In fact, the role
of women workers as the vehicle through which Lochner is undone and through which
protective labor legislation is constitutionally vindicated for all is routinely overlooked in
                                                 
1 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
2 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3 For a review of scholarship that points to the importance of West Coast Hotel as a new direction in
constitutional development, see Gary D. Rowe, "Lochner Revisionism Revisited," Law and Social Inquiry
24 (1999).  West Coast Hotel has been characterized in recent years by William Leuchenberg as marking a
political/institutional settlement; by Bruce Ackerman as heralding a “constitutional moment” embracing
activist government; by Cass Sunstein as establishing a new baseline for constitutional interpretation; and
by Robert Post as emphasizing a new commitment to harmonizing constitutional meaning with social and
economic realities.  See Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, Ackerman, We the People:
Transformations, William Edward Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn : The Constitutional
Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), Robert C. Post, "Defending
the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era," Boston University Law Review 78 (1998),
Sunstein, "Lochner's Legacy."
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constitutional scholarship that contemplates the transition between these radically
different constitutional eras.4
Novkov’s study of the role of gender in the doctrinal roots of the modern welfare
state not only draws attention to the gendered exception to Lochner’s stringent limits on
state labor regulation, which was established in 1908 in Muller v. Oregon,5 but also
highlights the women’s movement’s own agency in creating this exception and
subsequently exploiting it on behalf of working women.  This separation of the
constitutional identity of male and female workers was not the product of patriarchal
coercion.  In fact, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Muller, which emphasized women’s
greater physical needs for protection and the special public interest in their role as
society’s reproducers, was drawn from the maternalist arguments presented by the NCL,
which was one of the leading SMOs of the women’s movement at that time.6  Such a
deliberate embrace of constitutional difference may seem strange to modern
constitutional sensibilities, but the NCL and other organizations active on behalf of
working women at this time did not balk at establishing a separate constitutional place for
their sex, though they did hope to see protective labor legislation eventually extended to
all workers.
                                                 
4 Novkov, Constituting Workers, Protecting Women: Gender, Law, and Labor in the Progressive Era and
New Deal Years  4-14.
5 208 U.S. 416 (1908).
6 I will use the term “maternalist,” as opposed to the also popular designation “social feminist,” in this
chapter to describe the rhetoric and policy preferences of the NCL, WTUL and other organizations within
the women’s movement that focused on the extension of domestic ideals into public life and the integration
of women’s special identity and special needs associated with their roles as wives and mothers into social
provision and civic identity.  See Seth Koven and Sonya Michel, Mothers of a New World : Maternalist
Politics and the Origins of Welfare States (New York: Routledge, 1993), Theda Skocpol, Protecting
Soldiers and Mothers : The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992).  But see Lipschultz’s work for the argument that “social
feminism” better captures the approach taken by the NCL and other women’s groups on labor standards.
Sybil Lipschultz, "Hours and Wages: The Gendering of Labor Standards in America," Journal of Women's
History 8, no. 1 (1996).  For a general discussion of the limits of feminist terminology, see Nancy F. Cott,
"What's in a Name? The Limits of 'Social Feminism;' or Expanding the Vocabulary of Women's History,"
The Journal of American History 76, no. 3 (1989).
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Securing and defending protective labor legislation for women became the
dominant strategy of progressive reformers for aiding women who worked during this
period in light of the constitutional success of Muller.  Constitutional sanction of a
preferred policy is a welcome resource for any social movement, but perhaps even more
so for a movement that was limited in its political resources by the disabilities of the
second-class citizenship of its members. But the passage and enforcement of state
regulation of the workplace was by no means the only approach employed by women
activists to improve the lot of women in industry.  Women’s movement organizations
also experimented with ethical consumerism, trade union organizing and the
empowerment of women within the labor movement itself, and adding a working-class
voice to the suffrage campaign in order to improve the political agency of working
women so that they might help themselves, particularly in the expansion of state labor
regulation in their favor.
In this chapter, I focus on one such alternative to gendered labor legislation by
examining the activities of the WTUL, which formed in 1903 with the express purpose of
organizing working women into unions so that they could engage in collective bargaining
in their own interests. To accomplish this goal, the WTUL began as an inter-class
organization comprised of both middle-class women reformers and working-class
women.  The WTUL, then, was unique as a SMO that had a place in both the labor
movement and the women’s movement given both its ambitions and its composition.
However, it would not succeed in its original mission.  The failure of the trade union
approach to empowering women workers and integrating them into the labor movement
could be attributed both to failed efforts at coalition and cooperation with the AFL, which
ruled organized labor, and to the increasing attractiveness of legislative work, given
Muller, and its fit with league strengths.  SMOs must be strategic in the use of their
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resources, and the WTUL made little headway with the AFL, which did not provide
much tangible support or guidance to the league, and in turn working women, as the
resources the league did possess absent AFL assistance were not well-suited to direct
organization work, but given the special status of working women under the Constitution,
the organization’s limited resources could more readily be translated into results when
working on legislative reform.  Thus turning away from the unionization approach
toward the legislative approach was a resource conscious choice by the WTUL.  In this
chapter, I will analyze the practical, political and constitutional reasons for and the
ramifications of this choice to dedicate the bulk of the SMO’s resources and efforts to the
exploitation of the gendered Constitution in lieu of greater emphasis on integrating
women into the labor movement and promoting the labor Constitution of collective free
contract that Gompers and the AFL were carefully crafting at this time.
In shifting its focus, the WTUL became a significant partner of the NCL in the
campaign for protective labor legislation for women that would stretch through to the
New Deal period.  Beyond legislative campaigning, the WTUL would also be principally
responsible for the establishment of the Women’s Bureau of the U.S. Department of
Labor, which would be supportive of protective legislation for women.  With this
transformation in strategic goals and full plate of legislative and bureaucratic activities,
the WTUL’s tenuous foothold within the labor movement weakened further
With woman suffrage secured through ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment
in 1920, the women’s movement faced a challenge of redefinition for those who had
focused their activism on the ballot.  For members of the NWP, the new challenge would
be securing equality for women.  This goal put them at odds with other organizations
within their movement that had built social services and regulatory protections for
women on maternalist foundations now entrenched in the Constitution and providing a
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means to circumvent Lochner.  The NWP’s fight for an equal rights amendment (ERA)
would spark heated competition between their members and the NCL, WTUL and their
allies.  This conflict was punctuated by the devastating setback to protective labor
legislation for women suffered with the Supreme Court’s veto of a minimum wage for
women in 1923 in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.7
But the WTUL would not only have to protect the gendered Constitution from
attack by a faction of women within the women’s movement, but also by a faction of
women within the labor movement. The Women’s League for Equal Opportunity
(WLEO) and the Equal Rights League (ERL), which were comprised of women printers
and other women workers who had been adversely affected by protective labor
legislation, went on the attack in the years following World War I, and engaged the
WTUL in a heated battle over the gendered Constitution. While this battle between the
WTUL and the WLEO and ERL was fierce, the WLEO and ERL represented the views
of only a small faction of skilled women workers.  Unskilled women workers generally
favored protective labor legislation for women.  Nevertheless, this struggle with these
women workers aptly illustrated the strategic tradeoffs the WTUL had made earlier in its
history when it turned its primary focus away from organizing women.
The challenge of the ERA would fail, and the setback of Adkins would only be
temporary as the New Deal approached.  With the triumph of protective labor legislation
in West Coast Hotel, the WTUL would be vindicated for its turn to legislative work on
behalf of women in industry.  What’s more, the WTUL and the NCL would also
heroically, and at long last, serve as the thin edge of the wedge that opened the
Constitution to state labor regulation that benefited men and women alike.  The gendered
Constitution was no longer needed to meet women workers’ needs.  However, all would
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not go smoothly for working women with the apparent re-integration of gender and labor
in the Constitution as New Deal labor reform moved forward.  I will conclude this
chapter with a reflection on this legacy of West Coast Hotel, and a reconsideration of the
resource-conscious choice earlier made by the WTUL to limit their commitment to
unionizing women workers and to establishing their influence over collective bargaining,
which was now newly legitimized by the Constitution and sponsored by the state as part
of the New Deal revolution.
THE FORMATION OF THE WTUL – CREATING A WOMEN’S BRANCH OF THE LABOR
MOVEMENT
The American WTUL had its origins in the settlement house tradition, which
brought together middle-class social reformers and women workers.  Through living
together, these reformers got a first-hand look at the miserable working conditions that
industrial women toiled under.  But many of them would grow frustrated with the limits
of the settlement house approach to aiding the working-class and seek other methods of
assistance.  Gertrude Barnum, a middle-class settlement worker who helped establish the
Chicago branch of the WTUL and would later be active in the national organization,
expressed this frustration in 1905:
I myself have graduated from the Settlement into the trade union.  As I became
more familiar with the conditions around me, I began to feel that while the
Settlement was undoubtedly doing a great deal to make the lives of working
people less grim and hard, the work was not fundamental.  It introduced into their
lives books and flowers and music, and it gave them a place to meet and see their
friends or leave their babies when they went out to work, but it did not raise their
wages or shorten their hours.8
                                                 
8 Remarks originally appeared in Weekly Bulletin of the Clothing Trades (March 24, 1905).  Quoted in
Nancy Schrom Dye, As Equals and as Sisters : Feminism, the Labor Movement, and the Women's Trade
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Another such reformer and settlement worker that wanted to do more for women
workers was William English Walling, a socialist and economist, and millionaire, who
would later play an integral role in the founding of the NAACP.  Walling lived and
worked in multiple settlement homes, and he had become particularly interested in trade
unionism while at Hull House in Chicago.  In 1902, Walling took up residence at
University Settlement in New York.  There he learned of the organizing work of the
British WTUL, which had formed in 1874.9  That same year, 1902, Walling also
observed an ongoing boycott and series of demonstrations against Jewish butchers that
was carried out by the working-class women of New York’s East Side.   Walling was
impressed with the militant and articulate activism of the women involved, and he
became convinced that unionization of working-class women might be feasible.  With the
blessing of fellow settlement workers, such as Florence Kelley and Lillian Wald, Walling
left for England in 1903 to learn more about the activities of the British WTUL.  He
would be particularly impressed by the league’s mixed class effort to organize women
                                                                                                                                                  
Union League of New York (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1980) 41-2. This frustration would
also stimulate other activists from the settlement tradition, such as Florence Kelley, to pursue other
methods of assistance to the working poor beyond unionizing.  In Kelley’s case, as will be discussed below,
she would pursue both ethical consumerism and protective legislation while heading the NCL.  For a
general discussion of this phenomenon and the manifold approaches middle-class women took to aid the
poor, see Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers : The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United
States.
9 Interestingly, the British WTUL was formed by a British suffragist, Emma Ann Paterson, who was
influenced by the efforts of American union women that she encountered during a visit to this country in
1873.  In 1919, a member of the British WTUL speaking at the American WTUL convention would joke
that it was unclear whether the British league was the American league’s “grandmother or granddaughter.”
Gladys Boone, The Women's Trade Union Leagues in Great Britain and the United States of America (New
York: Columbia university press, 1942) 20.  See also Allen F. Davis, "The Women's Trade Union League:
Origins and Organization," Labor History 5, no. 1 (1964), Philip Sheldon Foner, Women and the American
Labor Movement, 2 vols., vol. 1 (New York: Free Press, 1979).  For a history of the British WTUL, see
Robin Miller Jacoby, The British and American Women's Trade Union Leagues, 1890-1925, Scholarship in
Women's History; V. 7 (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Carlson Pub., 1994).
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workers into unions and returned to the United States with a plan to form an organization
on that model.10
Walling arrived in Boston in November of 1903 to attend the annual AFL
convention.  He approached fellow settlement resident Mary Kenney O’Sullivan, who
was a bookbinder and working-class labor leader,11 with his plans to establish an
organization aimed at unionizing women and she enthusiastically agreed to assist him in
getting the group off the ground.  Fittingly, the WTUL began with a cross-class
partnership that would become its hallmark.  A series of meetings were held at the
convention that included several AFL delegates along with a group of Boston settlement
workers.  Not surprisingly, all of the labor delegates save one that would attend these
meetings were men, while the Boston settlement workers in attendance were
predominantly women.  At the close of the convention, the new organization had a name,
a constitution, and a set of officers.  As for the name, the WTUL began as the Women’s
National Trade Union League, but the name would be changed to the National Women’s
Trade Union League in 1907.
The constitution of the new league set out very clearly that its mission “shall be to
assist in the organization of women workers into trade unions.”  Soon after that statement
was supplemented with the rationale for collective bargaining for women, the constitution
                                                 
10 The historical recounting that follows of the initial founding and early work of the WTUL is drawn
principally from Foner, Women and the American Labor Movement  290-302.  For other extensive
historical accounts of the founding and early years of the WTUL, see Boone, The Women's Trade Union
Leagues in Great Britain and the United States of America, Davis, "The Women's Trade Union League:
Origins and Organization.", Dye, As Equals and as Sisters : Feminism, the Labor Movement, and the
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London: D. Appleton and company, 1915), Alice Henry, Women and the Labor Movement (New York,:
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Studies (Montréal ; St. Albans, Vt.: Eden Press Women's Publications, 1981).
11 Kenney had served as a part-time organizer for the AFL in 1892, but her appointment lasted only five
months, as the AFL council decided that there was no need for a woman organizer after all.  Kenney’s
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now reading “and thereby to help secure conditions necessary for healthful and efficient
work and to obtain a just return for such work.”12  The WTUL would come quickly to
wear many hats, committing to several different approaches to helping women workers,
but at its initial formation it was single-minded in its commitment to organizing women
and to being a labor organization.
What made the WTUL unique as a SMO at this time was its ambition to bring
middle-class feminist reformers into an ostensibly working-class, labor organization in
order to assist in the task of unionizing women.  These middle-class and upper-class
members of the group were called “allies,” and their role was anticipated in the league
constitution.  The constitution mandated that anyone was eligible to become a member,
and hold office, so long as they declared themselves “willing to assist those trade unions
already existing, which have women members, and to aid in the formation of new unions
of women wage workers.”13  But Walling and his fellow founders were adamant that the
WTUL not be dominated by the allies.  Walling described the ally in a letter to Leonora
O’Reilly, a New York garment worker and original board member of the WTUL, as
someone who had “patience, lofty faith and unalterable humility.  It is the girls who must
ever be the movement, but the ally can help immensely.”  He warned that the league not
become a vehicle for imposing middle-class values on women workers.  He envisioned
the WTUL as part of the labor movement first and foremost and its goals at the direction
of women workers.14  To that end, the constitution stipulated that the Executive Board
was to be divided as follows: “The majority … shall be women who are, or have been,
trade unionists in good standing, the minority of those well known to be earnest
                                                 
12 Constitution of the National Women’s Trade Union League of America, Adopted in Boston, MA,
November 17-19, 1903.  Quoted in Foner, Women and the American Labor Movement  299-300.
13 Constitution of the National Women’s Trade Union League of America, Adopted in Boston, MA,
November 17-19, 1903.  Quoted in Ibid.  300.
14 Letter from Walling to O’Reilly (November 25, 1903).  Quoted in Ibid.
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sympathizers and workers for the cause of trade unionism.”15 The initial leadership of the
WTUL would reflect this mixture.  Mary Morton Kehew, a wealthy reformist and former
president of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC), was selected as the
league’s first president, and Jane Addams of Hull House was tapped to be vice-president.
Kenney, the one-time AFL organizer, was named secretary.  The initial board would be
true to the working-class character required by the constitution with at least nine
members who had some union organizing experience. Reflecting on the formation of the
WTUL and its labor-first character, member, and early editor of the league periodical Life
and Labor, Alice Henry, would refer to the WTUL as “a federation of trade unions with
women members,” that happened to also provide a “niche” and an “honorable and useful
function for the wives of workingmen, for ex-trade-union women, and for others who
endorse trade unionism and gladly give their support to constructive work, aiming at
strengthening the weakest wing of labor, the unorganized, down-driven, underpaid
working-girls.”16
What emerged from Boston was the first labor organization geared toward
working women’s needs and interests of a national scale, which could organize women
through local branches, the three largest were established in Chicago (by settlement
workers at Hull House), New York (by settlement workers at University Settlement) and
Boston (by settlement workers at Denison House) in 1904, while simultaneously linking
them together through the national organization to allow for communication, cooperation
and the exchange of ideas.17  But if it was truly to be a successful labor organization
embedded within the labor movement and dedicated to integrating women into the
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16 Henry, The Trade Union Woman  87.
17 Ibid.  59-61.
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established centers of labor power, if it was truly to be an organization dedicated first to
the economic advancement of women as workers rather than their social and political
advancement as women, then it needed a solid relationship with organized labor.18  For
all practical purposes this meant a solid relationship with the AFL, which as discussed in
earlier chapters dominated the labor movement during this period.  From the start,
Walling and other league founders were eager to ensure good relations with the AFL.
After all, they had come to the AFL’s annual convention to start their organization.  The
WTUL did not ask for an immediate endorsement from the AFL in 1903, waiting instead
to make some tangible accomplishments first and hesitant due to the lack of female
representation among the AFL delegates present to press for AFL action, but a desire for
ties with the AFL was clear from the decision that an annual meeting of the WTUL be
held jointly with the AFL convention.19
Even in these earliest moments of the WTUL, the relationship with the AFL was
erratic, marked by both moments of embrace and dismissal.  In his autobiography,
Samuel Gompers recalled warmly welcoming the formation of the league and promoting
its program of work.  “When they submitted to me a proposal,” he wrote of Walling and
Kenney’s presentation of the league at the 1903 convention, “I gave it most hearty
approval and participated in the necessary conferences.  It was a step toward the
realization of the economic organization of women.  I defended the movement against the
dubious and tried to contribute counsel for its guidance.”20  But Gompers did not make
any approving remarks following Kenney’s announcement of the formation of the WTUL
                                                 
18 Dye, As Equals and as Sisters : Feminism, the Labor Movement, and the Women's Trade Union League
of New York  45.
19 Philip Foner reports that out of the 496 members of the AFL present at the 1903 convention, only 5 were
women.  Foner, Women and the American Labor Movement  301.
20 Gompers and Salvatore, Seventy Years of Life and Labor: An Autobiography  128.
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at the podium of the AFL convention, nor did he announce its formation in the American
Federationist in the reporting on the news from the convention.21
As the fledgling WTUL departed Boston and began its operations, its members
were optimistic, but they faced a difficult task in unionizing women. While some women
did belong to unions prior to the twentieth century, they comprised only a small
percentage of total union members, and where they did participate in unions that
participation was typically limited to local unions and did not extend to the national
level.22  Due to rapid industrialization, by 1900 one in five women in America were part
of the workforce, and women had representation in a broad array of occupations, but the
vast majority remained unorganized.23
Women had a different occupational pattern than men that did not lend itself to
existing practices of unionization.  The typical women worker in industry at this time was
young and single, normally beginning work in her mid-teens, often an immigrant that did
not speak English, and likely to remain in the labor force for only an average of six to
seven years.  Marriage was a natural interruption to employment, although many women
returned to industry later out of necessity.24  This transient nature of women’s
employment not only contributed to the “working only for pin money” myth of women’s
employment that was widely accepted at this time, but also made it difficult for both men
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to see the value in organizing women and women to see the value in making the effort
and taking up the expense (dues) to join a union.  These differences in employment
patterns were largely due to societal belief that women belonged in the home not the
workplace.  The ideological commitment to the cult of true womanhood was pervasive
during this era, and as will be discussed below, created an immense barrier to the
integration of women into the labor movement.
UNIONIZING WOMEN FALTERS – THE WTUL’S DIFFICULT COURTSHIP OF THE
AFL AND WOMEN WORKERS
Even against these structural and cultural barriers to organizing women, the
WTUL held fast during its early years to its original commitment to trade unionism as the
critical means to empowering women workers.25  But the drift to legislative work as a
focal point would occur quickly, as the organization faced resistance to unionization of
women from both organized labor and working women. Capturing the resources of the
AFL, through coalition and cooperation, was necessary to achieve success in organizing
women, particularly in light of the structural and cultural difficulties that made women
reticent to unionize.  But the WTUL would not succeed in winning much cooperation
from the AFL.  This failure to gain AFL support was attributable to many factors,
including ideological hostility to women as wage-workers by male trade unionists and
fear of female competition, the craft bias of the AFL and its federated structure, cultural
differences between men and women workers, inflexibility by the AFL in accepting
women’s unions or adapting to their needs and a failure of the AFL to provide tangible
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support to unionization efforts, and particular suspicions that the AFL had about the
WTUL itself, particularly based on its cross-class character.
The AFL’s official stance on the organization of women from the beginning of its
existence was that women’s unions should be represented upon an equal footing with
those of men within the AFL, and that there should be equal pay for equal work.  In much
the same way that the AFL had always officially welcomed black workers, such
platitudes were routinely offered at the annual conventions, but little actual effort was put
forth to unionize women or to give those women that were unionized a voice in the AFL.
Only two national affiliates of the AFL, the Cigar Makers’ Union and the Typographical
Union, during these early years accepted women members and many other affiliates had
prohibited female members or discouraged their active participation in union affairs at the
local level.  In fact, only one female delegate appeared at an AFL convention prior to
1891, and as discussed earlier, the AFL council put limited effort toward a national
approach to organizing women, having only employed one woman organizer in its
history prior to 1908, Mary Kenney in 1892, for a mere five months.  The WTUL would
force little change of this disconnect between AFL policy and AFL practice.
The WTUL felt compelled to court the AFL given its dominance of organized
labor, but the AFL represented the interests of craft unions first and foremost and most
women laborers were unskilled.26  This made the AFL a less than ideal coalition partner
from the outset, as they were already predisposed against industrial unionism.  This same
problem had stymied the efforts to unionize African-American and immigrant men.
Frustration over AFL hostility to unskilled workers was frequently vented within the
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WTUL, but it did not change the necessity of winning its cooperation.27 To that end, the
WTUL insisted on craft organization of women, but the policy proved ineffective.
Unskilled women inside craft unions were isolated and powerless and their interests were
routinely ignored by their skilled male counterparts.  This was a particular problem in the
garment industry, where tremendous gains were made in the raw number of women
organized with WTUL help, but in the failure of those women to earn many concessions
or assume any power within their unions.28
Compounding the problem of the craft union bias, was the AFL’s commitment to
trade union autonomy and noninterference.  Even if Gompers and the national leadership
had been so inclined to strenuously press the incorporation of women, skilled and
unskilled, into the trade union movement, they could do little concrete to press the matter
locally.  It was up to the WTUL to win cooperation not only of the national AFL
leadership, but also the individual unions.
The greatest obstacle to unionizing women, however, was the prevalent attitude
throughout society and among trade union men themselves that women did not belong in
the labor force but rather in the home.  Despite the surface commitment of the AFL to
unionizing women, hostile attitudes to women working as against the natural order and
contributing to societal decay, and serving as a blow to proper masculinity, were readily
apparent among its members at the turn of the century and onward.29  One member wrote
in the pages of the American Federationist:
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… that it is wrong to permit any of the female sex of our country to be forced to
work, as we believe that the man should be provided with a fair wage in order to
keep his female relatives from going to work.  The man is the provider and should
receive enough for his labor to give his family a respectable living.30
Another member complained that:
Respect for women is apt to decrease when they are compelled to work in the
factory or the store. … More respect for women brings less degeneration and
more marriages … if women labor in factories they bring forth weak children who
are not educated to become strong and good citizens.31
And an 1897 submission used perhaps the most colorful language of all to express the
unnatural and insidious effects of wage work for women.
The demand for female labor is an insidious assault upon the home … it is the
knife of the assassin aimed at the family circle. … The wholesale employment of
women in the various handicrafts must gradually unsex them as it most assuredly
is demoralizing them, or stripping them of that modest demeanor that lends charm
to their kind, while it numerically strengthens the multitudinous army of loafers,
paupers, tramps and policemen.32
Buttressing this ideology of proper womanhood and belief in the confinement of
women to the domestic sphere was fear among working men that unskilled women
workers were undercutting their wages and taking their jobs.33 Gompers himself
wondered whether women belonged in the workforce given their negative effects on the
male breadwinner’s wages.  “It is the so-called competition of the unorganized,
defenseless woman worker, the girl and the wife, that often tends to reduce the wages of
the father and husband,” he wrote.34  Of course, removing women from the workforce
altogether was not feasible, so the AFL increasingly gave begrudging lip service to
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unionizing women, but emphasized that it was for men’s protection as much as for
women.  Gompers, in the same article quoted above where he lamented women working
at all, concluded that AFL policy would be best served if they were, “to throw open wide
the doors of our organization and invite the working girls and working women to
membership for their and our common protection.”35  Thus the WTUL confronted an
ambivalent coalition partner, filled with latent hostility to the mission of the WTUL and
only pragmatic and begrudging motivations to counteract that hostility and to cooperate
with the unionization of women.
Trade union men were not alone in having absorbed the ideology of proper
womanhood.  Many women workers likewise believed that they did not belong in the
workforce on a full-time basis, and they were apathetic about unionizing because they
expected to return to the home when they married.  This self-identification as being a
part-time worker or supplementary worker also contributed to disinterest in unionizing
and a failure to see the importance of solidarity with the collective bargaining efforts of
their fellow male workers, which was as the AFL feared.  The WTUL frequently used
women workers’ own identification as wives and mothers first and industrial help-mates
second as a marketing tool to women for unionizing.  Women needed to unionize, if not
for themselves, then as part of their responsibility to their family as good wives and
mothers.  President Margaret Dreier Robins explained to the 1909 WTUL convention
that, “if the young woman acts as an underbidder before marriage, then her husband must
bring home a lesser wage after marriage … and she must suffer a lower standard of living
all the remaining years of her life.”  Furthermore, Robins explained that if husbands
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earned lower wages, they would have to work longer hours, causing wives to lose the
“fellowship of a husband,” and their children to lose the “companionship of a father.”36
But there were even more practical and mundane obstacles than ideology and
competitive fears to unionization of women due to social and cultural differences
between the sexes, and their relative positions in the labor force.  Union dues were a
greater hardship on lower paid women than on men.  More so in AFL unions, which
typically insisted on higher dues than unaffiliated unions.  WTUL policy to incorporate
women into AFL unions led to a greater financial hardship on women through higher
dues.  This was a hardship that the AFL was unwilling to work around and which the
WTUL lacked the funds to defray.37  As to social and cultural problems, union meetings
often took place in saloons and other locales where women were socially prohibited, and
meetings very often took place at night when many young working girls, particularly
immigrant girls, were expected by their families to be home.38  Furthermore, male
organizers were limited in where they could go themselves to recruit women.  For
instance, decorum required that they could not call on women who lived alone in their
own lodgings.39 Alice Henry would also point out that the relative youth of women
workers made them resistant to the commitment necessary to participate in union
meetings, as they were at the “play age” and likely to view union activities as “tiresome
and boring past endurance.”40  Added to all of these barriers to unionization, was the
reality that women workers had domestic responsibilities that absorbed their time outside
the workplace.
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Helen Marot, a WTUL organizer and ardent trade unionist, aptly summarized the
above challenges to unionizing women, when she wrote of “the woman’s problem” in
labor. Marot wrote:
The question of why more women are not members of unions is only partially
answered with the reasons for lack of organization among the unskilled.  There is
another phase of the problem … It is the woman’s problem … Men’s domestic
duties coincide with the performance of a day’s work. … Wage-earning women
give their time and strength to industry as men give theirs, but women, unlike
men, are not relieved from home duties in consequence. … They perform their
day’s work in the factory in addition to their obligation at home.  They go into
industry, in short, not as competent wage-earners, with the common needs of
individual human beings, but as helpers-out at home.  They have little conception
of their place in industry and their relation to other wage-earners … With this
attitude toward their work they readily accept a wage which is an auxiliary wage,
that is, a wage which supplements the wages of others … This is not only a
woman’s attitude toward her wage.  It is the general attitude.  The woman who is
thrown entirely on her own resources … is subject to the same depressing
influence of the prevailing attitude toward women as is her sister who pools her
earnings with members of her family.  No one expects a woman to take her wage-
earning seriously, or to consider it as a future occupation.  She is invited to
indulge in the glittering generality that marriage will relieve her of all financial
burdens. … This attitude toward women wage earners is more serious in its
effects on wages and her interest in the problem of her fellow workers than is the
actual bearing of children.  The eternal emphasis on a woman’s response to the
demands of her family make it difficult for her to realize the effect of her
underbidding her fellow workers in search of jobs, or her responsibility to them.
The appeal to her to help build up an organization for permanent protection is not
met with the ready response it might if she were master of her own time and if the
future was as clear for her as for her brothers.  Even as she answers the appeal to
organize, she finds it difficult to attend union meetings in addition to her
household duties … Many labor men are men first and unionists second.  Such
men are too often annoyed at the thought of women out of the home to face the
danger which threatens organization by leaving her free to shift for herself and to
meet the organization of labor as she meets capital, as best she can and in her own
way. 41
In order to address some of these immense cultural obstacles to female
unionization, the WTUL believed that the AFL needed to do more to adapt to the special
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needs of women in their recruiting of female labor.  The vehicle for this, in the league’s
view, was women organizers who could meet the special needs of women workers and
appeal to their special problems in organizing.42 The training of women organizers
became a central focus of the league very early on, as the concrete effort involved in
actual unionization drives often were too much for the members of the WTUL
themselves, particularly the allies.43  The New York branch, which had been the most
aggressive organizer in early years, reported in 1908 that it recognized “that the strength
of the league lies in its capacity to train wage-earning women for the work of
organization.”44  To this end, the WTUL in 1913 would establish a school for the training
of women organizers, which involved both fieldwork and coursework for selected
working-class women in topics such as parliamentary procedure and the writing of
business letters that were skills needed to operate within existing unions.45 The WTUL
lobbied hard for the AFL to hire woman organizers, but the AFL employed only thirty-
eight woman organizers between 1908 and 1923, and most for short tenures of only a few
months.46  This meant that the organization of women that was taking place was
occurring in unaffiliated unions that held less power and stability and less of a chance of
eventual affiliation.  This also meant that the AFL was unwilling to take concrete steps
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toward indicating favoritism for women in the workforce and even more to the point for
women to be integrated into the labor movement.47
Class was also a significant barrier to AFL cooperation.  The mixed-class
character of the WTUL made Gompers and others in organized labor uneasy, as Walling
and other founders had worried.  This uneasiness manifested itself in several ways.  The
AFL refused to seat delegates from the WTUL at conventions, limiting them only to
ceremonial and informational participation in AFL business.  Gompers wrote to Gertrude
Barnum of the WTUL to explain that union members were not comfortable that the ladies
of the league would be, in their participation, “voicing the sentiments and reaching the
conclusions desired by the membership.”48  Gompers’ own hostility to the WTUL also
manifested itself in the 1908 selection of the woman organizer that the WTUL had
agitated so strongly for.  Gompers selected Annie Fitzgerald of the rival Union Label
League to serve rather than a WTUL candidate.  Fitzgerald was hostile to the WTUL and
league members took this snub by Gompers personally.  But even this tainted victory was
short-lived as Fitzgerald’s commission was revoked quickly.49  Gompers also viewed the
WTUL as filled with dilettantes and prone to socialist beliefs.50  Trade unionist men also
distrusted the WTUL’s sincerity as a labor organization, suspecting it of being a political
organization and a suffragist group in disguise.51  The league was always aware of this
distrust built on class suspicions and fear of the interloping of the women’s movement
and its agenda.  Thus the WTUL felt it particularly important to work hard to secure the
“confidence of the official movement,” because, as Helen Marot explained, “the league
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was composed of two groups of people, unionists and sympathizers [it] is in danger of
creating a feeling that the latter look for strength to forces other than labor.”52
Despite these frustrations with the AFL, the WTUL continued to devote resources
to organizing women, but the experiences with the AFL’s response to the revolution in
the garment trades between 1909 and 1913 would disillusion the WTUL and refocus their
approach to helping women workers.53  Ostensibly, the series of strikes that took place in
the garment trade from New York City, to Philadelphia, to Chicago, to Kalamazoo to
Lawrence were successes for women in unions and for the WTUL who had supported the
major strikes.   The WTUL earned great praise in the press and even from the AFL for
their participation in strike support, including the unprecedented participation of allies on
the front lines, particularly in the New York strike of shirtwaist workers that lasted for
several months.54  Rose Schneiderman, a WTUL organizer and later president,
nicknamed the society ladies who faithfully picketed the “Mink Brigade.”55  However,
the gains made for women in unions fell far short of what was possible given the hostility
of the United Garment Workers (UGW) to women within their unions.  Time and again
the WTUL witnessed the UGW marginalize the concessions to be given to women
workers within their ranks despite the overwhelming number of women workers that
participated in the strikes.  The AFL did nothing to pressure the affiliated UGW to
change its ways, and when the WTUL experimented during these strikes with supporting
unaffiliated unions that were more receptive to unionizing and supporting the needs of
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the largely immigrant and unskilled women in the garment trades they made little
headway with employers and only sparked the ire of the AFL.
Tensions between the AFL and the WTUL would come to a head with the strike
of textile workers in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912.  The socialist enemy of the AFL,
the IWW, dominated the strike, and the AFL union that represented the striking skilled
workers, the United Textile Workers (UTW), advised the WTUL to avoid involvement.
But members of the Boston branch of the league decided to assist the women strikers
once the size and importance of the strike became apparent.  The UTW begrudgingly
permitted the league to assist the women strikers, but the UTW quickly negotiated a
settlement with the mills that benefited only the skilled male workers in their union and
ordered the WTUL to cease assistance in light of the settlement, despite having left the
mass of unskilled women workers unprotected.  The WTUL, given its commitment to
AFL principles, complied, but the incident inflamed the league.
WTUL frustration with the AFL’s intransigence on organizing women boiled
over.  Mary Kenney O’Sullivan, co-founder of the WTUL, ignored AFL (and WTUL)
directives and stayed on to assist the strikers and subsequently quit the league in
disgust.56  The opinion of Sue Ainslie Clark, president of the Boston league, on the
futility of alliance with the AFL was representative of the views of many within the
WTUL.  She wrote:
To me, many of those in power in the American labor movement today seem to be
selfish, reactionary, and remote from the struggle for bread and liberty of the
unskilled workers.  Are we, the Women’s Trade Union League, to ally ourselves
with the ‘stand-patters’ of the Labor Movement or are we to hold ourselves ready
to aid the insurgents – those who are freely fighting the fight of the exploited, the
oppressed and the weak among the workers?57
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Melinda Scott called the AFL “a bag of wind.”58  WTUL president, Margaret Dreier
Robins, confessed to her sister that she was growing immune to the insensitivity of the
AFL.  “It is just as well that I have no illusions regarding the men,” she wrote.59  Rose
Schneiderman left the WTUL for a time to join the suffrage fight following the crushing
disappointments of the general garment strikes, blaming the AFL for the failures the
WTUL had encountered in organizing women.  “We have come to the American
Federation of Labor,” she complained, “and said to them, ‘Come and help us organize the
American working girl’ … but nothing was done.”60
Despite this disillusionment, the WTUL saw little choice to adhering to AFL
principles and policies when unionizing and continuing to attempt to draw upon the
established resources of the AFL.  The WTUL could offer little in the way of assistance
to women workers if they organized them into unions that had no influence with
employers or staying power within the labor movement.  Thus the WTUL held firm to
coalition with the recalcitrant AFL when unionizing women.  As Raymond Robins,
husband of the WTUL president, explained to the restless New York branch, “The AFL
with all of its shortcomings – and few people know these better than ourselves – is none
the less the true representative body of organized labor in this country … As a matter of
expediency you must cooperate with the policy of the American Federation of Labor.”61
Not surprisingly, given the futility of this expectation of AFL cooperation, the WTUL
increasingly looked to channel its resources into other methods for aiding women
workers.  Propitious then was the constitutional victory of Muller in 1908, which
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invigorated the prospects of securing protective labor legislation for women in the
workplace.
MULLER MEETS DISILLUSIONMENT – THE WTUL REINVENTS ITSELF
At the 1913 convention of the WTUL, the national secretary summarized the first
ten years of the league’s existence.  She announced that:
During the ten years which have elapsed since its founding, the effort of the
National Women’s Trade Union League has been twofold, to organize women
directly and to awaken public opinion to the recognition of the value of trade
organization.  A great deal of preparatory work has been done with meager
equipment and unbounding enthusiasm and faith in the future distinctive of
pioneer undertakings, and the next ten years may be trusted to show very definite
results.62
The next ten years proved distinctive in the undertakings of the WTUL and did show
definite results, as the league turned its attention to a legislative program.  But even in
reflection on the first ten years, it was clear that the league had shown more skill and had
greater success in awakening public opinion to trade unionism than it had in actually
organizing women.
In fact, it was apparent almost immediately that the WTUL’s natural strengths lay
in providing education and public relations to support the cause of unionization of
women.  The organization did not possess a reservoir of membership with field
experience in unionizing women or with inside connections to labor unions.  Thus at the
first executive board meeting, the national league agreed that it would best suited to aid
the cause of organizing women through providing general education and investigating
factory conditions.  William English Walling and Jane Addams dedicated themselves to
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publishing pro-union propaganda, and a Wellesley College professor among their ranks
was put to work on a bibliography on labor topics that could educate both the league and
the public on the importance of unionization for women.63  At the first annual meeting of
the league in 1904, the WTUL added ambitions for creating a bureau of information for
members on labor statistics and factory investigations and commitment to appearances
before women’s clubs in order to promote the league as fruitful techniques to achieve
their goals of unionization of women.64
These natural strengths and strategic predispositions of the league could be
attributed in part to the presence of the allies in the WTUL.65  These women were
articulate and predominantly college educated, thus they were naturals at publishing and
propaganda. The WTUL published frequently in labor periodicals, such as the Union
Labor Advocate, and started a periodical of their own, Life and Labor. Also, their
position within the network of the women’s movement was a tremendous resource to be
exploited, such as with informational appearances before women’s clubs.  After all, the
first president of the WTUL had first helmed the GFWC.  Time and money were also
resources that the allies possessed in greater abundance than the working-class
membership and thus skewed the methods employed by the league.  Experience of
members within the women’s movement created a comfort level that also pushed the
WTUL toward engagement with the state as a technique of activism.66
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Buttressing the dominance of these strategic predispositions and resources for
education, public relations and political work was the WTUL’s financial problems.  The
league did not even hold an annual convention in 1906 due to money woes.  The AFL
never provided any financial assistance to the WTUL, thus the league relied on the
generosity of its allies, particularly the wealth of its long-time president Margaret Dreier
Robins, who kept the league periodical afloat with her own money.67  Due to these
financial exigencies, the WTUL could only afford to underwrite a limited number of
approaches to organizing women, and thus when squeezed the league often defaulted to
the methods that the allies excelled at and felt at home with, methods and interests which
would quickly prove particularly conducive to legislative and suffrage work.
Thus the WTUL in its early years not only experienced frustration with
organizing efforts and rejection by the AFL, but also discovered that its organizational
and membership strengths predisposed it to the kind of publicity and bureaucratic work
that was best aimed at lobbying the state rather than at transforming the attitudes of
working-class union men and recruiting working-class women to unions.  Contributing to
this confluence of factors pointing to a new direction for the WTUL would be the birth of
the gendered Constitution in Muller and the prospect of an attractive partnership with the
NCL and other organizations within the women’s movement.
From its inception, the WTUL maintained a legislative agenda.  In 1903, the
organization noted that one of its objectives would be “to secure new legislation to
protect women workers and to obtain better enforcement of existing laws.”68  In 1904, the
WTUL board got somewhat more specific, as it recommended that the league work for
the “adoption of progressive industrial legislation and uniformity in factory laws
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throughout the United States.”69  This progressive industrial legislation the league
dedicated itself to included not only laws geared toward workplace safety and sanitation,
but also the limitation of hours to be worked by women to eight hours per day and fifty
hours per week, along with a prohibition against night work.70  At the WTUL’s first
national convention in 1907, the league adopted a platform that included, in addition to
calls for the organization of women into trade unions, equal pay for equal work, the
promotion of the economic principles of the AFL, and full citizenship for women, the
eight-hour day.71
At this point in time, these legislative goals were fairly unremarkable.  While the
AFL was moving away from supporting a legislative program for shorter hours in the
workplace to supporting an economic program for shorter hours in this first decade of the
twentieth century due to judicial hostility, they had not yet turned fully hostile to state
labor reform.72  Likewise, there were a growing number of legislative campaigns for
hours restrictions for working women that had spread to assorted states.  At this point, the
success of a legislative approach to limiting the hours women worked had been erratic, as
state and federal courts struggled with balancing state police powers with a developing
commitment to free contract liberty, which would not fully triumph until 1905 with
Lochner.  Thus in these early years of the WTUL there was no special advantage to
working on legislative reform.  The uncertain constitutionality of protective labor
legislation for women made the state an uncertain resource for the advancement of the
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interests of women workers.  Given this uncertainty and more importantly the still fresh,
and perhaps naïve, enthusiasm for the trade union approach, the WTUL treated legislative
work as a supplementary approach to aiding women workers.  This would begin to
change after 1908.
The Progressive Era battle over protective labor legislation for women began in
Illinois in the 1890’s.  There had been sporadic attempts to limit the hours women could
work in Massachusetts and a few other states beginning in the 1870’s, but these laws
were weakly drafted and largely unenforceable.73  For the most part these laws survived
judicial review, but the courts did not engage in any extensive analysis of the relationship
between women, the police power, and the parameters of individual liberty.74  In Illinois,
Florence Kelley worked with her fellow settlement residents at Hull House to draft and to
lobby for an aggressive law governing factory practices and inspections, which included
limitations on the hours women could work.  The law, which had far more bite than
earlier forays into protective labor legislation in Massachusetts and elsewhere, passed in
1893 and Florence Kelley was appointed as the state factory inspector, a job she took
quite seriously.75  However, this protection for women workers in Illinois was short-
lived, when the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the hours provision in 1895 in
Ritchie v. People.76
In Ritchie, gender did not play a significant role in the decision of the Illinois
Court.    The justices upheld a general right to freedom of contract that trumped the police
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power of the state, glossing over any discussion of sex.77  Ritchie was part of a larger
period of constitutional adjustment, as courts around the country worked out the proper
parameters of the police power in light of developing commitment to ideals of economic
due process liberty that had first found voice in Field’s dissent in The Slaughter-House
Cases, had gained acceptance in state cases such as in re Jacobs, and would culminate in
the victory of freedom of contract in Lochner.78  In the years that followed Ritchie and
preceded Lochner, a few other states would instead uphold maximum hours laws for
women in the face of this constitutional uncertainty, but the disappointment of Ritchie
dealt a setback, though not a deathblow, to the movement for protective labor legislation
for women.79  Florence Kelley did not give up on protective labor legislation for women,
despite the experience in Illinois, and she would go on to spearhead campaigns for hours
laws, and later minimum wage laws, to protect women workers at the helm of the NCL.
The NCL began as a movement of individual consumer leagues that developed in
several states in the 1890’s, and then consolidated in 1899 as the NCL.  Florence Kelley
was brought on board that year as the NCL’s general secretary.  The NCL agitated for
better working conditions for women that worked in shops and factories.  To win these
better working conditions for women, the NCL relied on ethical consumerism (regulation
through consumption).  To that end, the NCL publicized “white lists” of shops that
treated employees well, provided “white labels” for merchandise manufactured under
safe and sanitary conditions, and undertook a variety of consumer campaigns to bring
about changes in the workplace that were not covered by state regulation or collective
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bargaining, such as the “shop early” campaign which encouraged women to do their
Christmas shopping early so as to avoid unhealthy hours for shop girls at the holidays.
The NCL worked closely with the GFWC on these projects, using the clubs to raise
consumer awareness and serve as an information distribution network for their lists and
labels.80
The NCL was the quintessential embodiment of “social housekeeping,” which
was the prevailing ideology of the period.81  The organization embraced and utilized the
domestic role of the woman, as homemaker and therefore purchaser of household goods,
as a force for positive social change that benefited the community at large.  Their reform
program, which exported the duties and responsibilities of the maternal role in the private
sphere to the public sphere, was an exemplar of what Paula Baker calls the
“domestication” of American politics during this era.82
With Florence Kelley at the helm, the NCL quickly added the pursuit of
protective legislation for women and children to its slate of consumer campaigns.83
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Buoyed by the success of a Utah maximum hours law for miners before the Supreme
Court in 1898, which took some of the sting out of Ritchie, the NCL sponsored legislative
campaigns in several states.84  Between 1900 and 1908, branch consumers’ leagues
participated in campaigns to secure new or improve existing hours laws for women
workers in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Oregon, Connecticut, Michigan, and
Tennessee.85  They also worked, during these pre-Muller years, on campaigns for laws
against women’s night work, and secured such legislation in four states, including New
York.86
In 1905, the Supreme Court struck down a maximum hours law for bakers in
Lochner, and freedom of contract was solidified as a constitutional principle.  Protective
labor legislation was now imperiled everywhere.  But Lochner also contained hints that a
gendered exception to free contract liberty might be possible.  The majority opinion,
echoing language found in the plaintiffs’ brief, spoke of the “intelligence and capacity” of
bakers, like other men, to “care for themselves,” without state interference in their
“independence of judgment and action.”  Bakers, as a class, were in “no sense wards of
the state.”87  Women did not possess such robust independence, judgment and capacity
for self-protection according to the conventional wisdom and legal conventions of the
period. But it would not be male state officials or judges’ themselves that would bring
such an insight to the fore when a maximum hours law for women only subsequently
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made its way to the Supreme Court.  Women themselves, through the NCL, would be
responsible for bringing such arguments to the constitutional table.
The NCL became involved in the litigation of the hours laws they helped pass
when Florence Kelley and Josephine Goldmark, the NCL member who was the chief
researcher and co-author responsible for the famous Brandeis Brief used in Muller,
attended the judicial proceedings on New York’s night work law, which was challenged
in 1905 in the wake of Lochner, to show women’s support for the measure.  They were
horrified to discover that the state attorney had assigned no one to argue the case and had
merely submitted a brief, which Florence Kelley described as “a disgraceful display of
ignorance.”88  Kelley became convinced that the NCL needed a concerted litigation
strategy to protect NCL-sponsored legislation.
In 1907, the Portland branch of the NCL reported that their state’s maximum
hours law for women had survived judicial review in Oregon following a challenge by a
laundry owner, but was now headed to the Supreme Court.  The NCL recruited
Goldmark’s brother-in-law, Louis Brandeis, to the cause.  Incidentally, Margaret Dreier
Robins, president of the WTUL, and her husband participated in Brandeis’ recruitment.89
This kind of interconnection between reform organizations was typical during this period,
and demonstrates the comfortable degree to which the WTUL was wired into the power
centers of the women’s movement, in sharp contradistinction to the league’s tenuous
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connection to the power centers of the labor movement.  Thus, cooperation with the NCL
in legislative work was a ready resource for the WTUL even before the enticing success
of Muller would draw a greater proportion of its attention to legislation.
Brandeis and Goldmark set to work on crafting the amicus brief for the Oregon
case.  The brief was a landmark in American constitutional history for its voluminous use
of statistics and its embrace of sociological jurisprudence, but it also laid the groundwork
for a maternalist exception to the established constitutional principle of economic due
process liberty.90  Brandeis and Goldmark chose not to attack Lochner directly, but
instead opted to push for an exception for women, perhaps influenced by the masculinist
rhetoric of the Lochner opinion itself.  The Supreme Court adopted virtually wholesale
the arguments put forth by Brandeis and Goldmark, accepting the general point that
women’s overwork harmed the general welfare because women were responsible for
reproduction.91  Justice Brewer, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, embraced the
medical, social and statistical evidence provided by the NCL to support their maternalist
rationale:
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place
her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially
true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by
abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her
feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the
body, and, as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical
well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to
preserve the strength and vigor of the race.92
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Male labor was the constitutional norm, and governed by the principles in Lochner that
celebrated individualism, but women were distinguished not only by their relative
weakness, but also by their significance to the community, which counseled against
treating them merely as individuals.  Brewer explained (with greater flourish on the point
of female dependence than was to be found in the Brandeis Brief):
Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly placed in a
class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained,
even when like legislation is not necessary for men, and could not be sustained. It
is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and
depends upon him. Even though all restrictions on political, personal, and
contractual rights were taken away, and she stood, so far as statutes are
concerned, upon an absolutely equal plane with him, it would still be true that she
is so constituted that she will rest upon and look to him for protection; that her
physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions-having in
view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race-justify legislation
to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man.93
A gendered Constitution was born, and the NCL had served as midwife.94
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With unanimous Supreme Court backing of a separate constitutional category for
women’s labor that favored state protection, and near universal public acclaim for the
decision, the NCL, enjoying its now greatly enhanced status as a major leader for social
reform, made the promotion and defense of protective labor laws for women its
paramount mission and viewed it as the best method for aiding women workers.95  They
would achieve great success.  Between 1908 and 1917 nineteen states and Washington,
DC would enact hours laws for women, and twenty states with existing laws would
improve them.  All these new maximum hours laws survived judicial challenge.96  Most
gratifying to Florence Kelley was the reversal of the 1895 Ritchie decision by the Illinois
Supreme Court in 1910.97  The NCL was not alone, however, in recognizing the valuable
resource of the gendered Constitution and the new promise of the state as a site for
reform after so many years of judicial obstruction.
Muller made an immediate impression on the WTUL.  At an early 1909 executive
board meeting a rift developed in leadership, with one faction favoring league dedication
to educational and legislative missions, and the other faction favoring a sustained central
focus on organizing women and strengthening women’s unions.98  This strategic
disagreement on the most effective role of the organization would keep the WTUL’s
attentions divided between legislative work and union organizing through a period of
adjustment from 1909 to roughly 1914 that coincided with the increasing disillusionment
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with organized labor discussed above that plagued the league in these years.  From that
point forward, however, the WTUL would be first and foremost a state-focused pressure
group.  At the 1909 national convention, the WTUL broadened its legislative program,
putting the pursuit of the eight-hour day and the elimination of night work for women at
the top of its eleven-point platform.99  However, the WTUL, perhaps given executive
dissension over strategy, did not become active at the national level in lobbying for
legislation until 1913, instead encouraging local leagues to come to their own decision
regarding how much time to devote to legislative lobbying.100  Many local leagues went
immediately to work, forming coalitions with local consumers’ leagues and other reform
allies, to press the fight for maximum hours laws.  In 1909, WTUL branches campaigned
for legislative reform in Illinois and Missouri, followed by local campaigns in
Massachusetts in 1911 and Vermont in 1912.101  The Chicago WTUL was particularly
aggressive as a legislative pressure group.  They assisted in the passage of the ten-hour
law in 1909, but they believed an eight-hour day was preferable and vowed to continue to
fight for the more stringent restriction.  Agnes Nestor, the local WTUL president from
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1913 to 1948, appeared before every session of the state legislature from 1909 until the
bill finally passed in 1937.102
Although the national league did not fully dedicate itself to legislative
campaigning in 1909, it did publicize its platform as a representation of the policy needs
and preferences of organized women workers to other SMOs, such as the NCL and the
American Association of Labor Legislation (AALL), and encourage them to incorporate
the legislative goals into their own efforts.103  What made the league’s 1909 legislative
program particularly distinctive was its call for a minimum wage (the final point of the
eleven-point platform).  The NCL had not yet made such a bold call.  This put the WTUL
at the forefront of upping the ante of the success of Muller to regulate an aspect of the
employment contract that was not so obviously linked to the health and reproductive
capacity of women workers.
The Boston branch of the WTUL went quickly to work on a minimum wage
campaign in Massachusetts, and by 1911 they had assembled a coalition that included
unionists, social workers and local outlets of the NCL and the AALL, and in 1912 they
succeeded with passage of a state wage bill.  This success would quickly spread, with
eight more states following with minimum wage laws for women in 1913.104  At this
point, the NCL would take the lead in the national legislative campaign.  The NCL would
now spearhead the coalition of reformers, not only because they were better resourced for
and more tightly focused on a legislative approach to aiding women workers, but also
because the WTUL was still adjusting the scope and focus of its activism and tensions
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over that adjustment were high.  Kelley explained in 1912 that the minimum wage
campaign “was first actively taken up by the Women’s Trade Union League.  It seems
likely to be carried to success in the near future chiefly by the efforts of a public
commission and the Consumers’ League constituency, the Women’s Trade Union League
being shaken to its foundations by inner dissension.”105
Muller had significantly impacted the league’s strategy and focus and not
everyone was happy.  Many of the working-class members of the league, and even some
of the more radically-inclined allies, were alarmed at the de-emphasis on organizing work
that was implicit in the redirection of resources to legislative campaigns.  The AFL was
also displeased with the WTUL endorsement of a legislated minimum wage, exacerbating
the tensions between the organizations.  Gompers was adamant that there be no minimum
wage for men, as a minimum wage might serve as a ceiling on wages that could be
negotiated and such a wage for women might prove to be a slippery slope.  “The
establishment of such a policy or practice … would infringe upon the liberty of women,
and would directly or indirectly affect that of men,” declared Gompers.106  He conceded
that as a resource-conscious strategy it was tempting “to resort to legislative devices that
palliate the ills,” but that legislative solutions were inferior to trade unionism since a
minimum wage would not help women develop the valuable qualities of “self-discipline,
the development of individual responsibility, and initiative.”107  Many of the women
within the WTUL agreed and resisted the new direction.
By 1915, when the WTUL reiterated its commitment to minimum wage
legislation at its annual convention, the AFL issued a warning that the WTUL was
endangering its identification with the labor movement and becoming far too comfortable
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a creature of the women’s movement.108  Gompers reminded the WTUL that “industrial
freedom must be fought out on the industrial field … Protection and regulation may offer
immediate relief – but they are not freedom.”  He praised the WTUL for having
“tremendous opportunity and promise,” as an organization, but warned that those
resources made it attractive to those with other agenda.  Being “confronted by dangers
and pitfalls,” the league “must protect itself against attempts to dominate it and use it for
other purposes.”  Shamelessly glossing over the AFL’s own failures to organize women
and to aid the WTUL in that mission, Gompers contended that “the fight of women for
industrial freedom is made doubly difficult … by patronizing social workers and those
who would protect woman in order to keep her from exercising her own will power and
becoming a member of society upon equality with all.”109
The WTUL stood at a strategic and constitutional crossroads.  Gompers had
reminded the WTUL of the virtues of the labor Constitution, which as discussed in
Chapter Three, emphasized the civic value of trade unionism, which created independent
citizens, and its ability to enhance the liberty of the individual, who could rely on
collective self-help rather than the state for his survival.  This constitutional vision was
deeply at odds with the regulatory embrace of the gendered Constitution.
But with the WTUL more disenchanted with the AFL than ever following the
disappointments of unionizing efforts in the garment trades in the years following 1909,
and with the AFL more disappointed with the WTUL than ever due to their legislative
efforts on the minimum wage and earlier dalliances with the IWW and other unaffiliated
unions,110 and with the rapid success of legislative campaigns following Muller that
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showed tangible returns on the resources invested, the pro-legislative faction of the
WTUL won out by the middle of the decade.  The labor Constitution had been traded in
for the gendered Constitution.  Trade unionism was not abandoned, but President
Margaret Dreier Robins captured the resource and opportunity driven reinvention of the
WTUL well in a 1914 essay:
It is ten years since the National Women’s Trade Union League was organized,
and out of our ever widening experience, we are seeking to establish such
measures for constructive work as will enable us to meet with greater knowledge,
courage, and capacity, the ever growing problem of women in modern industry.
We must ever use the living issues of each hour.  If the fight for the shorter work
day presents itself, we throw ourselves into winning that fight.  If the contention
for better wages becomes a legislative measure, we throw whatever we have of
time and strength into that fight.111
Those who disagreed with the strategic change believed that legislative solutions
to the problems of working women, though perhaps more easily or more quickly secured,
were inferior to the benefits to women workers of trade unionism.112  The league had
always emphasized unionization as a source of fellowship, education and empowerment
for women,113 but many of its members also echoed the voluntarist rhetoric of Gompers
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in suggesting that women could obtain better concessions through collective bargaining.
Helen Marot took a swipe at meddlesome philanthropists and bureaucrats in her 1914
book.  “Benevolently imposed measures are weak substitutes for those which are self-
imposed and administered,” she wrote.114  She also enthusiastically cited Gompers’
editorial on the material and spiritual benefits of trade unionism for women over any
regulatory solution.115 Pauline Newman, a working-class organizer and one of the more
ardent trade unionists in the WTUL, favored women workers’ control of reform.  She
wrote, “to shorten the workday and raise wages is, or SHOULD BE, the business of the
working woman herself.  No one can or will do it better than she herself. … it will have
to be done … on the basis of collective bargaining. … And so why not concentrate all
efforts to the organizing of the working woman?”  She went on to explain that unions
could better enforce workplace standards than the state.116  Mary Dreier, president of the
New York league and Margaret’s sister, emphasized as against the supplementary work
of legislation, “the more important work of organization, for we know that the greatest
power to enforce labor laws is trade unions, and a strong trade union can demand better
conditions and shorter hours than the law will allow, and then, too, we get education and
power through organization, which we do not get through law.”117
Some like Marot would leave the WTUL as a result of the new direction, but
others like Newman and Dreier stayed on and begrudgingly accepted that a legislative
agenda was both useful and realizable, especially in light of the recalcitrance of the AFL,
even if not the best solution.  Newman admitted at the 1915 convention that where
                                                 
114 Marot, American Labor Unions  9.
115 Ibid.  76-7.  Citing Gompers, "Woman's Work, Rights and Progress."
116 Pauline Newman, "The Workers of the World," Progressive Woman, May 1912, 7.  (emphasis in
original)  Quoted in Novkov, Constituting Workers, Protecting Women: Gender, Law, and Labor in the
Progressive Era and New Deal Years  165.
117 From New York Times, December 3, 1909.  Quoted in Dye, As Equals and as Sisters : Feminism, the
Labor Movement, and the Women's Trade Union League of New York  143.
200
organization fell short (and for many women workers it did), legislative protections were
important.  “[I]f the state, which is supposed to serve its people, can help these people get
2 or 3 dollars a week more,” she argued, “not one of us has a right to say to the girls:
‘Don’t accept it.  Starve rather than accept money from the state.’”118  Mary Dreier
agreed that organization was regrettably often unobtainable, therefore the WTUL needed
to assist in obtaining legislative relief.  Dreier wrote to Melinda Scott in 1914 that:
It seemed to me that in arousing public sentiment, first among the workers
themselves, and second among the general public, for the minimum wage the
League could proclaim to those women who know nothing about organization,
who are so hard-pressed that there seems little chance of organizing them, that the
Women’s Trade Union League is a friend to them in their extremity.119
As Alice Henry, who came to be a great league defender in later years despite her
skepticism of converting the WTUL to a legislative pressure group, summed it up: “What
we win for ourselves we ever value more highly and hold more securely.  But it would be
inhuman to postpone the day of improvement until trade unionism among women
becomes so general that they can act through the power of numbers.”120
At this point, a legislative strategy had proven to be a faster and more reliable
route to results on behalf of working women, not to mention in keeping with the natural
resource strengths of the league women and their connections to the reform network of
the women’s movement.  In 1923, Alice Henry would explain that where “organization is
too slow a method to relieve oppression, it is on legislation that the League bends its
efforts.”121  The gendered Constitution, which provided an exception to Lochnerian
jurisprudence, had proven to reliably provide such a faster route to results and protective
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legislation had absorbed the bulk of the league’s attention.  By this year, however, the
gendered Constitution would no longer hold such promise as a resource for women’s
labor activism, given a change of attitude on the Supreme Court.  The WTUL would find
itself challenged in the 1920’s not only by this judicial setback, but also by an internecine
battle within the women’s movement itself.  And it was in the women’s movement that
the WTUL now made its true home, having drifted far from its original moorings within
the labor movement to embrace the strategic methods, policy preferences, and support
network of women reform organizations such as the NCL.
FIGHTING THE ERA – THE WTUL OUT OF STEP WITH WOMEN WORKERS
As the 1920’s approached, the WTUL dedicated itself to a series of political and
bureaucratic initiatives consistent with the new focus of the league.  One of the most
significant of these initiatives was the creation of the Women’s Bureau in the Department
of Labor.  The WTUL first campaigned for its creation in 1909 and intensified their
lobbying efforts during World War I, winning the establishment of a woman’s division of
the War Labor Administration.  WTUL members were hired to run this division, and
were integrally involved in the drafting of regulations on women’s war-time employment.
In 1920, this agency was converted to the Women’s Bureau, an autonomous unit of the
Department of Labor.122  Mary Anderson, a one-time WTUL organizer and member of
the working-class, was appointed director.  Other significant political activities by the
WTUL included creating the International Congress of Working Women in 1919 to deal
with post-war reconstruction issues.  Consistent with the league’s new emphasis, the
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program recommended by the Congress was geared entirely toward legislative solutions
for the problems of working women.123  The WTUL would also join as a charter member
the Women’s Joint Congressional Committee (WJCC) in 1920, meant to flex the new-
found political muscle of women that accompanied the granting of suffrage.
The granting of suffrage marked a tremendous victory for the women’s
movement, but left many of the organizations within it wondering what, if any, policies
on behalf of women they should now pursue.  One such organization was the NWP, the
most militant of the suffrage groups, which struggled with establishing a new identity and
mission for itself following the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.  The group’s
executive board met regularly in 1920 to hash out its new priorities, and convened a
convention of members in early 1921 to settle on a new strategic direction.  The new
mission that emerged was the pursuit of equality, which in NWP leader Alice Paul’s view
meant the removal of all legal disabilities of women.124  This new mission created a
conflict with the WTUL, NCL and other organizations in the women’s movement that
had secured protective labor legislation for women on the grounds of women’s difference
that had been entrenched in the Constitution at their own request.  This conflict was only
magnified when the NWP decided to pursue their new mission through an amendment to
the Constitution – the ERA.125  Almost everyone agreed, except the NWP of course, that
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the gendered exception to Lochner could not survive a sex-based equality requirement in
the Constitution.
The NWP floated several versions of the ERA to other members of the women’s
movement, in an effort to reduce the threat to protective labor legislation for women and
calm tensions within the movement.126  But the WTUL, and others, was in no mood to
deal.  WTUL legislative secretary, Ethel Smith, rejected the olive branch offered to her
by her counterpart at the NWP.  Smith wrote to Maude Younger, to inform her that, “I
have found no one yet … who believes it is possible to draft a blanket Federal
constitutional amendment which would not jeopardize our social legislation.”127  The
WTUL, like the NCL and others, including Mary Anderson at the head of the Woman’s
Bureau, were too deeply invested in the legislative results they had won since 1908 on a
maternalist foundation to jeopardize them for abstractions of sex equality.  Both sides dug
in their heels on the equality issue and a fierce battle ensued in the press, in the courts,
and in legislative hearings.
The WTUL pulled out all the stops in its fight against the ERA, which included
recruiting and publicizing union disapproval of the ERA, and asserting its own exclusive
right to speak for wage-earning women in one voice against the measure.  The WTUL
took it upon itself to voice the working-class preference for protective labor legislation
for women.  But this voice was not so singular as the WTUL portrayed.  A small but
vocal group of skilled and semi-skilled women workers had doggedly challenged
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protective labor legislation for women for years, and their pitched battle with the WTUL
highlighted the distance that had opened up between the WTUL and women workers as
the WTUL had increasingly identified itself with the women’s movement.
Skilled women workers in the printing trade levied early challenges against
protective labor laws for women.  After New York’s prohibition of night work by women
in 1914, many women workers in publishing, such as bookbinders, lost their jobs.  These
women put the WTUL on the defensive for its support of the night-work provision, and
the WTUL responded that individual hardship to a small subset of women workers was
counterbalanced by the tremendous value of the law to most working women.  As one
member of the New York league reported telling these workers, “in the case of all good
things, the few suffer for the good of the many.”128  This was the same response that the
WTUL gave to New York waitresses who had been banned by the state legislature from
night work (after 10pm) and had protested vociferously to the WTUL.  “The mere fact
that in some instances individual hardship is experienced under the statutes is no way
controlling as to its constitutionality,” the league explained in support of the state court
decision to uphold the law in 1918.129  Dissatisfied with the suggestion that sacrifice was
a part of progress, the women printers formed the WLEO in 1915 to battle all protective
legislation for women.  The smaller ERL would be founded in 1917.
The ranks of these two organizations would swell after the war with women
workers, largely from the transit industry, that had been displaced by new regulations that
prohibited them from working in their traditionally male industry.  Incidentally, the
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WTUL with its newfound legislative and bureaucratic influence in the labor department
was instrumental in securing many of these war-time and reconstruction laws and
regulations.130
Members of the WLEO and the ERL attended every legislative session in New
York in the years following the war to combat protective legislation, later frequently
sitting side by side with members of the NWP who also attended to protest such
legislation, and they fanned out to battle protective laws in Rhode Island, New Jersey and
other states as well.131  They argued that protective laws ensured that women would
remain segregated in low-paying occupations.  As one leader explained, “[i]t will drain
women out of all the highly paid and highly organized trades, because the law will
prevent them from doing the same work as men do.”132  Frustrated with the WTUL, the
WLEO accused it of being out of touch with the needs of working women and too much
a creature of the middle-class women’s movement.  “So-called ‘welfare’ legislation is not
asked for or wanted by real working women,” it argued.  “These welfare bills are drafted
by self-styled social uplifters who assert that working women do not know enough to
protect themselves, aided by a few women who once worked but are now living off the
labor movement.”133
The WTUL reacted bitterly to the challenge from these women in the WLEO and
the ERL.  Their public attacks in the press and lobbying of legislators against protective
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legislation undermined the WTUL’s contention that it spoke for all working women.  The
WTUL used its influence where possible to silence the WLEO, such as encouraging
former member Mary Anderson, head of the Women’s Bureau, to exclude the group from
government deliberations on women and industry because they were not a national
organization and did not represent the true views of working women.  The WLEO
responded in outrage:
BUT WE ARE WAGE-EARNING WOMEN, ALL OF US; we have been
fighting this type of legislation for years and proving that it is a handicap instead
of a protection; we are citizens about to be exploited by the recommendations of
organizations whose members know nothing of economic conditions, the law of
supply and demand etc.134
The WTUL also reassured legislators that the groups were a fringe element and that the
WTUL was the legitimate voice of women workers.  A member told one New York
legislator that the WLEO consisted of a few hundred women, whereas:
The WTUL whom they spend a good deal of time reviling, is an organization
which has been in the field since 1903.  It has an affiliated membership of 60,000
trade union women … which [at a conference in January 1918] went on record as
favoring our entire legislative program.  It would seem to me that the answer in
that is enough. … the very best opinions and minds  of the entire civilized world
are against them, and organized labor itself.135
The WTUL also accused (without evidence) the WLEO and the ERL of being secretly
financed by manufacturing groups looking to topple protective legislation, in order to
deny their legitimacy in representing the views of women workers.136  The WTUL even
attempted to have some of the most vocal women printers in the groups thrown out of
their own union.137
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The WTUL was right that the members of the WLEO and the ERL were atypical
women workers.  They were skilled women working in occupations that required them to
compete directly with men for work.  Protective labor legislation put them at a distinct
disadvantage.  These women could be better served economically by joining craft unions
and engaging in collective bargaining, which most did.  They had the means to gain
admittance to and enjoy the benefits of the labor Constitution.  But legislation interfered.
Most women workers, however, were unskilled and sex-segregated by occupation.  They
needed to worry more about exploitation by men than competition with men.  They were
harder to unionize than skilled women, and therefore legislative solutions to their
problems made better sense from a resource-conscious perspective.  This struggle with
the WLEO and ERL made for quite an irony, however, as the WTUL’s now preferred
legislative methods of serving women workers artificially blocked the functions and
benefits of trade unionism for this small percentage of women that could successfully
unionize and partake in collective bargaining.138  The WTUL was now far afield from the
labor solutions to women’s problems they had once championed.
Despite this estrangement with skilled women workers, the larger mass of
unskilled women workers generally supported protective labor legislation for women.139
But their attitudes toward legislative solutions echoed the same frustrations that had been
aired within the WTUL years earlier.  Collective bargaining was preferable to legislative
intervention, but state protection was useful for those women who could not yet be
unionized. Fannia Cohn, one of the most influential labor leaders in the garment trades,
and a one-time trainee in the WTUL’s school for women organizers, gave voice to this
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reluctant endorsement of middle-class reform:  “I did not think the problem of working
women could be solved in any other way than the problem of working men, and that is
through trade union organization, but considering that very few women are as yet
organized into trade unions, it would be folly to agitate against protective legislation.”140
The WTUL spoke for the great bulk of women workers when they challenged the ERA as
a threat to protective labor legislation, but mounting such a defense drew even more of
the league’s resources away from the solution most women workers truly craved – a
chance to bargain on their own behalf.
The ERA never stood much of a chance of success in the 1920’s.  The resources
arrayed against the NWP were far greater than what it could muster for a pitched political
fight on behalf of the ERA.  The majority of women’s groups were against the ERA.  So
was organized labor, with the AFL now helpfully coming to the WTUL’s aid in
defending protective legislation that kept women workers out of competition with male
workers.  And little political will to fight for another women’s issue was to be found on
Capitol Hill.  But the weak political prospects of the ERA did not stop the Supreme Court
from dealing a severe blow to protective labor legislation for women in 1923 in its spirit.
The maternalist exception to the free contract rule of Lochner was based on
protecting the health of women so that they could serve as mothers, but such a
justification was more tenuous in the case of the minimum wage, which did not directly
implicate the conditions under which women worked.  The minimum wage for women
had survived the Supreme Court’s 4-4 non-decision in Stettler v. O’Hara in 1917, but
judicial attitudes had shifted, as had the civic status of women, by 1923.141  The Supreme
Court struck down Washington, DC’s minimum wage law in Adkins.  The Court was
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skeptical of the police power justification for the minimum wage.  What’s more, wages
were “the heart of the contract” for employment, therefore government had far less
latitude in restricting the free contract right on this issue, free contract being “the general
rule and restraint the exception.”142  But the Justices went beyond merely pointing out
that women possessed some measure of free contract liberty that could not be trespassed
on police power grounds.  They also suggested that women’s free contract rights were
becoming virtually as robust as the free contract rights of men, given social trends and the
recent elevation of women’s civic status.  Justice Sutherland explained that:
the ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physical, as suggested in the
Muller case … has continued "with diminishing intensity." In view of the great --
not to say revolutionary -- changes which have taken place since that utterance, in
the contractual, political and civil status of women, culminating in the Nineteenth
Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say that these differences have now come
almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point.143
The “Alice Paul theory of constitutional law” had been adopted and no ERA had been
necessary.144 Protective labor legislation for women had been dealt a serious blow.  The
minimum wage, which had boldly tested the parameters of regulatory labor reform, was
near death and there was foreboding about even maximum hours laws and other
occupational restrictions.145
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But Muller did survive intact, and proof of that came the following year when the
Supreme Court upheld the New York night-work ban for waitresses in the interest of
women’s health and the public welfare, in Radice v. New York, which the WTUL had
celebrated years earlier, when it survived the state court, despite the great outcry of the
women workers affected.146  In discussing the Adkins and Radice decisions, Judith Baer
points to the irony in the Court’s choice to protect the free contract rights of unskilled,
low-paid hotel workers, and to deny the free contract rights of independent waitresses
that could earn their largest tips at night.  She writes that freedom of contract had been
“sustained in a situation where it did not exist and curtailed in a situation where it did
exist.”147  The WTUL did little better than the courts in grappling with the contours and
impact of the gendered Constitution, and with the legislative solutions it enabled, which
did not always reflect workplace realities.  It is difficult to claim that trade unionism was
a more artful and productive approach than the regulatory approach to protecting and
empowering women workers given the manifold difficulties in unionizing women, which
turned the WTUL to the regulatory approach in the first place when Muller presented
itself.  But de-emphasizing trade unionism and the integration of women into the labor
movement as a strategic priority, did have some negative consequences for the WTUL
and women workers.  Some of these negative consequences, however, would not become
apparent until after the New Deal embrace of protective labor legislation.
CONCLUSION
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The Great Depression hit the WTUL’s finances hard, and it lacked the resources
to continue to play a significant role in pursuit of protective labor legislation, much less
to sustain public relations and organizing efforts on behalf of women’s trade unionism.
The league periodical was suspended after 1929 and no convention was held between
1929 and 1936.  What little resources the league did have were directed toward the fight
against the ERA that had continued to boil throughout the 1920’s and into the 1930’s.
The WTUL did receive a boost in influence from the support of Eleanor Roosevelt, a
devoted member, but the organization’s influence had clearly waned from its earlier
years.  The league would finally disband in 1950.148  Despite its fading star, vindication
for the WTUL’s investment in protective labor legislation for women arrived in 1937
with the constitutional revolution of the New Deal that would be augured by West Coast
Hotel.
In 1936, Washington’s high court upheld its minimum wage law and Elsie
Parrish, a hotel chambermaid, sued for back wages.  Her case arrived as the U.S.
Supreme Court was ready to embrace a new constitutional direction.  The justices
overruled the Adkins decision, declaring the minimum wage for women workers
constitutional.   They embraced the gendered arguments of Muller and the importance of
women’s health to the public interest in doing so, observing a link between wages and
women’s well-being.  But they went beyond gender to question the validity of free
contract liberty itself.  “What is this freedom?” the Court asked. It answered itself with a
mortal blow to Lochner:
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and
prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that
deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable
liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation. But the
liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection
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of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of
the people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the
restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its
subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.149
A signal had been sent that freedom of contract would no longer stand in the way
of the state police power, and that labor reform was now open to men as well as women.
This was confirmed a few short years later in United States v. Darby, when the Court
upheld a minimum wage for men.150  Women had not only helped themselves, but also
served as the “entering wedge” for the constitutionality of universal labor reform, as the
NCL, WTUL and other progressive reform groups had long hoped.  State labor regulation
was now constitutionally secure, and the gendered Constitution was no longer strictly
necessary to regulate for the benefit of women workers since sex-neutral labor regulation
was now possible. Thus Darby, taking up the invitation of West Coast Hotel to bring men
under protection, appeared to constitutionally re-integrate gender and labor with Lochner
now fully in the past.  But this re-integration of gender and labor was only apparent and
not actual, both as a constitutional matter and as a political matter.
Constitutionally, Lochner may have been dismissed, but Muller remained and had
been reaffirmed in West Coast Hotel.  Women remained of special constitutional interest
to the public interest, to all the good and the ill that might lead.  This differential
constitutional place allowed for the continuation of sex-specific labor regulations rooted
in the police power, some of which were designed to prevent female job competition.
This was the case with Goesaert v. Cleary, which upheld a Michigan law that prevented a
woman from experiencing the social and moral dangers of working as a barmaid (unless
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she was an “alewife, sprightly and ribald” and secure in her husband’s protection) in
order to keep jobs open to returning World War II veterans.151
Politically, the will did not exist at the state level in the post-New Deal years to
engage in extensive labor regulation of men.  However, extensive regulatory regimes
already existed to govern female labor courtesy of the NCL, WTUL and others.  Many of
the women reformers invested in existing protective laws for women, such as night work
bans, hoped that these laws would be extended to men as well under the new universal
reach of the police power, making the workplace healthier and more humane for all, but
states showed little inclination to do so.  Women remained subject to these laws,
however, and therefore remained at a competitive disadvantage in industries where they
competed with men.152
Compounding the problem of the limited extension of state labor regulations to
male workers, was the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), passed in 1938.  The federal
government took responsibility, under commerce clause authority, to mandate a
minimum wage and set limits on the maximum hours to be worked by men and women
alike.153  Although an incredible victory for labor reform, the FLSA not only enervated
state level initiative for male labor regulation, perpetuating a sex-based regulatory gap
below, but also created a constitutionally submerged gender (and race) stratification at
the federal level by exempting from its scope, for both political and structural reasons, the
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industries where female labor was well-represented or dominated, such as in retail, in
agriculture and in personal and domestic service.154 It would take decades for the FLSA
to cover even half the workers in the United States, and this limitation in coverage hit
women harder than men.155
The gendered Constitution of Muller, and its promise of reform results for women
workers, had rerouted the WTUL’s mission from promoting trade unionism to securing
state regulation, but now the gendered Constitution, and the protective regime it
supported, had left a constitutional and political residue of gender difference and
stratification of the workforce beyond its original utility in the pre-New Deal years.  This
then was one of the enduring legacies of the constitutional journey of women from
Lochner, to Muller, to West Coast Hotel.
But, as discussed in Chapter Three, West Coast Hotel, and the clearing of the
decks for government regulation of labor, represented only one of the tectonic
constitutional shifts of the New Deal.  The New Deal constitutional revolution also netted
the constitutional coronation of collective bargaining in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin.156
Unions now had sanction from the state to negotiate the best contracts possible.  And for
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the AFL this meant the power to exact compensation in excess of any floor the
government might offer in the FLSA.157  The labor solution was superior to the
legislative solution.  Just as women workers had always told the WTUL.
Yet women workers were still not significantly integrated into the labor
movement.  Much work was still to be done to unionize women workers, and furthermore
to unionize them effectively so that they held sufficient power within unions to protect
their own interests at the bargaining table.  But the WTUL had given up this fight to
organize women, and its place within the labor movement, to pursue more readily
obtainable legislative reform.  This continued alienation of women from organized labor,
and from membership in the progressive labor Constitution of Jones & Laughlin, then,
was in part also a legacy of the constitutional journey of women from Lochner, to Muller,
to West Coast Hotel.
Of course, the WTUL did not reorient itself to the exploitation of the gendered
Constitution simply because of the promise of Muller.  It also changed its strategic
approach to activism on behalf of women workers because it had substantial difficulty
organizing women effectively due to the intransigence of the AFL.  The WTUL could not
convince the AFL to join them in a useful partnership to organize women and admit them
to the labor Constitution.  The league instead unsuccessfully spent their limited resources
battling the AFL’s dual bias against unionizing women, which consisted of sexism and
the organization’s craft bias, which militated against unionization of most women
workers who were unskilled, as well as the AFL’s suspicion of the cross-class, cross-
movement WTUL itself, until a more resource-friendly option presented itself after 1908.
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But even if the WTUL had redoubled rather than effectively abandoned its efforts
to organize women, it is highly doubtful they could have made the headway necessary in
the unionization of women to avert the negative political and constitutional fallout of the
remnants of the gendered Constitution.  For that matter, the WTUL had little control over
the creation of the gendered Constitution itself, and it was not the most significant player
in the proliferation of sex-based labor laws across the states.  That honor belonged to the
NCL.158  Nevertheless, in examining and better understanding the political dynamics of
cooperation, conflict and competition between the parties that sought constitutional
change during this era, we can better appreciate and understand the underlying ironies,
strategic tradeoffs, and unintended consequences of this often overlooked gender legacy
of West Coast Hotel and the New Deal constitutional revolution.
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Chapter Six:  Conclusion
This project mapped, through the study of the strategic interrelationships of
organizations within the labor movement, the civil rights movement and the women’s
movement, an important and often overlooked branch of the political genealogy of the
constitutional contestation and development of the Lochner Era.  By isolating and
examining the resource competition that took place between these peer social movements
active at this time, I exposed a series of constitutional undercurrents, tradeoffs, ironies
and oversights that have been obscured by the juricentric focus of modern constitutional
scholarship and the preoccupation with the judicial activism of the Lochner Court.
I began this project with a series of theoretical observations on constitutional
resource competition, which counseled an expansion of the scope of constitutional
inquiry to include a horizontal dimension of study.  Through attention to this horizontal
dimension, I captured the impact of the actions and choices of constitutional competitors,
as opposed to constitutional arbiters, on the claims made by social movements seeking
constitutional change during this era.
Winning constitutional rights and powers requires substantial resources. Where a
resource is valuable and difficult to obtain, competition can be expected. Therefore, any
actor that seeks constitutional change in its favor must be both strategic and opportunistic
in engaging, cultivating and maintaining the Constitution as a positive resource for the
advancement of its interests and adapt its behavior to the competitive environment.  This
competition for constitutional resources can come from many sources.  It can come from
the current constitutional power holders in society, who are eager to maintain their
advantage.  It can come from those who seek opposing and incompatible constitutional
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change.  And it can also come from those who travel the same constitutional byways in
pursuit of their own constitutional advancement that may or may not be compatible with
another actor’s own constitutional goals, values and strategies.
It is on this last class of constitutional competitors that I focused my study, and I
found that the peer social movements studied did indeed share competitive constitutional
relationships that manifested themselves in both cooperation and competition, and which
led to strategic adjustments of the constitutional claims groups within these movements
forwarded.  Thus the constitutional claims that organizations within the labor movement,
the civil rights movement, and the women’s movement advanced during this period,
when Lochnerian jurisprudence dominated, were the product of a rich terrain of strategic
political contestation, which included their competitive engagement with each other.  The
scope and depth of this terrain I uncovered is not always readily apparent to scholars that
utilize court decisions as a point of departure for studying constitutional development,
rather than beginning with the ambitions of those seeking to force constitutional change
and tracing their claims to find where they succeed, where they fail, and where they are
negotiated and adjusted, or where they are abandoned altogether.  Guided by this
resource competition approach, my study provides fresh insights into the roots of the
New Deal constitutional revolution.
Entering the twentieth century, workers faced difficult labor conditions due to the
effects of rapid industrialization.  Any attempts to change these conditions were governed
by strict constitutional limits, being enforced by the courts, on the state as an agent of
reform of the workplace. However workers did not confront these conditions as a unified
group.  Within the labor movement, the AFL, the movement’s dominant organization,
principally represented the interests of white, male workers.  Although their
constitutional claims were universal in nature, they limited the reach of any constitutional
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change they might win by effectively blocking membership to women workers and
African-American workers.  This created a need within the women’s movement and the
civil rights movement to address the needs and interests of workers within those groups.
This need would be addressed by the WTUL and the NCL, and the NAACP and the NUL
respectively.  Here I found that the differences of race and gender and class played just as
critical a role in the initial construction of constitutional claims as they did in the
arbitration of those claims by those who possessed the interpretive authority of the state.
This peer social movement competition over the constitutional fate of workers carried out
across race, class and gender lines sets the backdrop of my study.
In confronting the constitutional conditions of this period and judicial hostility to
state labor reform, I found that the AFL responded by creating an alternative
constitutional vision of the workplace.  The AFL lacked the political and institutional
resources necessary to counteract or circumvent this constitutional barrier to state labor
reform, thus they accepted and incorporated the Lochnerian understanding of the
workplace as a private sphere, where employer and employee held individual rights to
bargain for labor that the state could not violate, into their own constitutional vision that
was consistent with precedent.  On to this existing constitutional foundation, the AFL
grafted a collectivist vision of free contract liberty that was supported by the Thirteenth
Amendment.
Given the existing power imbalance within the workforce between white male
workers and female workers and African-American workers, the AFL was able to rebuff
coalition attempts from organizations within other movements on their behalf.  These
workers lacked the resources in numbers, skill, employer desirability, and wider social
and political power to provide a sufficient competitive inducement to the AFL to
negotiate their constitutional vision and admit these workers to their ranks.  Thus I found
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that peer resource competition was not highly relevant to the crafting of the collective
free contract vision of the AFL, at least not as to competition from these peer movements.
However, as the AFL vision floundered for acceptance in the face of continued
judicial hostility, now along antitrust lines rather than as to the character of the
workplace, it faced competition from an elite social movement built on progressive
ideology.  These progressives sought to expand the powers of the state (to regulate in the
interest of social betterment and socioeconomic efficiency) by converting the workplace
into a public sphere.  The social and political resources these progressive politicians,
bureaucrats and professionals had at their disposal to challenge the recalcitrant courts and
remake the Constitution to fit their ambitions far outweighed the social and political
resources of the working-class AFL.  Outmatched and outmaneuvered in Congress, the
AFL surrendered its constitutional vision, that remained tethered in key ways to
Lochner’s principles, and aligned itself with the progressives’ corporatist vision of the
state and federal sanction of collective bargaining, which would win out following the
surrender of the Supreme Court to the New Deal.
By focusing on the AFL’s constitutional vision from its formulation (in response
to the vertical channeling of Supreme Court precedent) through its abandonment due to
horizontal resource competition with progressives, I uncovered both a lost undercurrent
of constitutional development and a common oversight of modern constitutional
scholarship that is preoccupied with the rise and fall of Lochner.   By mapping
constitutional development from the perspective of constitutional claimants rather than
from the starting point of constitutional outcomes, I was able to flesh out the contours of
a rich constitutional vision constructed by the AFL that engaged the boundaries of the
Thirteenth Amendment in ways unfamiliar to modern constitutional jurisprudence, and
which also envisioned a middle way, through collective freedom of contract, between the
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individualism of the old constitutional order and the needs of modern, industrial society
to regulate as to groups.  If one relies only on the seminal cases of constitutional law to
mark and to retrace the course of constitutional development, this vision is lost, as it
never was judicially vetted because it was surrendered to the better prospects of the
progressive vision that eventually found its way into the courts and triumphed in Jones &
Laughlin.  Furthermore, preoccupation with Lochner as the key case of constitutional
obstruction of the New Deal order and of helpful state intervention on behalf of workers
is somewhat misplaced once it is understood that organized labor (at least on behalf of
white males) had incorporated Lochner into its own preferred solution to workplace
exploitation and moved on in its attention to other judicial barriers (to collective
bargaining) to improving working conditions.
Regarding the constitutional interests of black workers during the Progressive and
Inter-War eras, the study of resource competition between social movements allows me
to provide much needed nuance to the common constitutional depiction of African-
Americans as victims and detractors, like their poor and working-class brethren, of
Lochnerian jurisprudence.  It also allows me to highlight a modest but cruel constitutional
irony of the estrangement between white and black workers as African-American
activists took aim in Congress at the AFL’s constitutional vision built on expanding the
boundaries of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Black workers, as they increasingly joined the industrial class in the twentieth
century, were not welcomed into organized labor.  This created a tension in constitutional
strategy for the NAACP and NUL, which were quickly gaining influence over the voice
and strategic direction of the civil rights movement.  Perpetuation of Lochnerian free
contract principles limited the power of white collective bargaining and provided black
workers continued opportunities to work as strikebreakers and underbidders of white
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labor.  Free labor principles were also well-ingrained in the psyche of African-American
workers due to the legacy of abolitionism.  But the NAACP and the NUL were not
satisfied to hew to a constitutional vision that afforded meager short-term benefits and
was subject to consistent and aggressive challenge from not only white labor, but also
non-judicial government institutions.
Foreseeing the need to assure future constitutional resources, they pursued a
coalition strategy with the AFL, despite its racist resistance, in an attempt to re-integrate
the racial and class interests of the black worker.  But this courtship was marked by
pragmatism.  This pragmatism particularly reflected the resource-conscious decision
made within the civil rights movement to assign principle advocacy of the interests of
black workers to the NUL, which was predisposed to favor more conservative and
pragmatic solutions to constitutional rhetoric or claims-making.  Here the resource
competition approach aids in uncovering the intra-movement politics of constitutional
competition that can further enrich constitutional understanding by isolating strategic
tradeoffs that are often silent in case law.
By studying this resource competition between the AFL and the NUL/NAACP
coalition, the divided constitutional loyalties of the civil rights movement to two
constitutional visions, the one that they husbanded for short-term gains and the one they
pursued for long-term benefits, is revealed.  This nuance of the careful parsing of two
constitutional orders, collective free contract with limitations on judicial power and
individual free contract with emphasis on judicial hegemony, by the civil rights
movement, with full cognizance of the strategic tradeoffs inherent in each vision, is
obscured for scholars that do not move beyond blanket assumptions about the effects of
constitutional doctrine on group interests to explore these groups’ own strategic
calculations and modulated and negotiated responses to constitutional authority.
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Incidental to this exploration of the resource competition between the labor
movement and the civil rights movement is the discovery of a lost constitutional irony
involving the Thirteenth Amendment, as NAACP activists sought to squelch, for
admittedly instrumental and not ideological reasons, the radical expansion pursued by the
AFL of the amendment that had granted emancipation.  This interesting episode of
constitutional conflict is hidden from the view of constitutional scholars who remain
wedded to a juricentric examination of constitutional development, as the AFL
abandoned the Thirteenth Amendment narrative in its concurrent resource competition
with progressives before it reached the channels of judicial review.
In applying the resource competition approach to the study of the constitutional
advocacy on behalf of women workers during the Lochner Era, I uncovered the most
complex and interesting interplay of the politics of both internal and external social
movement competition.  Women workers had greater constitutional flexibility due to
prevailing gender ideology than either black or white male workers, and the study of
movement exploitation of this constitutional flexibility reveals a significant constitutional
tradeoff that would resonate for women long past the New Deal constitutional revolution.
Like black workers, women workers were not welcomed into the ranks of
organized labor by the AFL.  This continued rejection made it a calculated risk for
women workers to support constitutional sanction of collective bargaining power that
would push women further to the margins of the workforce if they were not integrated
into unions.  However, the constitutional status quo of Lochnerian free contract
principles, which permitted unorganized women workers to survive as underbidders of
male labor, was not the only other constitutional option for women workers.
Established gender ideology enabled the judicial granting of an exception to
Lochner’s barrier to state labor reform on behalf of women.  Thus the women’s
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movement, through the aggressive constitutional advocacy of the NCL, constitutionally
fused women with the public interest in a way that specially enabled the regulatory
powers of the state.  Female labor became part of the public domain, while male labor
remained private and unreachable by the state.  To the degree that this exception to
Lochner blunted the competitiveness of women workers with men and remained strictly
cabined in its application to women, the AFL accepted this alternative constitutional
vision of labor as only a limited danger to the resources for its own constitutional
ambitions to win sanction for collective free contract liberty.
But the NCL was not the only movement voice speaking out in favor of women
workers.  The WTUL preferred the constitutional vision of trade unionism promoted by
the AFL and the integration of women into the labor movement as a means to assisting
them.  But continued efforts to court the AFL failed, causing them to redirect their own
resources into the gendered Constitution once it received constitutional sanction.  This
was a resource-conscious decision that reduced the constitutional options of women
workers, as no organization continued to actively pursue integration of women workers
into the labor movement.
When middle-class women in the NWP challenged the gendered Constitution for
the disabilities to women it created in the wake of its assistance to women workers, the
costs of the resource-conscious constitutional tradeoff made by the WTUL in abandoning
the labor Constitution for the gendered Constitution came to light, as those women
workers, whom the WTUL claimed to specially represent, and who had already
integrated into the labor movement joined the ERA challenge to the gendered
Constitution.  The gendered Constitution proved incompatible with the labor Constitution
for women workers, who could not apparently enjoy the benefits of both.
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This early working-class challenge of the abandonment of the labor Constitution
for women workers prefigured the longer-term costs of the gendered Constitution
strategy that developed when women’s labor interests and men’s labor interests failed to
fully re-integrate in the Constitution after the New Deal constitutional revolution mooted
the need for an exception to Lochner in order to win salutary state regulation of the
workplace.  While the gendered Constitution itself is readily apparent to constitutional
scholars that focus on judicial constructions of the Constitution to mark and to explain
constitutional development, the role of the WTUL, which operated in the interstices
between the women’s movement and the labor movement, as both a particularly
instructive emblem and harbinger of the strategic constitutional tradeoffs inherent in this
maternalist constitutional gambit is not so readily appreciated.
By orienting my study to begin from the perspective of constitutional claimants
themselves rather than from the perspective of constitutional outcomes, and by using
theoretical insights on resource competition to guide the direction of my inquiry, I have
uncovered several interesting and previously obscured or underappreciated aspects of the
constitutional development of these pre-New Deal years that are not captured in the
standard disciplinary narratives of the Lochner Era.
Reflecting more broadly on the constitutional development of this period, that was
in part a product of the political byplay of resource competition that I have highlighted,
the role of labor as a key engine of the constitutional reconstruction that occurred during
the New Deal is apparent.  For Karen Orren, the labor movement, with its commitment to
voluntarism, was not a victim of an omni-present American liberal tradition and a
Hartzian spoiler of socialism, but rather was both the catalyst and the constructor of
modern American liberalism itself, with liberalism being understood as interest-group
centered pluralism in the vein of Ted Lowi.  I agree with Orren that Jones & Laughlin,
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rather than Lochner, is the key gateway to the modern constitutional order with its public
legitimation and mediation of private collective bargaining, but her account overlooks the
varying influences on and compromises inherent in the brand of voluntarism ultimately
grafted onto the Constitution with the Wagner Act and the brand of interest-group
liberalism it supports, which I have highlighted in tracking the resource-conscious
interactions between labor and other social movements as well as ambitious progressive
reformers with a statist agenda.  Labor may be the key locus of constitutional
development during this era, but the labor movement is hardly independent in its role as
constitutional constructor.
Labor is the key focal point of New Deal constitutional change, not only because
this new recognition of the group as a constitutional actor rather than the individual
enabled a liberal economic pluralism, but also because this recognition enabled and
channeled later constitutional attention to the needs and demands of African-Americans
and women, who were largely excluded from the initial benefits of the constitutional
reconstruction of the New Deal due to their alienation from the labor movement and in
turn collective bargaining.  This attention came in the form of legislatively constructed
anti-discrimination principles applicable to employment practices.1  The rich legacy of
political and constitutional contestation between these movements that was ongoing
during the Progressive Era suggests that these subsequent civil rights developments
cannot be simply categorized and understood as separate, supplemental iterations of the
new pluralist constitutional order, which was birthed from labor strife, designed to
expand its reach and make it more inclusive.
                                                 
1 The triumph of a legislative constitution over the feudal, judicial constitution is also important to Orren’s
labor account.  The inter-movement politics and constitutional negotiations I highlight also frequently
played out against a legislative backdrop.
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These Progressive Era efforts by women and African-Americans to engage with
the labor movement and modulate or challenge voluntarism to fit their interests illustrates
the important ways that these movements viewed work as a key avenue to securing not
only subsistence, but also to securing their other constitutional aspirations of civic
inclusion and protection against public and private discrimination.  Labor questions were
significantly integrated in the larger strategic calculus of these movements and their
division of labor between organizations.  Movement actors devoted significant attention
to the project of influencing (admittedly often with limited success) the constitutional
parameters of an economic pluralism long before Jones & Laughlin. The civil rights
potential of collective bargaining was not a new revelation or fresh strategy for these
groups, or the clever and independent invention of bureaucrats seeking ways to exploit
the potential of the new state, but instead was already deeply rooted in their constitutional
narratives and strategies.  The roots then of the modern constitutional order, both in the
manner of economic management and in the provision of civil rights, in the Progressive
Era are deeper and more extensively intertwined than even previously realized.
The value of this resource competition approach to the study of the constitutional
insurgency of social movements is not limited, to this study or to these conclusions.  It is
possible to study all time periods of constitutional development and all social movement
actors under the guidance of this approach.  Furthermore, the resource competition
insight, which counsels investigation of the horizontal channeling of constitutional
claims, even by parties whose constitutional interests and preferences do not obviously
conflict, across all possible venues for constitutional competition, also has broader
applicability beyond social movements.  All constitutional claimants are, after all, in
direct competition with other non-authoritative constitutional actors to capture the
resources of the Constitution.  With this study I sought not only to bring greater richness
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to constitutional scholarship that explores the roots of the New Deal constitutional
revolution, but also to broaden the horizons of constitutional inquiry with an approach
that can assist in providing nuance to and filling in other gaps in our understanding of
constitutional development that have opened due to the prevailing (though presently
moderating) juricentric focus of constitutional research.
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Appendix A: Abbreviations Used
AABA American Anti-Boycott Association
AALL American Association of Labor Legislation
ACLU American Civil Liberties Union
AERA American Equal Rights Association
AFL American Federation of Labor
BSCP Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters
CIICNNY Committee for Improving the Industrial Condition of Negroes New York
CORE Congress of Racial Equality
CUCAN Committee on Urban Conditions Among Negroes
EEOC Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
ERL Equal Rights League
FLSA Fair Labor Standards Act
GFWC General Federation of Women’s Clubs
KOL Knights of Labor
NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NAWSA National American Woman Suffrage Association
NCL National Consumers’ League
NIRA National Industrial Recovery Act
NLPCW National League for the Protection of Colored Women
NLRA National Labor Relations Act
NLRB National Labor Relations Board
NLUCAN National League on Urban Conditions
NOW National Organization for Women
NUL National Urban League
NWP National Women’s Party
NWSA National Woman Suffrage Association
PCSW President’s Commission on the Status of Women
RM Resource Mobilization
SCLC Southern Christian Leadership Conference
SM Social Movement
SMI Social Movement Industry
SMO Social Movement Organization
SNCC Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee
UGW United Garment Workers
UTW United Textile Workers
WJCC Women’s Joint Congressional Committee
WLEO Women’s League for Equal Opportunity
WTUL Women’s Trade Union League
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Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884)
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters, 274 U.S. 37 (1927)
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873)
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
Bunting v. Oregon 243 U.S. 426 (1917)
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Company, 184 U.S. 540 (1902)
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Morehead v. New York ex rel Tipaldo 298 U.S. 587 (1936)
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 416 (1908)
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231
Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924)
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